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ABSTRACT 
 
Name : Mohamed Saad Morsy Saleh 
Thesis Title : Analysis of Information Security Risks and Protection 
Management Requirements for Enterprise Networks. 
Keywords : Information Security, Risk Management, Analytical Models, 
Protection Measures, ISO/IEC 27002 Standard, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, Six-Sigma, Compliance  
With widespread of harmful attacks against enterprises’ electronic services, 
information security readiness of these enterprises is becoming of increasing 
importance for establishing the required safe environment for such services. 
Various approaches are proposed to manage enterprise information security 
risks and to assess its information security readiness. These approaches are, 
however, not adequate to manage information security risks, as all required 
information security components of its structural and procedural dimensions 
have not considered. In addition, current assessment approaches lack 
numerical indicators in assessing enterprise information security readiness. 
Furthermore, there is no standard approach for analysing cost versus benefit 
in selecting recommended protection measures. 
This thesis aims at contributing to the knowledge by developing 
comprehensive Enterprise Information Security Risk Management (EISRM) 
framework that integrates typical approaches for information security risk 
management, and incorporates main components of key risk management 
methodologies. In addition, for supporting phases of the proposed EISRM 
framework, analytical models for enterprise information security readiness 
assessment and cost-benefit analysis are developed. 
The practical evaluation, using the proposed enterprise information security 
readiness assessment model has been performed depending on a developed 
investigation form that used to investigate nine enterprises inside Saudi 
Arabia. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the model in assessing 
and comparing enterprises information security readiness at all levels of the 
model, using numerical indicators and graphical representations. The EISRM 
framework and the analytical models presented in this research can be used 
by enterprises as single point of reference for assessing and cost effectively 
improving their information security readiness. 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This research study investigates the current applied approaches within 
enterprises for information security risk management so as to integrate these 
approaches in a comprehensive reference framework that contributes to the 
protection of information resources. The main objective is to provide analytical 
models for information security readiness assessment and cost-benefit 
analysis within an enterprise wide reference information security risk 
management framework, aimed at assessing numerically the state of 
information security inside enterprises with different levels of detail and cost 
effectively helping in the selection of the recommended security protection 
measures. The results obtained from such an assessment can be used for 
economically directing enterprises’ resources to proactively respond to the 
information security challenges and therefore minimise the risks to the 
protection of information resources. 
1.2 Background  
The use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is widely 
recognised as an important mean for national and international development. 
This has been emphasised by various important international sources 
including: the United Nations (UN) summit meeting of September 2000, which 
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issued the widely known UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (UN 
2000); the Lisbon European summit held in March 2000 (European Summit 
2000); the European community drive toward the knowledge society 
(European Community 2001); the Okinawa G8 summit of July 2000 (G8 
Summit 2000); and the Sea Island G8 summit of June 2004 (G8 Summit 
2004). The strength of the previous emphasis on the use of ICT is not 
surprising. This use enables people and enterprises to perform their tasks 
faster, cheaper and with better quality. It also supports transformation to the 
knowledge society, creating new opportunities, supporting innovation and 
leading to sustainable development.  
Consequently, current enterprises base their operations on the Information 
Technology (IT) infrastructure and most business processes are completely 
dependent on information systems. As most enterprises become increasingly 
dependent on information and its related technology, they become highly 
susceptible to risks of IT systems’ security flaws. Therefore, IT systems’ 
security has become such an integral part in successfully conducting business, 
and it also plays a crucial role in giving an enterprise the competitive edge over 
another (Gerber and Solms 2001). 
Solms (2006) explains that enterprise information systems security historically 
passed through three successive waves during the last two decades, which 
are technical, management and institutional. The technical wave was 
characterised by information security being a technical issue, best left to the 
technical experts. It includes using computer security systems, such as 
authentication devices, encryption programmes and access control services. 
The management wave begins when enterprises’ top management started to 
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involve in implementing and managing information security systems and 
security policies. It was driven by the realisation that information security has a 
strong management dimension, and aspects like procedures, policies and 
management are considered very important. The institutional wave includes 
considering information security as enterprise culture, covering 
standardisation, certification, measurement and concern of human factors in 
information security culture where information security activities become a 
daily concern of all employees of the enterprise. According to Solms (2006), 
the current fourth wave of enterprise information systems security is defined as 
the process of explicit inclusion of information security as a pivotal part of 
corporate governance. It is characterised by integration of the information 
security management processes and effective implementation of information 
security risk management programmes.  
Recognising the importance of information security risk management, various 
organisations concerned with standards and business have published or 
republished different risk management methods and updated these methods 
regularly (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 1998; CRAMM 2001; NIST SP800-30 2002; 
AS/NZS4360 2004; OCTAVE 2005). In the past, these methods were used 
successfully by enterprises using IT and working in different fields for 
identifying, analysing and minimising risks for their IT activities. Nowadays, the 
results of these methods, in addition to time consuming and high cost, show 
unrealistic expectations (Warren and Hutchinson 2003; Karabacak and 
Sogukpinar 2005; Braber et al. 2007; Ekelhart et al. 2008). 
Recent studies of computer crime and security management, despite the 
increasing number of information technology and information security risk 
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management methodologies, still continually report that there is a poor 
implementation of security measures and a low level of awareness in general 
about security issues (CSI 2007; DTI 2008). The results of the 2008 
Information Security Breaches Survey (ISBS) running by the Department of 
Business Enterprises & Regulatory Reform (BERR) of the United Kingdom 
(UK) indicated that only 11% of the surveyed enterprises have implemented 
BS 7799/ISO/IEC 27001. The same survey reported that 79% of the surveyed 
enterprises are not aware of the contents of BS 7799/ISO/IEC 27001. In 
addition, the survey showed that 52% of the surveyed enterprises do not carry 
out any formal security risk assessment programme (ISBS 2006, pp.8-9). 
It is widely known that the structure and type of enterprise information 
technology systems have changed over time. In contrary, the risk management 
methodologies used to identify the most appropriate security protection 
measures still depend on the same traditional theory of the past. This theory is 
focused mainly on the technological assets and the most effective technical 
security solution to protect these assets. Knowing that the emphasis has 
changed from protecting computer assets to protecting information assets and 
to secure information, a different and more modern approach is needed that 
considers human, organisational, environmental aspects in addition to the 
technical aspects in dealing with the information security management issues 
(Vraalsen et al. 2005; Braber et al. 2007; Mayer et al. 2008; Kraemer et al. 
2009).  
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
After thorough literature review, it is found that, two main approaches are 
prevailing in dealing with enterprise information security risk management, 
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namely the risk-analysis approach and the best-practice approach (ISO/IEC 
13335-1 2004; Boehmer 2008). In spite of the importance of these two 
approaches in managing enterprise information security risks; these 
approaches are however seldom considering the numerical assessment of the 
current situation enterprise information security readiness (Johansson and 
Johnson 2005). It is well known that one can’t manage what he can’t measure. 
It is necessary to be able to numerically assess the current state enterprise 
information security to be able to prioritise the required changes and monitor 
the achieved security improvement (Hoo 2000). Therefore, the development of 
an effective information security assessment models is considered as one of 
the main challenges facing enterprises for having better view of their 
information security situation, and for identifying and evaluating ineffective and 
non-compliant controls with the information security management standards.  
Most of the risk-analysis based methodologies start the risk management 
process by trying to discover the important assets and their associated risks 
then suggesting mitigation plans without introducing a convincing measure or 
numeric value to the top management regarding the weakness in information 
security controls that needs improvement. Similarly, the best-practice 
methodologies audit only the existence of the security controls according to a 
given standard without investigating the effective use of these controls by the 
users of the system or even having an overall indicator of the enterprise 
information security level that needs improvement (ISO/IEC 13335-1 2004). 
The main goal of this PhD thesis is to develop a comprehensive framework for 
enterprise information security risk management, which combines the typical 
approaches for information security risk management from one hand, and 
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accommodates the essential components of the key risk management 
methodologies from the other hand. The proposed framework is expected to 
assess numerically and improve cost effectively the protection level of 
enterprises’ information security considering not only technological factors, but 
also organisational, human and environmental factors as well. The 
assessment is performed using a developed analytical multi-level assessment 
model that depends on the security controls of the ISO/IEC 27002, code of 
practice for information security management standard. This research also 
seeks to raise the level of awareness inside Saudi enterprises about the 
importance of the effective management of the information security protection 
measures. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The main research concern is to find answers to the following five main 
questions aiming at filling the gaps in the information security risk management 
literature. 
 Research question 1: What should a comprehensive enterprise 
information security risk management framework comprise of in order to 
integrate current available enterprise information security risk 
management approaches? 
 Research question 2: How to assess enterprise information security 
readiness using an efficient numerical valid and reliable modelling 
technique? 
 Research question 3: What is the possibility of using suitable 
economic metrics in the selection of the recommended information 
security protection measures? 
  
 
- 8 - 
 
 
 Research question 4: What is the current situation information security 
readiness inside Saudi enterprises? 
 Research question 5: What steps Saudi enterprises must take to 
improve their current information security risk management practices? 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
This study aims to provide a comprehensive Enterprise Information Security 
Risk Management (EISRM) framework. The proposed EISRM framework is 
designed to incorporate the essential components of the key risk management 
methods on one hand, and depends on the TOPE (Technology, Organisation, 
People and Environment) scope for its structural dimension and on the six-
sigma DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and Control) process for its 
procedural dimension on the other hand. The research also presents 
information security readiness indicators based on a developed analytical 
model that can assess numerically enterprise information security readiness. 
These indicators represent protection levels against possible risks, and provide 
an information security performance measure for future improvements. In 
addition, a practical cost-benefit analytical model is developed for applying the 
recommended protection measures cost effectively. Furthermore, for practical 
application of the proposed information security assessment model, the 
research suggests a gradual approach for the implementation of the ISO 
information security standards. Finally, for evaluating the EISRM framework 
and investigating the effective use of its associated models, practical case 
studies are presented and the data was analysed using a developed computer 
tool. In summary, the work presented in this thesis has six main objectives as 
follows: 
  
 
- 9 - 
 
 
 The first objective is related to the development of a comprehensive 
enterprise information security risk management framework. 
 The second objective focuses on the identification of the ISO/IEC 
27002 based enterprise information security assessment measures. 
 The third objective is concerned with the development of an analytical 
model that provides integrated multi-level information security readiness 
indicators considering the risk controls of the ISO/IEC 27002 code of 
practice for information security management standard. 
 The fourth objective is devoted for the development of a practical 
model that provides cost-benefit trade-off between the estimated cost 
from applying the recommended information security protection 
measures and the expected benefits as a result from the protection of 
the information resources. 
 The fifth objective is associated with using the information security 
assessment model for investigating information security readiness of 
nine Saudi enterprises working in different fields and presenting the 
assessment results numerically and graphically using a developed 
computer tool. 
 The sixth objective is concentrated on raising the level of awareness 
about the importance of managing information security risks within 
Saudi enterprises and providing recommendations for improving the 
current situation information security management practices inside 
these enterprises. 
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The ultimate objective of this research study is to present to the theory of 
information security management by unique analytical models via a 
comprehensive enterprise information security risk management framework. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study is important in general for both practitioners and researchers in the 
field of information security risk management. There is still little work regarding 
agreed comprehensive reference framework for enterprise information security 
risk management (Robert and Rolf 2003; ISO/IEC 27005 2008). In addition, 
the information security assessment approaches lack the numerical indicators 
in assessing enterprises information security readiness (Werlinger et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, there is no agreed practical economical model for analysing the 
cost of applying the recommended protection measures against the expected 
benefits that could convince the top management about the importance of 
applying these security measures (Mercuri 2003; Gordon and Loeb 2006; 
Anderson and Choobineh 2008). 
The developed EISRM framework in this research study is distinguished from 
previous related work in the subject by four main features. It has a 
comprehensive view in that it incorporates the main components of the key risk 
management methodologies; it integrates the current approaches for 
information security risk management in a reference framework; it depends on 
the international information security management standards; it uses the TOPE 
scope for its structural dimension and depends on the six-sigma DMAIC 
cyclical process for its procedural dimension. The use of the TOPE scope 
enables the EISRM framework to accommodate wide range of issues 
associated with risk management in a well structured and comprehensive 
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manner. While the use of the DMAIC process enables the EISRM framework 
to incorporate the essential components of the key enterprise information 
security risk management methods.  
The developed analytical model, for enterprise information security readiness 
assessment, provides a set of integrated indicators for the TOPE domains at 
various levels of the ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice for information security 
management standard. The levels of the model start in measuring the effective 
use of each of the 283 assigned basic ISO security measures leading to 133 
ISO security controls, and move up measuring the achievement of 39 ISO 
security objectives, measuring the implementation of 11 ISO/IEC 27002 main 
clauses, assessing the security state of each of the 4 TOPE domains and 
finally reaching up to an indicator that assesses enterprise information security 
readiness. The overall high-level enterprise information security readiness 
indicator aggregates the lower-level indicators, with the value of each indicator 
not only based on its performance in protection against certain risks, but also 
on the weight of importance with its related issues. 
The developed practical cost-benefit model is based on economical metrics 
and presents an approach that depends on the ISO/IEC 27002 recommended 
security protection measures. This model seeks to weight the investment in 
information security protection measures against the expected benefit from 
implementing these measures and tries to explore the optimal solution. 
To support the developed enterprise information security assessment model, a 
prototype computer tool is developed and used in applications concerned with 
nine Saudi enterprises to examine its strengths and weaknesses and to check 
its effectiveness. Finally, this study is important in specific for Saudi enterprises 
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in that its results are compiled in a number of important recommendations for 
improving the current applied information security risk management practices. 
1.7 Research Process  
The choice of research strategy depends mainly on the type of questions and 
to what extent one has control over the event (Yin 1996). It is also clear that 
the choice of the right methodology to achieve the research objectives is 
crucial for the success of any research study. March and Smith (1995) explains 
the unique characteristics of the technology research paradigm and its 
methodologies. They explained that in the context of computer and information 
science there are two main research strategies, the behavioural-science and 
the design-science. The behavioural-science originates from research methods 
within natural science where it is used to develop and refine principles and 
laws. The aim of the behavioural-science research in the natural and social 
science is to achieve more knowledge about some existing part of the world. 
From the other hand, the design-science drives from engineering and the 
artificial since. The aim of the design-science research is to solve a problem by 
creating new or improved artefacts (constructs, models, methods or 
instantiations) in the IT systems (Simon 1997; Hevner et al. 2004).  
This thesis used the design-science research methodology to achieve its 
stated objectives. This method encompasses three steps: (1) problem 
analysis, (2) innovation and (3) evaluation (Glass 1995; Stolen 2006; Peffers et 
al. 2008). The design-science research methodology is used for thorough 
understanding of the main requirements for developing comprehensive 
enterprise information security risk management framework and its associated 
analytical models. In this respect, the research process has involved six basic 
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stages: 1) identification of research problem/objectives; 2) research 
design/methodology; 3) development of comprehensive EISRM framework; 4) 
development of analytical models for information security readiness 
assessment and for cost-benefit analysis of the recommended protection 
measures ; 5) practical evaluation of research assessment model & data 
analysis; and 6) discussion and conclusion. Figure 1-1 shows a schematic 
representation of the research stages and the phases considered at each of 
these stages toward the achievement of the target objectives of this research 
study. 
1.7.1 Problem Analysis 
The problem analysis step of the research methodology includes two stages, 
stage 1: identification of research problems and objectives; and stage 2: 
research design and methodology. The first stage involved literature review for 
the identification of research problems and objectives. The extensive literature 
survey in Chapter 2 allowed the concepts and issues in information security 
Stage 1 
Problem Analysis Evaluation Innovation 
Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 
Identification 
of research 
problems 
Research 
design & 
methodology 
Development 
of research 
framework 
Development 
of research 
models 
Practical 
implementation 
& evaluation 
Conclusion & 
future work 
Phase1: Critical review of 
Information security risk-
analysis approach 
Phase2: Critical review of 
Information security best-
practice approach 
Phase3: Research 
methodology and process 
Phase5: Extraction of 
information security 
assessment measures 
Phase6: Development of 
an analytical model for 
information security 
readiness assessment 
Phase7: Development of a 
practical model for 
information security cost-
benefit analysis Phase4: Development of 
enterprise information 
security risk management 
(EISRM) framework 
Phase8: Case studies – 
assessment of information 
security readiness of nine 
Saudi enterprises including: 
Banks, Governmental 
agencies and Business 
companies. 
Phase9: Conclusion, general 
recommendations for improving 
enterprises information security 
risk management practices and 
future work.  
Figure ‎1-1 Stages of the research 
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risk management to formalise. Section 2.2.1 presents a critical review of the 
relevant literature related to enterprise information security risk-analysis 
approach. It discusses standard, professional and research methods for 
enterprise information security risk management in order to explore basic 
elements, essential components and main steps of these methods to be 
included in the proposed framework. The best-practice approach for 
information security risk management and the key information security 
management methods are discussed in detail in Section 2.2.2. Section 2.3 
serves to discuss the main requirements for developing a comprehensive 
enterprise information security risk management framework. 
The second stage of the research methodology serves to investigate the 
available research methods and to discuss the research design. The 
technological research methodology is adopted in this research in developing 
new analytical tools for enterprise information security risk management. 
1.7.2 Innovation 
The innovation step of the research methodology includes two stages, stage 3: 
development of EISRM framework; and stage 4: development of analytical 
models for enterprise information security readiness assessment and for cost-
benefit analysis. In the third stage, the research developed an EISRM 
framework and identified its four main dimensions. The EISRM framework was 
developed in this stage of the research based on the literature review of 
Chapter 2 and on the extensive review of various risk management standards 
to formulate the framework and its main dimensions, basic elements, essential 
components and main steps. Chapter 3 provides the proposed framework and 
its structural and procedural dimensions. 
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The fourth stage adds to the theory and extends the existing techniques for 
enterprise information security readiness assessment. An analytical model for 
enterprise information security readiness assessment was developed based 
on the literature review of Chapter 2 and on the identified enterprise 
information security assessment measures extracted in Chapter 4. In addition 
an incremental approach for gradual implementation of the protection controls 
of the ISO international information security management standards is 
presented in Chapter 4. A standardised investigation form was developed 
based on the proposed model to collect the required assessment data from 
different enterprises. The formulation of the model appeared in Chapter 5. A 
practical model for cost-benefit analysis appeared in Chapter 6. This model is 
concerned with the analysis of cost of challenges facing information security in 
enterprises versus the benefits of applying the recommended security 
protection measures that can be used to reduce the effect of these challenges. 
This model seeks to help enterprises in selecting the optimum economical 
solution. 
1.7.3 Evaluation 
The evaluation step of the research methodology includes also two stages, 
stage 5: model evaluation; and stage 6: discussion and conclusion. In stage 
five, in order to evaluate the developed enterprise information security 
readiness assessment model, testing was conducted using a developed 
investigation form and case study technique. The developed investigation form 
was used to collect data from public and private Saudi enterprises. Because of 
the sensitivity of research subject and the collected data, it requires to use a 
small sample of nine Saudi enterprises instead of having a larger one as was 
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planned at the early stages of this study. The collected data was analysed 
using a developed computer tool and graphs were developed to represent the 
information security situation of the investigated enterprises with different 
levels of detail. In addition, for the comparison between the investigated 
enterprises specialised in the same field, the nine Saudi enterprises were 
categorised under three groups. The collected data from the investigated 
enterprises is analysed in Chapter 7. 
Finally, stage six is dedicated for discussing the key findings presented in 
Chapter 8. It also provides a comprehensive interpretation of findings. The 
conclusion and implications achievement of the research in terms of theoretical 
and practical contributions are reported and the direction for future research is 
presented as well. In addition, a number of recommendations for enhancing 
the information security practices inside Saudi enterprises are also presented. 
1.8 Thesis Contributions 
The work presented in this thesis introduces a comprehensive enterprise 
information security risk management framework to fulfil the gap, which exists 
in the literature regarding the need to combine the two main approaches for 
enterprise information security risk management and incorporate the basic 
elements, main components and essential steps of the key risk management 
methodologies in a comprehensive reference information security risk 
management framework. The proposed framework consists of four dimensions 
and introduces analytical models for enterprise information security readiness 
assessment and for cost-benefit analysis. The research suggested these 
models to provide more effective assessment tools that capture the 
perceptions of the users of the information security systems in the assessment 
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programmes, and also to introduce a practical model for analysing the cost 
versus the benefit of applying the recommended security protection measures. 
In this respect, the work provides the following main achievements: 
 It provides a comprehensive enterprise information security risk 
management framework that integrates the prevailing two approaches 
for information security risk management and incorporates the main 
components of the key risk management methodologies. 
 It provides information security readiness indicators, based on a 
mathematical model that integrates the risk control issues of the 
ISO/IEC 27002, according to the TOPE domains. The final 
assessment results presented as a single value for the decision 
maker to ease its understanding. 
 It provides a cost-benefit approach for basing the selection of the 
recommended protection measures on an economical analysis. The 
proposed approach is based on a mathematical model that provides 
the best trade-off between the cost of adopting the recommended 
protection measures and the expected benefits as a result from 
reducing the security challenges. 
 It presents practical case studies of nine Saudi enterprises using a 
developed computer tool in order to investigate the effectiveness of 
the proposed approach in evaluating enterprises information security 
readiness with different levels of details and in cost effectively 
evaluating the recommended best-practice protection measures. This 
will provide examples for future practical use of the proposed models 
developed in this research work. 
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1.9 Applicability and Usability  
The importance of quantifying enterprises’ IT systems security strength and 
risk continue to grow as private and public enterprises become totally 
dependent on these systems. Nowadays, the security of enterprises IT 
infrastructure has suffered because IT security protection measures are 
developed and implemented without any meaningful measures of their overall 
security strengths. This leaves the decision makers unable to assess the state 
of information security inside their enterprises. Even if the decision makers 
realised the urgent need for implementing more protection measures, the lack 
of efficient information security assessment models has hindered their ability to 
forecast the value to be gained by purchasing and implementing these 
protection measures. Without analytical models and tools for numerically 
assessing enterprises information security readiness, and economically 
assessing the gains from applying these measures, those tasked with making 
security decisions have been forced to depend mainly on expert’s opinion only 
as a base for their decisions.  
The work of this research would be useful to all enterprises concerned with 
improving their security readiness and providing e-services, compatible with 
international information security standards. This study will provide practical 
tools for the internal and the external assessors of enterprises information 
security readiness that has the following main features: 
 The developed enterprise information security assessment model, 
presented in Chapter 5 of the thesis will provide an early assurance 
measure for the effectiveness of the implemented information security 
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protection measures which considers as an essential input to the 
developed EISRM framework presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis;  
 the assessment results will determine numerically and graphically the 
overall enterprise information security effectiveness at five levels of 
detail; 
 the results will determine the validity and effectiveness of the security 
controls contained in the security plans that are based on the perception 
of the users of the systems; and 
 the results of the proposed cost-benefit analytical model, presented in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis, will facilitate the process of correcting 
weaknesses in the information security protection measures in an 
orderly and economical manner consistent with each enterprise mission 
and business goals. 
1.10 Thesis Organisation  
This thesis is structured in five main parts, with each part, in turn, consisting of 
a number of chapters. Figure 1-2, holds the outline of the thesis and the 
arrows indicate the relationship between the various chapters. 
The second part provides the required background of the thesis and introduces 
the literature review of the problems considered. This part has one chapter as 
follows: 
 Chapter 2 has four sections. The first section provides the needed 
background for the work presented by the thesis. The second section 
provides an overview of the existing risk-analysis based risk 
management methodologies followed by critical evaluation and 
comparison of these methods. The third section provides a critical 
  
 
- 20 - 
 
 
review of the best-practice approach for information security risk 
management. The fourth section of this chapter identifies the main 
requirements for developing a comprehensive enterprise information 
security risk management framework. 
The third part is the theoretical part which provides the achieved theoretical 
contributions of the thesis. This part has four chapters as follows: 
 Chapter 3 provides the developed comprehensive EISRM reference 
framework. The scope of the framework is based on the TOPE view 
and the management process of the framework is associated with the 
six-sigma DMAIC cyclic phases. The steps for running the proposed 
EISRM process are also discussed in detail. In addition, an approach 
for the application of the standard considering the information security 
policy in a way that emphasising continuous improvement is also 
presented. The structure and job description of the proposed team for 
the implementation of the work is also suggested. 
 Chapter 4 presents the extracted ISO/IEC 27002 information security 
assessment measures that will be used as a base for conducting the 
assessment of enterprises information security readiness. An 
incremental assessment approach of enterprise information security is 
also presented. This approach has three levels of assessment with 
increasing security measures that can be used by enterprises for the 
gradual implementation of ISO security controls. 
 Chapter 5 introduces a multi-level mathematical model for enterprise 
information security readiness assessment and describes its security 
readiness indicators at all levels.  
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 Chapter 6 introduces a mathematical model which provides analytical 
tools for cost-benefit analysis of information security challenges 
versus the expected benefit from applying the recommended 
protection measures. 
The fourth part is for the implementation studies. This part has one chapter as 
follows: 
 Chapter 7 introduces the results of the assessment model and 
provides an analysis of the data collected from nine Saudi business 
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enterprises working in different fields. A real world example for the 
application of the cost-benefit model in one of the investigated 
enterprises is presented to illustrate its practical use for reaching the 
required protection level cost effectively. 
Finally, conclusions and future work appear in part five with only one chapter. 
The final chapter, Chapter 8, concludes the findings of the research, and 
provides some suggestions for future research in the field of information 
security risk management and presents a number of recommendations for 
future improvements of the current situation information security risk 
management practices at Saudi enterprises. 
1.11 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the structure of the research. It introduced the 
background of the study, and presented the research problem and objectives. 
The research was then justified; the research methodology is introduced; the 
thesis contributions and its parts are outlined. The coming chapter will proceed 
with a detailed description of the general background of the research to 
achieve the ultimate research objectives. 
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Chapter 2  
ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SECURITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the current approaches for enterprise information 
security risk management that are available in literature. These approaches 
are investigated in detail to identify basic elements, essential components and 
main steps of each one of them. A compiled list of high-level requirements is 
identified from the investigated approaches that could be used as a base for 
the development of the target reference comprehensive enterprise information 
security risk management framework. Based on these requirements, a suitable 
framework for enterprise information security risk management will be 
developed in Chapter 3.  
2.1.1 Enterprise Information Security 
An enterprise is a complex system of cultural, process and technology 
components engineered together to accomplish organisational goals (Johnson 
and Whitman 1998). According to the European Commission (EC) definition, 
an enterprise is “any entity engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its 
legal form” (EC 2009, p.5). If one applies these definitions, an enterprise is a 
complex system of people and technology organised together and working in a 
specific environment to achieve the strategic goals of the business. In fact, 
information is now becoming the lifeblood of any enterprise, and it has become 
the most valuable asset to any enterprise. In this respect, information like 
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knowledge, facts or data are important business assets that have greater value 
to any enterprise and needs to be properly protected (Solms and Eloff 2002). 
Information security is defined as “preservation of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information” (ISO/IEC 27002 2005, p.1). The modern information 
security definition extends the previous definition to include authentication and 
non-repudiation, but they are not included in the ISO standard definitions till 
now, and throughout this thesis the standard ISO definitions will be used. 
Confidentiality of information is “the property that information is not made 
available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities or processes” 
(ISO/IEC 7498-2 1989, p.5). Integrity is “the property of safeguarding the 
accuracy and completeness of asset” (ISO/IEC 13335-1 2004, p.4). Availability 
is “the property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorised 
entity” (ISO/IEC 7498-2 1989, p.5). Information security requirements, on the 
other hand according to Gerber et al. (2001), are concerned with the amount 
and specifics of security required for effective protection of the information 
resources.  
From the above definitions one can conclude that the aim of enterprise 
information security is to achieve the protection of the enterprises‟ information 
and information systems from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, 
modification, disruption or destruction of information and information resources 
whether accidental or deliberate (Tipton and Krause 2008).  
2.1.2 Risks to Information Security  
The definition of risk varies based on different businesses and environments. 
Within information security context, risk is defined by ISO as “the combination 
of the probability of an event and its consequence” (ISO/IEC Guide 73 2002, 
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p.2). Carroll (1996) defines risk as “the probability that a threat agent will 
exploit a system vulnerability to create a loss to confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of an asset”. Threat is “a potential cause of an incident that may 
result in harm to a system or organisation” (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 2004, p.4). 
According to Whitman and Mattord (2004), threat is defined also as “any 
person or object that presents danger to an asset”. Vulnerability is defined as 
“a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one or 
more threats” (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 2004, p.4). Stephenson (2004) defines 
vulnerability as “a weakness, flaw, hole or anything that maybe exploited by a 
threat that then results in a damaging outcome”. 
Depending on the above definitions, one can conclude that risks to information 
security can result from processes of modification, destruction, fabrication, 
disclosure, interruption, denial of service and theft of hardware, software or 
data. In order to manage these risks effectively, each enterprise must run a 
regular and effective risk management exercise to understand the nature of 
these risks and the possible outcomes. Hong et al. (2002) consider the running 
of regular information security risk assessment programmes by enterprises is 
among five main components to ensure effective information security 
architecture. 
2.1.3 Importance of Risk Management 
The importance of managing information security risks continues to grow 
worldwide, as a result of the increasing breaches that affect the protection of 
information resources and consequently the business activities. The 
information security breaches survey of 2006 reported that the cost of security 
breaches to UK companies is of order of ten billion pounds per annum (ISBS 
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2006). This view is further supported by the Australian Computer Crime and 
Security Survey (ACCSS) of 2007 which reported that the total average annual 
losses for electronic attack, computer crime and computer access misuse or 
abuse reached $ 241,150 per enterprise (ACCSS 2007).  
The lack of properly implemented security measures to mitigate the rising 
information security risks has been reflected in recommendations by the 
governments and industry requirements for enterprises in running regular and 
effective risk management programmes. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, which is mandatory for all the enterprises working inside the United 
States of America (USA) irrespective of their size or business, requires the 
issuer of securities publicly traded on the USA financial markets to create a 
risk management model for their stakeholders (Raval 2004). Also, one of the 
main responsibilities of agencies under the FISMA (Federal Information 
Security Management Act) of the USA is to perform a regular risk assessment 
exercise (FISMA 2002). 
It is clear from the previous published surveys that enterprises are potentially 
losing profit as a result of the absence of effective information security risk 
management programmes that proactively share in the protection of the 
enterprises‟ information resources. Therefore, enterprises are required to 
acquire and run effective information security risk management programme to 
not only achieve better protection of their information resources and 
consequently reduce the financial losses, but also to comply with the 
governmental laws and mandatory regulations which was applied in their 
environments (CSI 2007; BERR 2008; Ponemon Institute 2009). 
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2.2 Existing Risk Management Approaches 
Today, there are various information technology and information security risk 
management methodologies; each of these methods has a different view and 
steps for identifying, analysing, evaluating, controlling and monitoring risks to 
information systems and information security. An extensive literature review 
reveals that there are two main approaches for enterprise information security 
risk management, namely the „risk-analysis‟ approach and the „best-practice‟ 
approach (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 1998, p.2). 
The risk-analysis approach for EISRM is concerned with the systematic in-
depth identification and valuation of assets, the assessment of threats to those 
assets, the assessment of vulnerabilities and the use of different risk analysis 
techniques to calculate the value of risk. The results from these activities are 
then used to assess the identified risks and to recommend justified protection 
measures (Bott and Eisenhawer 2002; ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 2004). The main 
characteristics of this approach are accurate results, appropriate identification 
of protection measures and detailed documentations that could be used in the 
management of security changes. Examples of methodologies under this 
approach include CRAMM, CORAS, EBIOS and OCTAVE (CRAMM 2001; 
CORAS 2003; EBIOS 2004; OCTAVE 2005).  
On the other hand, the best-practice approach for enterprise information 
security risk management was developed to solve the major practical problems 
which appeared with the application of risk-analysis based methodologies. The 
main idea behind this approach is to use the best practice documents to 
standardise the security controls and to achieve a fast basic level of security 
inside the concerned enterprises. This approach utilises the checklist 
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technique to achieve its objectives, and it depends mainly on the compliance 
and certification processes to examine the existence of the required protection 
controls according to a specific standard (Solms B. and Solms R. 2001; Lech 
and Frank 2002; Fung et al. 2003; Tong et al. 2003). The main characteristics 
of this approach are reduced cost, ease in use, no training required and quick 
results (Warren and Hutchinson 2003). Examples of methodologies under this 
approach include the BSI-Germany, ISO/IEC 27002 and SOGP standards (BSI 
2005; ISO 2005; ISF 2007). 
The ISO/IEC 13335-3 document suggests the combination of the previous two 
approaches for achieving an improved comprehensive approach for enterprise 
information security risk management. However, the ISO/IEC 13335-3 
document does not provide any guidance or explanation of the practical 
implementation of the suggested combined approach. Therefore, one of the 
main goals of this thesis is to show that combining these two approaches in an 
integrated comprehensive enterprise information security risk management 
framework shall benefit the information security risk management results. 
The following sections provide an overview of the existing two approaches for 
information security risk management. Selective methodologies from each 
approach are investigated for the identification of basic elements, essential 
components and main steps that could be used to identify the main 
dimensions of the target EISRM framework defined for the purpose of this 
research study. 
2.2.1 The Risk-Analysis Approach 
The enterprise information security risk-analysis approach has many different 
methods. These methods are structured here in three groups (according to the 
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source of the method); which are standard, professional and research 
methodologies. Selective key methods from each group will be discussed in 
terms of their objectives, structure, content, basic elements, essential 
components, steps and their ability to integrate technological, organisational, 
human and environmental components in studying enterprises‟ information 
security risks. The technological view in dealing with information security risk 
management is not sufficient for the development of comprehensive EISRM 
framework. Organisation, people and environment issues should also be 
addressed in the framework to ensure that it is comprehensive. These 
methods are selected because they are issued by well-known national and 
international standard organisations used internationally and often referenced 
in other methods. 
2.2.1.1 Standard Risk Management Methods 
National and International standard organisations suggested a number of risk 
management methods. Three of these methods are presented in the following: 
AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management Method 
The AS/NZS 4360 (2004) standard was prepared by the joint standards, 
Australia/New Zealand committee OB/7, as a second revision of the original 
Australia/New Zealand risk management standard, AS/NZS 4360 (1995). This 
standard is considered one of the first risk management standards to define a 
complete risk management method. The standard is very generic and 
independent of any industry or economic structure. The AS/NZS 4360 defines 
risk management process as the total process of identifying, controlling and 
eliminating or minimising uncertain events that may affect IT system resources, 
which are often best carried out by a multi-disciplinary team.  
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The AS/NZS 4360 standard includes five main steps and defines two parallel 
processes. Table 2-1 summarises the issues considered by each step and 
process. These issues are of general nature and can be associated with risk 
management problems in different fields, including IT. Davidson et al. (2004) 
checked the applicability of the standard for small and medium enterprises‟ 
information security risk management. The results showed that the AS/NZS 
4360 structured risk management methodology should be supported by a 
database and outsourced skills to achieve better results.  
Table ‎2-1 The generic risk management steps & process of AS/NZS 4360 
Steps Issues Considered 
1 
Establish the 
context: 
Define the 
basic 
parameters & 
set the scope 
for the rest of 
risk 
management 
process 
External environment: Business, social, regulatory, cultural, 
competition, financial, political / Stakeholders & key business 
drivers / Organisation‟s: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
threats. 
Internal environment: Stakeholders / Organisation's: strategy, 
goals, structure, resources (people, system, processes, 
capital), decision making. 
Risk management: The depth and breadth of the needed risk 
management activities. 
Risk criteria: Risk evaluation issues: environmental, legal, 
financial, social, humanitarian, operational, technical. 
Analysis: Define the structure of the analysis. 
2 Identify risks 
What can happen, when and where, why and how: events that 
could prevent, degrade or delay the achievement of objectives. 
3 Analyse risks 
Existing risk controls / Likelihood of occurrence of identified 
risks and their potential consequences / Levels of risks.  
4 Evaluate risks 
Levels of risk versus risk criteria considering risk treatment: 
balancing adverse outcomes with potential benefits of 
treatment, setting priorities and making decisions. 
5 Treat risks 
Specific cost-effective strategies and action plans for risk 
treatment: development and implementation (options, 
treatment, residual risk).  
The parallel process 
Process Issues Considered 
1 
Communicate 
and consult 
Plan / Consultative team / Stakeholders perceptions of risk / 
Understanding the basis of decision. 
2 
Monitor and 
review 
The effectiveness of all steps for continuous improvement. 
The AS/NZS 4360 standard is adopted later by ISO in 2008 to become the 
ISO/IEC 27005 standard. The ISO/IEC 27005 standard does not provide any 
specific methodology for information security risk management. The standard 
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leaves the decision to each enterprise to define its approach for risk 
management.  
NIST SP 800-30 IT Risk Management Method 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the USA issues 
a special publication NIST SP 800-30 (2002) “Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems”. The main objective of this publication was 
to help enterprises inside USA to assess their IT risks.  
Table ‎2-2 IT risk management steps & process of NIST SP 800-30 
Steps Input Issues Output Issues 
Risk assessment process 
1 
System 
characterisation 
System: mission, hardware, 
software, interfaces, data and 
information. 
System: boundary, 
functions / System and 
data: criticality, 
sensitivity. 
2 
Threat 
identification 
History of system attack / Data 
from intelligence agencies: NIPC 
(NIPC, 2007), OIG (OIG, 2007), 
FedCIRC (FedCIRC, 2007), mass 
media (SecurityFocus.com, 
SANS.org, etc). 
Threat statement. 
3 
Vulnerability 
identification 
Reports from prior risk 
assessments / Audit comments / 
Security requirements / Security 
test results. 
List of potential 
vulnerabilities. 
4 Control analysis 
Current controls / Planned 
controls. 
List of current and 
planned controls. 
5 
Likelihood 
determination 
Threat-source motivation / Threat 
capacity / Nature of vulnerability.  
Likelihood rating. 
6 Impact analysis 
Asset criticality / Data criticality / 
Data sensitivity. 
Impact rating: 
Confidentiality / Integrity 
/ Availability. 
7 
Risk 
determination 
Likelihood of threat exploitation / 
Magnitude of impact / Adequacy 
of current & planned controls. 
Risks and associated 
risk levels. 
8 Control recommendations 
9 Results documentation 
Risk mitigation process 
(1) Prioritise actions; (2) Evaluate recommended control options; (3) Conduct cost-
benefit analysis; (4) Select controls; (5) Assign responsibilities; (6) Develop 
safeguard implementation plan; (7) Implement selected controls. 
The NIST SP 800-30 document provides a foundation for the development of 
an effective risk management programme, containing both definitions and 
practical guidance necessary for assessing and mitigating identified risks 
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within IT systems. Table 2-2 summarises the issues associated with each of 
the NIST SP 800-30 main steps. For each step inputs, outputs and tasks are 
described under the form of guidelines, but without details concerning the 
implementation of the different tasks. The main characteristics of this method 
are specific for information systems, considered as a guide not a standard, 
have a tool for collecting the required data and self-directed by enterprise‟s 
stakeholders. 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 IT Risk Management Method 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) is the third part of a five series technical reports, 
which adopts a more holistic approach for enterprises‟ information security 
management. This technical report provides guidance on the management of 
IT security presenting a foundation to assist enterprises in developing and 
enhancing their internal security architecture, and to establish commonality 
between enterprises. The document also provides guidance on the selection 
and use of safeguards which addresses the vulnerabilities of a particular 
network and its associated security risks. The IT security risk management 
method of ISO/IEC 13335-3 has five basic steps. Table 2-3 presents the 
issues associated with each of these steps. 
The ISO/IEC 27005 standard, which appeared in 2008, revises the 
Management of Information and Communications Technology Security 
(MICTS) standards ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) plus ISO/IEC TR 13335-4 
(2000). The ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 still appeared in literature as a guide for 
information security management. The MEHARI (MEthode Harmonisée 
d‟Analyse du Risque Informatique) risk analysis method is compliant with 
ISO/IEC TR 13335 series of technical reports (Mehari 2007). 
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Table ‎2-3 IT risk management steps & process of ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 
Steps Issues Considered 
1  Risk analysis 
Boundaries: Technology & information / People: staff, 
subcontractors & others / Environment: building facilities / 
Activities: operations.  
Threats & vulnerabilities: Identifying both: accidental and 
deliberate risk sources / Assessing the likelihood of the 
occurrence of risk / Identifying weaknesses in: technology, 
people, physical environment, activities & procedures. 
Safeguards: Identifying existing and planned safeguards. 
Risks: Assessing the risks to which assets are exposed. 
2 
Safeguards 
selection 
Constrains / Security architecture / Risk acceptance & 
residual risk. 
3 Policy & plan 
Policy: Why selected safeguards are necessary. 
Plan: How safeguards can be implemented. 
4 
Plan 
implementation 
Practical implementation of safeguards according to plan / 
Awareness & training / Approval of plan. 
5 Follow-up 
Maintenance / Checking compliance / Monitoring / Incident 
handling / Change management. 
Investigation of Standard Risk Management Methods 
The above standard organisations‟ risk management methods show that 
AS/NZS 4360 standard has a generic nature, NIST SP 800-30 is specific for IT 
systems and ISO/IEC 13335-3 is devoted for information security. NIST SP 
800-30 considers only the surrounding technology, but ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 
considers technology, people and environment, while AS/NZS 4360 considers 
technology, organisation, people and environment in assessing the boundary 
and the context of the risk management programme. Each method adopts its 
own risk management process, and the assessment of the current information 
security state is not addressed explicitly by these methodologies. Table 2-4 
summarises the main issues considered by the standard organisations‟ risk 
management methods which could be adopted in developing the proposed 
EISRM framework presented in Chapter 3. 
The above reviewed standard risk management methodologies are considered 
as high-level documents. They just provide guidelines and recommendations 
for running the risk management programme. These standards answer the 
“what?” question (what should be done regarding information security risk 
  
- 35 - 
 
management?) and leave the “how?” question to be answered by the 
professional risk management methods that will be discussed in the next 
section. 
Table ‎2-4 Relation of standard risk management methods and the proposed 
EISRM framework 
Standard Method Main Issues to be Considered by the EISRM Framework 
AS/NZS 4360 
Fundamental concepts of risk management. 
Main steps of the risk management process. 
Cost-benefit strategies. 
Communicate and consult process. 
NIST SP 800-30 
Enrich the technology domain of the EISRM framework. 
Input/output technique for each step. 
Lists of assets, vulnerabilities and threats. 
Cost-benefit analysis. 
Impact analysis. 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 
The combined approach for risk management. 
Main terminologies of the risk management. 
Assessment of the current state information security. 
The lists of assets, vulnerabilities and threats. 
Follow-up (maintenance/checking compliance/monitoring/ 
incident handling) step. 
2.2.1.2 Professional Risk Management Methods 
Professional organisations also suggest a number of risk management 
methods from four which are presented in the following. 
CRAMM IT Risk Management Method 
CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method) is a qualitative risk 
analysis and management method developed by the UK government‟s central 
computer telecommunication agency (CRAMM 2001). The method had 
undergone major revisions and is finally being distributed by a private 
company. The main objective of this method was to assess risks of the UK 
governmental agencies. CRAMM method has three main steps, as shown in 
Figure 2-1, and each of these steps is concerned with answering a specific 
question. In the following, the steps are given together with the questions they 
are supposed to answer. 
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 Asset identification and valuation; this step answers the question of: 
Is there a need for security? 
 Threat and vulnerability assessment; and the question for this step is: 
What and where is the security needed? 
 Countermeasures selection and recommendation; and this should 
answer the question of: How can the security needs are met? 
One of the main features of CRAMM is the identification of the IT assets. The 
information is gathered through interviewing the owners of the assets, the 
users of the system, the technical support staff and the security manager. The 
method neither helps in the calculation of return on investment for the 
proposed controls nor helps in the monitoring of the effectiveness of these 
controls. CRAMM does not assist in risk management improvement inside the 
considered enterprises, so no training, meetings or workshops are utilised. No 
steps in CRAMM are concerned with implementation and follow-up. CRAMM 
targeted a managerial level risk assessment, thus detailed technical system 
specific vulnerabilities are not addressed (Insight Consulting 2003). 
 
Threats Assets Vulnerabilities 
Implementation 
Risks 
Audit 
Countermeasures 
Management 
Analysis 
Figure ‎2-1 CRAMM risk management process (CRAMM 2001) 
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OCTAVE IT Risk Management Method 
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) method was developed at the Computer Emergency Response 
Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) (CERT 2003). The method is 
considered as human centric qualitative risk analysis methodology. The main 
objective of this method is to examine enterprises‟ organisational and 
technological issues for developing a comprehensive picture for information 
security needs (Alberts and Dorofee 2003; Christopher and Audrey 2003). The 
method produced by OCTAVE has the following three main phases as shown 
in Figure 2-2. 
 Organisational view: Building asset-based threat profile; this phase is 
associated with four processes. 
 Technological view: Identifying infrastructure vulnerabilities; and this 
phase includes two processes. 
 Security strategy and plan development: Developing security 
strategy and plan; and this phase also has two processes. 
The method collects the required information at phase one through two 
workshops; the first with the senior management to define the scope of the 
7-Conduct risk analysis 
8-Develop protection 
strategy 
5-Identify key components 
6- Evaluate selected components 
1-Management knowledge 
2-Operational area management 
knowledge 
3-Staff knowledge 
4-Create threat profile 
Phase 1: 
Build Asset-Based 
Threat Profiles 
Phase 2: 
Identify Infrastructure 
Vulnerabilities 
Phase 3: 
Develop Security 
Strategy and Plans 
Preparation 
Figure ‎2-2 OCTAVE risk management process (Alberts 2003) 
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analysis, while the second with the staff that has more technical expertise. One 
of the main concepts of OCTAVE is self-direction. This concept means that 
people from various hierarchical levels of the enterprise are responsible to lead 
the information security risk evaluation programme. The outcome of the 
OCTAVE method is IT security strategy and plan. Therefore, it does not 
consider implementation and follow-up. The method does not consider the 
environmental factors under which the enterprise works (Lanz 2002; Passori 
2004; Vennaro 2005; Broodryk 2005).  
CORAS Risk Management Method 
The CORAS (Consultative Objective Risk Analysis System) project was 
developed in 2003 as a scientific project in the European Union (EU), and it 
had partners from four countries: UK, Greece, Germany and Norway. The 
CORAS aims at addressing security-critical systems in general, but places 
particular emphasis on IT security (Raptis et al. 2002; Fu et al. 2008). 
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Figure ‎2-3 CORAS risk management process (Fredriksen et al. 2002) 
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The main objective of CORAS is to improve the traditional risk assessment 
methodologies to get better results by gathering well-known risk analysis 
techniques into an integrated security risk analysis method. The CORAS 
method considers a broad view to security that includes not only the 
technological aspects, but also the human interactions with technology and all 
relevant issues of the surrounding organisation and environment. The CORAS 
risk management process, as shown in Figure 2-3, adopts the risk assessment 
process of the AS/NZS 4360 risk management standard. The CORAS 
methodology has four dimensions namely the documentation framework, the 
risk management process, the integrated management and system 
development process and the platform for the inclusion of tools. The method 
has a scientific origin and depends on its own terminology for risk 
management process, which is considered as one of its main weaknesses. In 
addition, the method adopts the risk management process of the AS/NZS 4360 
standard which is a generic risk management process and is not dedicated for 
information security (Vraalsen et al. 2005). 
EBIOS Risk Management Method 
The EBIOS (Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de 
Sécurité) method has been created in 1995 by the DCSSI (Direction Centrale 
de la Sécurité des Systémes d‟Information) (EBIOS 2004). The method is used 
to assess and treat risks related to information system security. The EBIOS 
method is widely used inside France for the analysis of French military and 
governmental information systems. However, it is also used in industry and 
other business enterprises. The method is composed of the following five 
steps as shown in Figure 2-4.  
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 Context study: The enterprise is studied by analysing its mission, 
business, own values, constraints, structure and the regulatory 
references applicable to the enterprise. The output of this step is the 
description of the essential elements of the concerned enterprise. 
 Expression of security needs: The purpose of this step is to allow the 
information system users to express their security needs for functions 
and information they handle. 
 Threat study: This step aims at determining the threats affecting the 
information system.  
 Identification of security objectives: In this step, the enterprise‟s 
security needs are compared with the identified threats. The risks are 
thus highlighted and can be treated by some security objectives. 
 Determination of security requirements: The security requirements 
are finally selected to achieve the defined security objectives.  
The method has analytical approach in dealing with risk, and it has an open-
source software tool that is used especially for collecting data for an EBIOS 
study and for producing summary documents (Fenz et al. 2009). 
Expression of 
security needs Threat study 
Identification  
of security 
objectives 
 
Determination 
of security 
requirements 
Context study 
Figure ‎2-4 EBIOS risk management process (EBIOS 2004) 
  
- 41 - 
 
Investigation of Professional Risk Management Methods 
The previous review shows that CRAMM and EBIOS have a technical nature. 
OCTAVE considers technical and organisational factors, while CORAS 
considers technical, organisational, human and environmental factors in 
dealing with the risk management programme. 
OCTAVE and EBIOS methods use the stakeholders in running the risk 
management programme, but CRAMM needs outsourced expertise. Table 2-5 
summarises the main issues of the above reviewed professional organisations‟ 
risk management methods that should be considered by the proposed EISRM 
framework presented in Chapter 3. 
Table ‎2-5 Relation of professional risk management methods and the proposed 
EISRM framework 
Professional Method Main Issues to be Considered by the EISRM Framework 
CRAMM 
Identification of IT assets. 
Sources of threats and vulnerabilities. 
OCTAVE 
Analysis team from the enterprise itself to lead the whole 
risk management activities. 
Development of security strategy and plan. 
CORAS 
Integration of risk management techniques. 
Platform for the inclusion of tools. 
EBIOS 
Identification of security needs by the users of the system. 
The analytical approach in dealing with risks. 
Identification of the security objectives. 
Identification of the security requirements. 
Table 2-6 summarises and compares the main issues considered by the above 
reviewed risk-analysis based methodologies. These methodologies, as shown 
in Table 2-6, have the following main limitations:  
 Most of these methods are country based and devoted for specific 
domain.  
 In general, these methodologies lack definite framework or common 
approach for running enterprise‟s wide risk management programme 
that is based on effective Information Security Management System 
(ISMS). 
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 Most of these methods are complex and depend on manual processes, 
and their results are informal most often in natural language.  
 The assessment of the current state information security is not 
addressed by all of these methods. 
 The results of these methods are not reusable to achieve continuous 
monitoring of the information security improvements. 
 No reference standard economic model for the analysis of the proposed 
mitigation plans. 
Table ‎2-6 Comparison of the risk-analysis based methods 
2.2.1.3 Researchers Risk Management Methods 
The management of information security risks has not only been the concern 
of standard or professional organisations, but they are also the concern of 
individual researchers and research projects. Key methods of this type are 
introduced in Table 2-7. The main steps that are considered by these methods 
also appeared in the same table. Most of the researchers‟ methods 
concentrated only on improving techniques for calculating the risk value. 
Issue 
Risk Analysis Method 
CRAMM OCTAVE CORAS EBIOS 
Origin UK USA Europe France 
Target sector Business Industry Industry Military 
Domain 
Information 
technology 
systems 
Security 
critical 
systems 
Security 
critical 
systems 
Information 
systems 
security 
Standard terminologies No No No No 
Users of the method 
Outside 
Expert 
Stakeholders 
Outside 
Expert 
Stakeholders 
Standard ISMS No No No No 
Type of results Reports Reports 
Reports & 
Graphs 
Reports 
Comprehensiveness T TO TOPE T 
Assess current state No No No No 
Economic analysis No No No No 
Type of analysis Qualitative Qualitative Qualitative Qualitative 
Software tool Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table ‎2-7 Key researchers risk management methods and techniques 
Method / Title Author/Year/Description/Steps/Technique 
1 RAMeX  
Kaily and Jarrah (1995) 
 Has two main phases: risk analysis and risk management. 
 The risk analysis has five steps producing identifications of: 
assets, threats, vulnerabilities, existing security 
countermeasures and business impact. 
 The risk management has two steps: assessment of security 
countermeasures; recommendation of countermeasures to 
select from. 
2 RiMaHCoF 
Smith and Eloff (2002) 
 Concerned with IT risk in health-care. 
 Considers four steps for risk management, including risk 
assessment.  
 Risk assessment stage is based on a cognitive fuzzy-logic 
technique. 
3 BPIRM 
Robert and Rolf (2003) 
 Combines the security focus with the business focus. 
 Has two elements: a process and a content model. 
 The process has six phases, and the content model has seven 
layers. 
 The content model is based on the "value chain" business view. 
4 
Ontology-
based 
Liu (2007) 
 Ontology is a collection of concepts, which represent higher 
level knowledge in the knowledge hierarchy in a given 
enterprise. 
 Enables knowledge sharing among security personnel, to 
support the management of risk for "Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) information security". 
 Uses the ontology principles of the "Unified Problem-solving 
Method Development Language (UPML). 
 Has three parts: "domain" associated with knowledge 
acquisition and modelling; "task" related to risk rating 
&management; and "resolution" concerned with minimising 
SCM information security risks using problem solving method 
based on ontology.  
2.2.1.4 Summary 
The above standard, professional and researchers‟ information systems and 
information security risk management methods are discussed in details. 
However, the major issues of all previously reviewed methods are of similar 
nature, these methods are structured in different ways. The previous review 
provides two main benefits: on one hand, it gives a broad view of the steps of 
how IT risk management can be performed, and on the other hand, it identifies 
the risk management issues that need to be taken into account as seen by 
different methods. 
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2.2.2 The Best-Practice Approach 
The best-practice approach for information security risk management depends 
mainly on the information security management best-practice standard 
documents in assessing enterprises‟ information security according to the 
requirements of these standards. Eloff and Solms, (2000a) mention that best-
practices are the combined experiences of several companies that have 
already had great influence in the information security environment. Recently, 
there are many different information security standards and recommended 
security best-practice documents that evolved to address the issues of 
enterprise‟s information security risk management from different perspectives. 
These standards are becoming increasingly important for assessing 
enterprises‟ information security readiness and for establishing a common safe 
environment for their business activities (Eloff and Solms 2000b; Allen 2001; 
Tsoumas and Tryfonas 2004).  
National and international organisations, such as International Standards 
Organisations (ISO), the German Bundesamt fur Sicherheit id der 
Informationstechnik (BSI Germany) and the Information Security Forum (ISF), 
have published information security management standards (ISO/IEC 2005; 
BSI-Germany 2004; ISF 2007). Two of the above mentioned best-practice 
standards will be presented in the following sections. 
2.2.2.1 The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security 
The ISF is an international independent organisation dedicated to 
benchmarking and best practices in information security. It was established in 
1989 as a European security forum, and then expanded its mission and 
membership in the 1990s. Nowadays, it includes hundreds of members, 
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including a large number of 300 leading organisations concerned with 
information security from all over the world (ISF 2008). 
The ISF published the first issue of the Standard Of Good Practice (SOGP) for 
information security in 1996. The SOGP standard is based on the extensive 
knowledge and expertise of ISF members, the views of other national and 
international standard organisations and the results of earlier ISF information 
security status surveys. The standard is free for the members and the most 
recent version of the SOGP standard was published in 2007. Participants can 
make a comprehensive assessment of how well their enterprises are 
conforming to the standard (ISF 2007).  
Table ‎2-8 The standard of good practice for information security aspects, areas 
and sections 
Aspect Description Area Section 
1 
Security 
management 
Covers topics relating to high-level direction 
for information security, arrangements for 
information security across the organisation 
and establishing a secure environment. 
7 36 
2 
Critical 
business 
applications 
Covers topics relating to requirements for 
securing business applications, identifying 
information risks and determining the level of 
protection required to keep information risks 
within acceptable limits. 
6 25 
3 
Computer 
installations 
Covers topics relating to the design and 
configuration of computer systems, 
management activities required to establish 
a secure computer installation and maintain 
service continuity. 
6 31 
4 Networks 
Covers topics relating to network design and 
implementation, management activities 
required to run and manage secure 
networks including: local and wide area 
networks and voice communication 
networks. 
5 25 
5 
Systems 
development 
Covers topics relating to the application of 
information security during all stages of 
systems development including: design, 
build, testing and implementation. 
6 23 
6 
End user 
environment 
Covers topics relating to local security 
management, protecting corporate and 
desktop applications, and securing portable 
computing devices. 
6 26 
Total areas and sections 36 166 
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The SOGP standard presents a comprehensive set of practical security 
specific controls. The standard comprises ten main parts including: high-level 
summary information, six detailed „aspects‟ and a comprehensive index. The 
six aspects of security include: security management, critical business 
applications, computer installations, networks, systems development and end 
user environment. The standard has a total number of 36 security areas and 
166 sections that address the six main aspects, as shown in Table 2-8. The 
standard is structured to cover the full spectrum of security related topics. 
However, such a structure means that there is some repetition of topics across 
these aspects. 
2.2.2.2 The ISO/IEC 27002 standard 
The ISO/IEC 27002 is a management standard providing a code of practice for 
information security management. The standard was originated from the British 
standard BS 7799 and was first issued in 2000. It was revised and reissued in 
2005. It is used by enterprises in managing their information systems security. 
The standard is adopted by various countries and used as a base for their 
regional information security standards. The ISO/IEC 27002 standard, as 
shown in Table 2-9, states 11 clauses, 39 security objectives and provides 133 
controls to achieve those objectives.  
In the past, various papers have advocated the use of international information 
security management standards. Solms (1999) emphasised the need for using 
such standards considering the problem of information security as a global 
problem not a domestic one. He considered the British standard, BS 7799, as 
a possible standard that would provide the basis for safe driving on the 
information super-highway.  
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Table ‎2-9 The ISO/IEC 27002 clauses, objectives and controls 
Clause Description Objective Control 
1 Security Policy 
Aims to provide management 
direction and support for information 
security. 
1 2 
2 
Organisation of 
information 
security 
Organisation of the process 
implemented to manage information 
security. 
2 11 
3 
Asset 
Management 
Concentrate on asset inventories, 
information classification and 
labeling. 
2 5 
4 
Human resources 
security 
Considers permanent, contractor 
and third party user responsibilities. 
3 9 
5 
Physical and 
environmental 
security 
Controls the allowance of only 
authorised access to facilities and 
secure areas. 
2 13 
6 
Communications 
and operations 
management 
Focus on the correct and secure 
operation of information facilities. 
10 32 
7 Access control 
Manage user access to information 
and include clear desk, network 
access and operating system 
access principles. 
7 25 
8 
Information 
systems 
acquisition 
development and 
maintenance 
Ensure the security of user-
developed and the information 
system products. 
6 16 
9 
Information 
security incident 
management 
Ensures that incidents are 
communicated in a timely manner 
and that corrective action is taken. 
2 5 
10 
Business 
continuity 
management 
Focuses on business continuity 
plans and testing. 
1 5 
11 Compliance 
Achieve it accordance with 
statutory, regulatory or contractual 
requirements or obligations, laws, 
audit and policy. 
3 10 
Total objectives and controls 39 133 
Solms B. and Solms R. (2001) recommended the use of the first version of ISO 
17799, which appeared a year before. In this respect, they presented an 
approach of incremental certification of information security. According to this 
approach, standard security requirements are divided into levels and are 
implemented gradually in steps, level by level, until all requirements of all 
levels are covered. Janczewski and Xinli (2002) reviewed the AS/NZS 4444 
standard, which is based on the British standard BS 7799, considering a 
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specific application concerned with health information systems‟ requirements. 
Eloff J. and Eloff M. (2003) stressed the need for using ISO 17799, in order to 
provide baseline security, which is the basic information security that needs to 
be acquired by enterprises working in different fields. In addition, a method, 
based on adequacy of security, for the evaluation of the use of ISO 17799 is 
presented in Fung et al (2003). The method considers four security protection 
classes ranging from inadequate to adequate classes of protection through 
minimal and reasonable classes. Bellone (2008) presents a practical approach 
for information security management system implementation. The approach is 
used to attain the necessary escape velocity to achieve the expected results. 
The escape velocity concept is defined as the momentum a project must have 
in order to escape resisting forces without reverting back and failing. The 
approach is simple and straightforward in applying ISO/IEC 27002 to the 
enterprises using a computer tool. The approach did not provide any criteria 
for the priority in applying this standard, and it also did not include an 
evaluation approach for the implemented security controls. The adopted Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) of COBIT (Control Objectives for Information 
and related Technology) by this approach do not appear to be effective in 
measuring the performance of ISO/IEC 27002, as its success in measuring the 
performance of COBIT sub-domains DS4 “Ensure business continuity” and 
DS5 “Ensure systems security”. 
The above reviewed research studies agreed on the need for using 
international information security management standards, BS 7799 in the 
beginning and then the first version of ISO/IEC 27002. They provided various 
ways for this use, including incremental use and evaluations of use based on 
adequacy of security. However, according to the author‟s knowledge, neither 
  
- 49 - 
 
of these research papers nor any known publication has, so far, developed a 
numerical assessment model based on a comprehensive standard information 
security risk management framework, for the use of ISO/IEC 27002 standard. 
The process of development of a comprehensive information security 
assessment model that is based on the international information security 
standards will be addressed later in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
2.2.2.3 Information Security Management Methods 
Researchers also suggest a number of information security management 
methods, two of these methods are presented in the following. 
The PROTECT Information Security Management Method 
Eloff J. and Eloff M. (2005) introduced a comprehensive approach towards 
information security, namely PROTECT, which is an acronym for Policies, 
Risks, Objectives, Technology, Execute, Compliance and Team. The seven 
components of the PROTECT method are aimed at implementing and 
managing an effective information security programme from technology to 
people perspective. They are summarised below: 
 Policy component includes information security policies, procedures 
and standards, as well as guidelines. 
 Risk methodologies such as CRAMM and OCTAVE, as well as 
automated tools to identify system vulnerabilities. 
 Objective component refers to implementation of controls by 
considering the risk environment of the enterprise and not 
implementing more or less controls than what is required. 
 Technology component includes hardware, software and systems‟ 
product components of the IT infrastructure. 
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 Execute component refers to a proper information security 
management system environment. 
 Compliance component covers both internal compliance, with the 
enterprise‟s policies, and external compliance, with information 
security expectations set by outside parties. 
 Team refers to the people component, i.e. all the employees of the 
enterprise, where each has a responsibility towards securing 
information. 
The Capability Maturity Model Security Management Method 
The Capability Maturity Model (CMM) methodology provides components used 
to protect information assets against unauthorised access, modification or 
destruction (MCCarthy and Campbell 2001). The method is based on a holistic 
view of information security and it encompasses seven main components, as 
follows: 
 Security leadership by means of an executive level security 
representative and an information security strategy. 
 A security programme with defined roles and responsibilities for 
information security tasks. 
 Security policies, standards and guidelines that are used to direct 
information security tasks. 
 Security management that constitutes day-to-day operations and 
monitors users and technology. 
 User management that focuses on awareness of policies and manages 
user profiles. 
 Information asset security that encompasses the technology aspects of 
information security. 
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 Technology protection for the environment and continuity, which 
focuses both on business continuity and disaster recovery. 
2.2.2.4 Summary 
The above reviewed standards and researchers best-practice information 
security management methods introduce a base for information security 
management. However, these methods do not provide any application rules or 
numerical measures that can lead to information security readiness 
assessment indicators (Karabacak and Sogukpinar 2006). Such indicators 
would be essential for identifying information security weaknesses in 
enterprises so that these enterprises can establish suitable security 
enhancement directions, in order to satisfy the requirements of the security 
management standards (Solms 2005; Bellone 2008). Eloff and Solms (2000b) 
show that the nature of the available information security best-practice 
standards is qualitative. They raised the issue of the importance of designing 
and implementing a measuring instrument that could be customised and 
utilised by enterprises in quantifying their information security status. Their 
paper concluded that there is an urgent need for developing a quantification 
model for measurement, specifically against the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. 
In light of the above reviewed standard, professionals and researchers risk 
management approaches, and according to the recommendations given by the 
ISO/IEC 27005 risk management standard, the author of the thesis proposed a 
set of main requirements for developing an effective enterprise information 
security risk management framework that will be discussed in the next section. 
2.3 Risk Management Main Requirements 
A thorough investigation of the main applied information security risk 
management approaches highlighted the need for a new comprehensive 
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information security risk management framework that enables enterprises to 
address all aspects of information security risk management in an effective and 
efficient manner. Therefore, an information security risk management 
framework should consider the following main requirements: 
 Incorporate the basic elements of the risk management methodologies. 
 Possess a comprehensive scope in that not only limit the analysis of the 
information security risk management on the technical issues, but also 
include organisation, people and environment issues as well. 
 Depend on a management process that integrates the main approaches 
for information security risk management and incorporates the essential 
components of the risk management methodologies. 
 Assess numerically the current situation enterprise information security 
using valid and reliable modelling technique. 
 Base the selection of the recommended ISO/IEC 27002 security 
protection measures on an economical analysis. 
In addition to the previous main requirements, a well defined information 
security policy, a trained supporting team from inside enterprises and a clear 
identification of risk management terms and concepts play a crucial role in 
successfully developing an effective information security risk management 
framework. Each of the previously stated main requirements will be discussed 
in more detail in the following sections. 
2.3.1 Risk Management Basic Elements 
There is a need for underlying standard that provides precise definitions for the 
basic elements, essential components, concepts and terminologies of the 
whole process of enterprises information security risk management. This 
standard will clarify the confusion resulted from inconsistent use of terms and 
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concepts in the field of information security (Hogganvik and Stolen 2005; 
Matulevicius et al. 2008). Based on the literature review presented in Section 
2.2, a list of basic elements was compiled from the AS/NZS 4360, NIST SP 
800-30, ISO/IEC TR 13335-3, OCTAVE, CORAS, EBIOS and CRAMM risk 
management methodologies. Table 2-10 holds the proposed list of information 
security risk management basic elements which, in the opinion of the author of 
the thesis, could aid in formulating the proposed EISRM framework. Table 2-10 
shows the alignment between the basic information security risk management 
elements with different concepts involved in the studied resources. 
2.3.2 Risk Management Scope 
Most IT risk management methodologies have focused mainly on technology 
solutions and have not yet fully adopted a comprehensive approach that 
addresses organisational, human and environmental factors in studying the 
information security issues. 
Beznosov and Beznosova (2007) discuss the imbalance of the security 
problem space. They noticed that over 94% of the public research in computer 
security has been concentrated only on the technological factors. Chang and 
Ho (2006) study the effect of the organisational factors on the implementation 
of the information security management system. The results show direct 
influence of the organisational factors on the effective implementation of the 
BS7799 standard. Kraemer et al. (2009) study the effect of human and 
organisational factors in computer and information security. They proved that 
human and organisational factors play a significant role in the development of 
the computer and information security vulnerabilities.  
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Table ‎2-10 Mapping the basic elements & concepts of key risk management methods to the identified basic elements of the proposed 
EISRM framework 
Concept 
Key Risk Management Methods 
AS/NZS 4360 NIST 800-30 OCTAVE CRAMM EBIOS CORAS 
Asset 
Asset 
Primary asset 
Supporting asset 
 
Asset 
Key component 
Asset 
Asset 
Essential element 
Entity 
Asset 
Security 
criterion 
Property criterion Security goal 
Criterion 
Classification 
criterion 
Property Security criterion Security property 
Threat 
Threat 
Threat source 
Origin of threat 
Threat 
Threat source 
Threat action 
Area of concern 
Actor 
 
Threat 
Event 
Threat agent 
Attack method 
 
Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability 
Impact 
Impact 
Consequence 
Impact 
Consequence 
Outcome impact Impact Impact 
Unwanted 
incident 
Risk Risk IT-Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk 
Control Control Control 
Protection 
practices 
Countermeasure 
Countermeasure Security solution  
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Werlinger et al. (2009) suggest an integrated framework to view the human, 
organisational and technological challenges of IT security management. Table 
2-11 shows the alignment between the TOPE scope and the different 
resources discussed in Section 2.2. This alignment shows the main aspects 
that should be considered in each of the TOPE domains by different 
information security management standards. In addition, it shows that the 
ISO/IEC 27002 information security management standard is comprehensive 
enough, compared to other standards and methods to be adopted as a base 
for assessing enterprises information security readiness. 
2.3.3 Risk Management Process 
The management system is the framework of processes and procedures used 
to ensure that an enterprise can fulfil all tasks required to achieve its 
objectives. The main purpose of the management system is to put the 
enterprise in a continuous improvement for the concerned domain. The above 
review shows that each of the reviewed risk management methods adopts its 
own management system in conducting the risk management process. ISO 
depends on the Plan, Do, Check and Act (PDCA) process for establishing, 
implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving the 
information security management system of any enterprise. The concept of 
PDCA model was originally developed in 1930 by Walter Shewhart. The PDCA 
concept was taken up and promoted very effectively from the 1950s by W. 
Edwards Deming, and is consequently known by many as “Deming Wheel”. 
The application of the PDCA for information security risk management is 
presented in Table 2-12 (ISO/IEC 27005 2008). The application of the PDCA 
model in the risk management process lacks the fair alignment of the risk 
management  activities.  It is apparent that the  scientific  origin  of  the  PDCA   
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Table ‎2-11 Mapping the contents of key information security management methods to the TOPE scope 
TOPE 
Key Security Management Methods  
ISO/IEC 27002 SOGP PROTECT Capability Maturity Model 
Technology 
- Communications and operations 
management 
- Access control 
- Information systems acquisition, 
development and maintenance 
- Computer installations 
- Networks 
- System developments  
- Technology controls 
- Implementation of 
controls 
 
- Technology protection 
Organisation 
- Security policy 
- Organisation of information security 
- Asset management 
- Information security incident 
management 
- Business continuity management 
- Critical business 
applications 
- Security management 
- Risk methodologies 
- Policy component 
- Information security 
 
- Security policies 
- Security programme 
- Information asset security 
- Security management 
People - Human resources security - End user environment - Team 
- Security leadership 
- User management 
Environment 
- Physical and environmental security 
- Compliance 
 - Compliance  
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“hypothesis, experiment and evaluate” hinder its ability to capture the risk 
management activities in a proper way (Anderson and Moore 2006). 
Table ‎2-12 The ISO information security risk management process 
ISMS Process Explanation 
1 Plan 
Establish the context 
Risk assessment 
Developing risk treatment plan 
Risk acceptance 
2 Do Implementation of risk treatment plan 
3 Check Continual monitoring and reviewing of risks 
4 Act 
Maintain and improve the information security risk 
management process 
Boynton (2007) suggests using improved methodologies within security 
environment. The six-sigma process is suggested as a suitable and well 
established management process that could be used in achieving continuous 
improvement of enterprises‟ information security practices. Table 2-13 maps 
the processes of the key risk management methods to the six-sigma cyclic 
phases. This mapping shows how DMAIC process can accommodate risk 
management main processes, providing a potential risk management process.  
2.3.4 Assessment of Information Security Situation 
The ISO/IEC 27004 measurement standard stated that, in order to provide 
convincing arguments to the top management for initiating an information 
security programme, the information security officers must identify risks to 
organisational processes. The standard also suggests developing a 
measurement system capable of determining the effectiveness of controls 
introduced in accordance with Annex A of the ISO/IEC 27001 standard. The 
need for new techniques for assessing the effective use of the ISO/IEC 27002 
in protecting the information resources is an important consideration by many 
papers and research studies. Siponen (2000) urged the need for an adequate 
maturity measurement system for information security management practices. 
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Table ‎2-13 Mapping the processes of key risk management methods to the DMAIC phases of the six-sigma model 
Six-
Sigma 
Key Risk Management Methods 
AS/NZS 4360 ISO/IEC TR 13335 NIST SP 800-30 OCTAVE CRAMM EBIOS 
Define 
Establish the 
context 
Risk analysis 
System 
characterizations 
Threat identification 
Vulnerability 
identification 
Management 
knowledge 
Operational area 
management 
knowledge 
Staff knowledge 
Create threat profile 
Identify key 
components 
Evaluate selected 
components 
Asset 
identification 
Asset valuation 
Threat and 
vulnerability 
assessment 
Context study 
Expression of 
security needs 
Threat study 
 
Measure       
Analyse 
Identify risks 
Analyse risk 
Evaluate risk 
 
Control analysis 
Likelihood 
determination 
Impact analysis 
Risk determination 
Conduct risk analysis  
Identification of 
security 
objectives 
Improve Treat risk 
Safeguards 
selection 
Policy & plan 
Plan implementation 
Control 
Recommendations  
Risk assessment 
report 
Cost-benefit analysis 
and selection of 
controls 
Implementation 
Develop protection 
strategy 
Countermeasure 
selection and 
recommendation 
Determination of 
security 
requirements 
Control 
Communicate and 
consult 
Monitor and review 
Follow-up 
Results 
documentation 
Test and evaluate 
 Audit  
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Boehmer (2008) evaluated the effectiveness of the information security 
management based on a measurement technique that includes the coverage 
of the business process, the controls operationalisation and the completeness 
of the security policy. Wiander (2007) mentioned that ISO/IEC 27002 
certification can give enterprises a false sense of security. He suggested that 
enterprises should develop and implement an information security measuring 
system that internally assesses the readiness of their information security 
protection measures. 
2.3.5 Economical Analysis of Security Investments 
The cost versus benefit from applying the mitigation plans need to be 
evaluated using efficient techniques. Applying conventional financial 
justification techniques (i.e. return on investment, internal rate of return, annual 
net present value, etc…) are often inadequate to measure the overall 
effectiveness of security controls. These inadequacies mainly stem from 
exclusion of the qualitative nature of the involved factors. Various factors 
should be considered in this evaluation including: the risk of loss that may 
result from the different challenges and the cost of the protection measures 
and its effect on the operation of the enterprise. An efficient technique has to 
deal with both financial and non-financial aspects to achieve satisfied results 
(Cavusoglu et al. 2004a; Tsiakis and Stephanider 2005; Anderson and Moore 
2006; Johansson et al. 2006). 
2.3.6 Other Requirements 
One of the important requirements in designing an effective EISRM framework 
is the identification of a suitable strategy for creating enterprise information 
security policy. This policy should be based on the international information 
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security standards and possess a continuous nature to evolve with the 
changes of the information security domain (Bakry 2003a). In addition, the 
involvement of a trained team consists of the system owners, custodians and 
users of the concerned enterprise in the process of planning, designing and 
implementing the information security risk management programmes is of 
important consideration for the success of these programmes.  
2.4 Summary 
The conclusion from reviewing the key enterprise information security risk 
management standard, professional and researchers methods is that they 
provide different tools and techniques for reaching generally the same goal of 
protecting enterprises information resources by defining suited security 
protection measures with the help of a risk management approaches. 
However, these methods achieve this goal by different approaches: risk-
analysis approach and best-practice approach, and have different levels: some 
methods are high-level just for providing guidelines, while others are more 
detailed and concentrate mainly on achieving better risk analysis results. Most 
of the available risk management methods have technical nature and ignore 
the assessment of the current state enterprise information security. In addition, 
these methods are not depending on standard economical approach in 
selecting the relevant security protection measures. Each method has its own 
strengths and weaknesses, and it is believed that integrating these methods in 
a reference comprehensive enterprise information security risk management 
framework will achieve better results. 
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Chapter 3  
AN ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SECURITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the development of a comprehensive enterprise 
information security risk management (EISRM) framework that could contribute 
in effective establishment of the required enterprise IT safe environment. The 
proposed framework is designed to integrate the main approaches for 
enterprise information security risk management from one hand, and 
incorporate the basic elements, main steps and essential components of the 
key risk management methodologies from the other hand. The EISRM 
framework is developed to serve, in turn, as a base for the development of 
analytical models for enterprise information security readiness assessment and 
for economical analysis of the recommended protection measures. The 
proposed EISRM framework contributes in addressing the first research 
question, namely to identify what should a comprehensive enterprise 
information security risk management framework comprise of in order to 
integrate the current available enterprise information security risk management 
approaches.  
3.2 Proposed EISRM Framework 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2010) defines a framework as a basic 
conceptual structure (as of ideas). In this respect, an information security risk 
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management framework can be seen as a structure upon which information 
security risk management elements, concepts and components are arranged 
for the purpose of minimising risks that may affect the information resources. 
Based on the investigation of different approaches for enterprise information 
security risk management which is discussed before in Chapter 2, a 
comprehensive EISRM framework is developed.  
The proposed EISRM framework has two main parts: one part is concerned 
with its structural view, while the other is associated with its procedural view. 
The structural view has, in turn, two dimensions: scope and criteria, while the 
procedural view also has two other dimensions: process and tools. The 
framework is described in the following in terms of these four dimensions. 
 The “scope” dimension of the framework is based on the four TOPE 
domains of technology, organisation, people and environment with 
different levels of detail associated with each domain. 
 The management “criteria” dimension of the framework is considered to 
be associated with the controls of the ISO family of information security 
standards. However, other requirements including: standards, cost-
benefit and benchmarks can also be considered.  
 The “process” dimension of the framework adopts the five cyclic 
phases of the six-sigma model DMAIC: define, measure, analyse, 
improve and control with identified input and output issues at each 
phase. 
 The support “tools” dimension of the framework includes the various 
means that would promote the work including: survey tools, 
mathematical models, computer tools and considering previous work. 
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The research methodology in the choice of these four dimensions was based 
on the extensive literature review of Chapter 2 and on the knowledge 
acquisition techniques, as will be discussed later in Chapter 4. Figure 3-1 
illustrates the structure of the proposed framework. Further explanations of 
both of its structural and procedural issues are given in the following sections. 
3.2.1 EISRM Structural Issues 
The structural issues of the proposed EISRM framework are described here in 
terms of its two dimensions: the TOPE based scope and the management 
criteria. 
3.2.1.1 The TOPE Concept 
The emphasis upon technical issues in studying information system security 
risk management is prevailing in most of the reviewed risk management 
methodologies. Whilst technology is a necessary concern, it is not the only 
Process 
Scope 
Asset/Security criterion/ 
Threat/Vulnerability/ 
Impact/Risk/Control 
Improve 
 
Control Others 
Benchmarks 
Cost 
Requirements 
Criteria 
Previous 
Work 
Math/ 
Comp 
Info. 
Collect. 
Define 
Measure 
 
Analyse 
 
Standards 
Tools 
E P O T 
STRUCTURAL 
ISSUES 
PROCEDURAL 
ISSUES 
Figure ‎3-1 The structure of the proposed EISRM framework 
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factor requiring recognition. One of the main requirements of the proposed 
EISRM framework, as stated before in Chapter 2, is to extend the general 
focus on technical issues of most of the reviewed risk management methods to 
be more comprehensive. The comprehensive view in dealing with information 
security risk management means that organisational concerns, human factors 
and environmental effects also directly and indirectly affect the security risk 
management results (Beznosove and Beznosova 2007; Kraemer et al. 2009; 
Werlinger et al. 2009). In the following, the main technological, organisational, 
people and environmental issues that should be considered in studying 
enterprise’s information security risk management issues will be discussed. 
Technology Domain 
This domain involves the technical and physical mechanisms that are 
implemented to secure enterprises’ IT environment. All aspects related to the 
technological issues of information security are grouped together under this 
domain. The technical considerations include, for instance, telecommunication 
facilities, electronic equipment and devices and computer hardware and 
software. Security related to technical issues would include protection of stored 
and transmitted data by for instance encryption, firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems, access restriction devices and authentication devices.  
Organisation Domain 
This domain includes considerations of the organisational aspects that are 
affecting the information security at the strategic, management and operational 
levels. All considerations of organisational nature are included together under 
this domain. The important issues at the strategic level include: structure and 
management style, organisational culture and policies. Issues at the 
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management level include aspects that are deployed to ensure the effective 
management of information security. For instance, asset management, 
information security management and information security incident 
management are included in this domain. Issues at the operational level 
include job design, workflow and any practices associated with general 
operations. In addition, awareness of security responsibilities of enterprise 
members at all levels, the security programme itself (i.e. policies, planning, 
education, etc...) and the audit function of ongoing control and management 
are considered as important organisational issues. 
People Domain 
The human considerations are concerned with the behavioural issues and 
consider the different perspectives of the people involved. All aspects that are 
related to the people involvement in information security are grouped together 
under this domain. People who are stakeholders of a given information system 
include: owners of the system, people who use the system directly, people 
who rely on the system and people who design, build and maintain the system 
(Theoharidou et al. 2005). For instance, processes like education and training, 
as well as concepts like trust are associated with this domain. The social 
environment within the system operates also is an important consideration. 
The social, cultural and religious elements influence the attitude of a person 
towards the protection of information resources.  
Environment Domain 
The natural and management environment in which the concerned enterprise 
and its IT systems operate are an important consideration. All aspects relating 
to the environmental effects on information security are grouped together 
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under this domain. This includes weather conditions and man-made 
environmental issues, on one hand and professional and cultural behaviour 
management rules and legal aspects, on the other. In addition, physical 
security and internal as well as external compliance with information security 
standards are considered under this domain. 
3.2.1.2 EISRM Scope Dimension 
The TOPE-based scope of the framework would enable the mapping of the 
basic elements of the enterprise, associated with IT, to the domains of 
technology, organisation, people and environment. The basic elements of an 
enterprise as identified previously in Chapter 2 with regards to the proposed 
EISRM framework, are considered to be its: assets, security challenges 
(threats and vulnerabilities) and security controls. These are addressed in the 
following according to the TOPE-based scope. 
Table ‎3-1 Enterprise assets considered by different references mapped on the 
TOPE domains (ISO/IEC TR 13335 1998; CRAMM 2001; BSI 2004) 
TOPE 
Assets Main Groups 
Tangible (examples) Intangible 
Technology 
Information: (Data files). 
IT Services: (Messaging-active directory). 
Software: System(Solaris), Application 
(Oracle), Utilities (management tools). 
Hardware: Hosts (Servers) other (Printers). 
Communication: Network (Routers), (Cables). 
-Goodwill 
-Service to clients 
-Public 
confidence 
-Public trust 
-Competitive 
advantage 
-Image of the 
organisation 
-Reputation 
-Trust in services 
-Employee moral 
-Productivity 
-Loyalty 
-Ethics 
Organisation 
Information: (Policy document-Research). 
Documents: (Management commitment). 
Agreements: (Confidentiality-third party). 
Other: (User manuals-training material). 
People 
IT staff: (IT security manager). 
Employee: (Senior management). 
Users: (Inside / Outside). 
Contractors: (Consultants). 
Owners: (Stakeholders). 
Environment 
Services: (Heating-lighting-power-AC). 
Equipment: (Desks-Fax machines). 
Physical: (infrastructure) (IT rooms-facilities). 
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Assets 
One of the main clauses of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard is the asset 
management, which has two objectives: responsibility of assets and 
information classification. Asset is defined by ISO as "anything that has value 
to the organisation" (ISO/IEC 27002 2005, p.1). This definition brings up the 
consideration of two types of assets: tangible and intangible. Table 3-1 maps 
the tangible assets considered by different references presented in Chapter 2 
to the four TOPE domains. This is a high-level mapping that can be refined 
into sub-levels for further details. Table 3-1 also considers intangible assets 
that are associated with multiple domains. 
Table ‎3-2 Threats and vulnerabilities considered by different references mapped 
on the TOPE domains (ISO/IEC TR 13335 1998; CRAMM 2001; BSI 2004) 
TOPE 
Challenges Main Groups 
Threats (examples) Vulnerabilities (examples) 
Technology 
Malicious codes: (Viruses) D 
Software: (Failures) D&A 
Hardware: (Failures) D&A 
Communication: (Infiltration)D  
Software: (Configuration errors) 
Hardware: (Missing patches) 
Communication: (Unnecessary 
protocol) 
Media: (Electrical interference) 
Organisation 
Policy: (Inadequate) 
Agreement: (Inadequate) D 
Information: (Errors) D 
Planning: (Problems) D 
Procedures: (Incorrect) D&A 
Document: (No care at disposal) 
Procedures: (Violations not 
reported) 
People 
Employee: (Sabotage) D 
Users: (Inside/Outside/Theft) D 
Crackers: (Malicious hacking) 
D 
Employee:(Insufficient training) 
Environment 
Industrial:(Espionage)D 
Natural: (Earthquake)A 
Services: (Power outage) D&A 
Natural:(Facility in flood zone) 
Physical:(Unlocked doors) 
Challenges 
Challenges can be viewed as negative coins of two faces: threats and 
vulnerabilities. ISO defines threat as "a potential cause of an unwanted 
incident, which may result in harm to a system or organisation"; and it defines 
vulnerability as "a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be 
exploited by one or more threats" (ISO/IEC 27002 2005, pp.5). Table 3-2 maps 
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threats and vulnerabilities considered by different references presented in 
Chapter 2 to the four TOPE domains. With regards to threats, Table 3-2 marks 
them as either: deliberate (D), accidental (A) or both (D&A). 
Controls  
ISO defines controls as “means of managing risk including policies, 
procedures, guidelines, practices or organisational structures, which can be of 
administrative, technical, management or legal nature” (ISO/IEC 27002 2005, 
p.1). Table 3-3 maps ISO/IEC 27002 information security clauses, objectives 
and controls to the four TOPE domains. The methodology in mapping the 
controls of ISO/IEC 27002 information security management standard to the 
TOPE domains will be discussed later in Chapter 4. 
Table ‎3-3 ISO information security clauses, objectives and controls mapped on 
the TOPE domains (ISO/IEC 27002 2005) 
TOPE 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 Basic Parts 
Part 
No. 
Clause 
No. of 
Objectives 
No. of 
Controls 
T Technology 
10 
Communications and 
Operations Management 
10 32 
11 Access Control 7 25 
12 
Information Systems 
Acquisition, Development 
and Maintenance 
6 16 
O Organisation 
5 Security Policy 1 2 
6 
Organisation of Information 
Security 
2 11 
7 Asset Management 2 5 
13 
Information Security Incident 
Management 
2 5 
14 
Business Continuity 
Management 
1 5 
P People 8 Human Resources Security 3 9 
E Environment 
9 
Physical and Environmental 
Security 
2 13 
15 Compliance 3 10 
Total ISO/IEC 27002 objectives and controls 39 133 
3.2.1.3 EISRM Criteria Dimension 
The management criteria dimension appears at all domains of the TOPE-
scope of the proposed EISRM framework, as shown in Figure 3-1, to illustrate 
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that it should be considered across all TOPE domains. The criteria could 
specify the required security controls on the various TOPE domains relative to 
cost-benefit analysis. For the controls considered, it could provide benchmarks 
to their acceptable levels. In general, the management criteria would be 
associated with the policy and business requirements of the concerned 
enterprise. 
3.2.2 EISRM Procedural Issues 
The procedural issues of the proposed EISRM framework are described here 
in terms of its two dimensions: the six-sigma based process and the support 
tools. In the following section, background on the main risk management 
components as seen by the ISO/IEC 27000 (2009) standard that should be 
considered by any risk management methodology will be presented.  
3.2.2.1 Risk Management Main Components 
For better understanding of the whole risk management process, it is important 
to analyse the various definitions that appeared in literature for its associated 
components. Hoo (2000) explains the difference between risk assessment and 
risk management. Risk assessment is the process of identifying, characterising 
and understanding risk; that is studying, analysing and describing the set of 
outcomes and likelihoods for a given endeavour. On the other hand, risk 
management is a policy process where alternative strategies for dealing with 
risk are weighted and decisions about acceptable risks are made.  
According to the NIST SP 800-30 standard, risk assessment is synonymous 
with risk analysis and is considered as part of risk management that entails 
identifying risks to system security, ascertaining the probability of occurrence, 
evaluating the resulting impact then suggesting safeguards that would reduce 
this impact to an acceptable level. The standard also defines risk management 
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as the process of identifying, controlling and mitigating information system 
related risks and encompasses risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis and the 
selection, implementation, test and evaluation of safeguards (NIST SP 800-30 
2002, E-2). The AS/NZS 4360 risk management standard has its own 
definitions for these risk management components, which is mainly based on 
the ISO/IEC 51 guide (1999) and the ISO/IEC 73 guide (2002). 
From the previous discussion, there are many different definitions for risk 
management components, in one context, risk analysis is considered as part 
of risk assessment, and in other context, risk analysis is interchangeable with 
risk assessment. The problem is the lack of precise definitions of the risk 
management terminologies (Hogganvik and Stolen 2005). Consequently, in 
order to develop common understanding among enterprises, ISO in 2009 
published the ISO/IEC 27000 overview and vocabulary standard to provide 
generic definitions for the risk management components. The core of the 
ISO/IEC 27000 standard is a list of definitions on risk management 
components including risk management tasks as follows: 
 Risk: the combination of the probability of an event and its 
consequence. 
 Risk analysis: the systematic use of information to identify sources and 
to estimate risk. 
 Risk evaluation: the process of comparing the estimated risk against 
given risk criteria to determine the significance of the risk. 
 Risk assessment: the overall process of risk analysis and risk 
evaluation. 
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 Risk treatment: the process of selection and implementation of 
measures to modify risk. 
 Risk management: the coordinated activities to direct and control an 
organisation with regards to risk. 
 Risk policy: the overall formal risk management intentions and 
directions. 
Figure 3-2 provides an integrated view of the above ISO components 
illustrating their inter-relationships. According to the ISO standard, the main 
objective of the risk analysis process is to estimate risks from potential events, 
with a view to reduce these risks to an acceptable level. On the other hand, the 
objective of risk assessment is to comprehend risks of particular environment 
and to evaluate these risks according to defined criteria. The risk treatment 
Figure ‎3-2 An illustrative view of ISO risk management components 
Identify Risk Sources 
RISK ANALYSIS 
Use Risk Info 
Estimate Risk 
Risk Sources 
Undesired Events 
Consequences 
Probability 
RISK 
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RISK 
EVALUATION 
Risk Acceptance Directions Coordination 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
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Protection 
Measures 
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and Implementation 
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objective is to propose a plan to mitigate these risks to an acceptable level. 
The objective of risk management is to use one or more methods to identify 
and evaluate new risks, then select risk mitigation strategy and also monitor, 
review and communicate information about existing risks so as to optimise the 
performance of the whole enterprise information security risk management 
programme. 
The introduction of the above definitions of risk management related 
components and concepts will help to provide unified terminology between 
different information security risk management approaches, and therefore will 
help to go towards a common understanding of the EISRM framework and its 
associated models presented in this thesis .  
3.2.2.2 EISRM Process Dimension 
The adoption of the six-sigma five phase cyclic process DMAIC by the 
proposed EISRM framework will be explained in the following sections. This is 
enhanced further by giving the function of each phase in the context of 
information security risk management process, as shown in Figure 3-3 and 
summarised in Table 3-5. 
The Six-Sigma Model 
Six-Sigma is a method for designing an efficient business that runs as error-
free as possible. The six-sigma was invented by Motorola in the late 1980s. 
The phases of the six-sigma cyclic process is abbreviated by: DMAIC, that is: 
define, measure, analyse, improve and control (Pyzdek 2003). The process is 
presented in Table 3-4. A mapping between the key risk management 
processes and the six-sigma cyclic phases had been presented before in 
Table 2-13. This mapping shows the possibility of adopting the DMAIC process 
in the proposed EISRM framework. 
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Table ‎3-4 DMAIC process (Pyzdek 2003) 
Phase Explanation 
1 
Define (D) 
opportunity 
Encapsulate the problem to determine what needs to be 
improved. In this phase, a problem statement, a goal 
statement, constraints assumptions and a project plan is 
documented. 
2 
Measure (M) 
performance 
Compare the current state against the wanted state. Going 
deeper into the problem and trying to answer why it exist and 
this will bring a more detailed understanding of the problem. 
3 
Analyse (A) 
opportunity 
By analysing the information that has been acquired from the 
previous phase, the aim is to confirm why the problems exist. 
4 
Improve (I) 
performance 
Based on all the earlier phases, a list of actions and methods 
are documented. If there are different ways to attack the 
problem, an evaluation is made so that the best of the 
alternative is chosen and implemented. 
5 
Control (C) 
performance 
The problem area that has been discovered in the define-
phase is being monitored to ensure that it dose not reoccur. 
The Define Phase 
The main objective of this phase is: to define the main business goals; to 
identify the context of the enterprise under consideration and to specify the 
basic elements of the risk management process. The process starts with a 
study of the enterprise’s context and identification of its main assets and basic 
elements. The enterprise and its environment are described, focusing on the 
sensitive activities that are related to information security, according to the 
TOPE scope. The security needs in terms of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability properties of the assets are then defined. This phase would use the 
output of a previous cycle of the DMAIC process or start a new process, 
depending on the case considered. This phase has a number of steps as 
follows: 
 Identify the main business goals; 
 establish the context of the reviewed area; 
 map the existing basic elements of the enterprise (assets, threats, 
vulnerabilities and controls) to the TOPE domains; 
 specify the owner of each asset; 
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 specify the location of each asset; 
 specify the source of the threat; and 
 give security requirements. 
The output of this phase would be a TOPE view of the current state of the 
basic elements of information security in the considered enterprise. 
The Measure Phase 
The main objective of this phase is to assess the basic elements of the 
considered enterprise according to specified criteria. This phase is mainly 
devoted for the assessment of the enterprise current state information security. 
The assessment will be conducted against the ISO/IEC 27002 standard with 
security readiness indicators. These indicators will be assigned and presented 
later in Chapter 4. The assessment indicators should indicate how far the 
DEFINE 
Business Goals, Context and 
Basic Elements 
IMPROVE 
Current Situation 
Protection Measures 
ANALYSE 
Risks to Information 
Security  
MEASURE 
Current State Enterprise 
Information Security 
CONTROL 
Implement Selection/ 
Monitor the Improvement 
COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 
Results satisfactory 
Results unsatisfactory 
Improvement 
satisfactory 
Improvement  
unsatisfactory 
Analyse satisfactory 
Analyse unsatisfactory 
Update the 
measuring system 
Repeat 
Figure ‎3-3 The proposed process for the EISRM framework  
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information security practices in the concerned enterprise from the ISO/IEC 
27002 standard and identify areas that need further improvement. 
This phase will receive the output of the "define" phase and add the following 
information to each element: 
 Assessment of the current value of assets; 
 assessment of the current state of threats; 
 assessment of the current state of vulnerabilities; and 
 assessment of the current state of controls.  
The output of this phase would be a TOPE view of the critical assets 
associated with the assessment of threats and vulnerabilities they are facing, 
and with the security controls used. The output of this phase will help the 
enterprise in the first decision as shown in Figure 3-3 regarding the need for 
moving to the next step of running enterprise wide risk analysis exercise or 
improving the current state according to the ISO/IEC 27002 standard. The 
enterprise will also have a measurement system that could be used in the 
future for monitoring and improving its information security practices.  
The Analyse Phase 
The main objective of this phase is to analyse the gap between the current 
state and the required state of protection from threats. This will be based on 
the output of the "measure" phase, on one hand, and on the required "criteria" 
on the other hand. In this respect, the analyse phase is devoted for running a 
risk analysis exercise for the considered enterprise based on the unsatisfaction 
of its performance in accordance to its security needs. The basic steps of this 
phase are as follows: 
 Development of an analytical model for gap analysis; 
 using the model for evaluating current state versus required state; and 
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 determination of the security gap between the current state and the 
required state. 
The output of this phase is a TOPE view of the gap between security 
requirements and the current state of security, considering all critical assets. In 
addition, the enterprise will then move to the second decision, as shown in 
Figure 3-3, of repeating the analysis phase for better results or moving to the 
next step of improving the current state information security. 
The Improve Phase 
The objective of this phase is to decide the best risk mitigation strategy. The 
cost-benefit model that will be developed later in Chapter 6 could be used in 
this phase to select the most economical solution from the identified subset of 
the ISO/IEC 27002 protection controls. This phase considers the security state 
and the required state. It has the following main steps:  
 Development of directions to close the security gap and achieve the 
required improvement; and 
 designing an action plan that follows the directions. 
The output of this phase is a TOPE view of an action plan of what should be 
done to close the gap and achieve the required security improvement. This 
output will include a treatment plan with levels of risks and the suggested 
protection measures to mitigate the identified risk. The decision for the risk 
treatment can include avoiding, reducing, transferring or retaining risk. The 
output of this phase will help the enterprise also in the third decision, as shown 
in Figure 3-3, regarding the need for moving to the next step of running, 
controlling and monitoring the new implemented protection measures, or 
repeating both of the “analysis” and the “improve” phases according to 
unsatisfactory results. 
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Table ‎3-5 The use of six-sigma five phase cyclic process DMAIC for EISRM 
6 Sigma Explanation Output 
Define 
Business goal: Identify the business objectives 
according to its stated goals (innovation, dynamic 
environment, competences etc...) 
A TOPE view of the 
current state of the 
basic elements of 
information security 
in the considered 
enterprise.  
Objective: Specify current state enterprise 
information security 
Input: Collect information about enterprise basic 
elements. 
Assets tangible/intangible/owner/location 
Threats deliberate/accidental 
Vulnerabilities technical/organisational 
Controls existing/planned 
Measure 
Objective: Assess the current state information 
security. 
A TOPE view of the 
critical assets, 
associated with the 
assessment of the 
threats and 
vulnerabilities they 
are facing, and with 
the security controls 
used.  
Input: Define stage outputs/expert or owner view 
Assets valuation (direct/indirect) 
Threats/assets possible damage 
Vulnerabilities / 
assets 
weaknesses in the security 
measures 
Controls / 
assets 
TOPE/ISO based evaluation 
approach for control analysis 
(Saleh et al. 2007) 
Assets / 
requirements 
(confidentiality-availability-
integrity) 
Analyse 
Objective: Find the gap between the current state 
and the required state of protection. 
A TOPE view of the 
gap between 
security 
requirements and 
the current state of 
security, 
considering all 
critical assets.  
Input: Assessment of the current state from the 
"measure" phase; and the "required security 
protection criteria" of the enterprise concerned. 
Model 
development of an analytical 
model  for gap analysis 
Evaluation 
using the model to evaluate the 
current state of security versus 
the required one. 
Gap 
determination of the security gap 
that needs to be closed, so that 
the required improvement is 
achieved 
Improve 
Objective: Specify required improvements to close 
the gap between the current state and required 
state. A TOPE view of an 
action plan of what 
should be done to 
close the gap and 
achieve the 
required security. 
Input: Required state and current state 
Directions 
development of directions to close 
the security gap and achieve the 
required improvement 
Plan 
designing an action plan that 
follows the directions  
Control 
Objective: Implement improvement, monitor and 
evaluate; then repeat the whole process.  Implementation of 
the plan, operation, 
performance, 
understanding and 
process activation 
Input: Action plan for improvement 
Implementing the action plan for improvement  
Monitoring the changing state 
Documentation documenting the work 
Re-initiating The DMAIC process 
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The Control Phase 
The objective of this phase is to attest that the risks are properly identified and 
the selected mitigation strategy is adequate. This phase has feedback to the 
“measure” phase by the new applied protection measures to be included in the 
information security assessment model. This phase considers the 
improvement plan and performs the following main steps:  
 Implementation of the mitigation plan; 
 monitoring the changing state; 
 documenting the work; and  
 re-initiating the DMAIC process. 
The output of this phase is an improved enterprise’s security practices, in 
addition to going into another cycle for responding to new requirements and 
changes. 
The above process is iterative and should be performed by enterprises many 
times until reaching an acceptable level for all risks, taking into account new 
risks that may arise during the process. The decision-makers and the 
stakeholders should be informed throughout the process about the risk 
management activities. This will be achieved by the parallel risk 
communication process and will be monitored by the illustration graphs of the 
information security assessment model. Table 3-5 illustrates how the process 
can be applied for information security risk management considering basic 
steps, input and output of each phase. 
3.2.2.3 EISRM Tools Dimension 
The proposed framework considers that "support tools" would be required for 
the execution of the various DMAIC phases. Such tools have also been 
considered by previous methods, as given in Chapter 2. The tools would 
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include, but are not limited to, information collection and survey management 
tools, modelling and mathematical analysis, computational methods and 
software packages. 
In the following section, an example is presented to illustrate the benefits that 
can be obtained from applying the above EISRM framework in identifying 
security challenges to the business goals and in showing how these goals can 
be badly affected as a result of the undefined security challenges to enterprise 
information resources. 
3.2.3 Using EISRM Framework 
Each enterprise has its own unique business objectives. These objectives 
often change over time to reflect the new requirements of the business. For 
instance, an enterprise in its recognition that wireless and mobile technology 
have become increasingly critical enablers of innovation, operational cost and 
service delivery in major applications, would like to rely on business 
infrastructure with robust wireless mobility services to improve the efficiency of 
the communication between the different employees. As a result, the decision 
is taken to provide state-of-the-art mobile technology to the employees. 
Accordingly, it is agreed that a wireless network access point should be 
deployed to allow all employees to have remote access to enterprise IT 
resources. 
The scenario presented above is an example that needs investigation tools to 
provide a reasonable decision that from one hand guarantee the protection of 
the enterprise information resources and from the other hand satisfies the 
business objectives. In this respect the proposed EISRM framework presented 
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above is suggested to conduct the required investigation to assess risks that 
may affect enterprise information resources. 
In the “Define” phase, the objective of the enterprise was to improve the 
quality of its working environment and to achieve an efficiency of its activities 
through the use of wireless technology. The basic elements of the enterprise 
are then identified using the TOPE view. This new technology naturally 
involves security concerns. The information that each employee will have 
access must respect confidentiality. The integrity of sensitive information must 
be respected. The availability of the whole system is essential to have access 
to the information resources at all times. The “Measure” phase is then used to 
assess the current state information security according to the ISO/IEC 27002 
standard. A list of missing controls according to the ISO/IEC 27002 information 
security management standard is identified which include: network controls; 
Information exchange policies and procedures; user authentication for external 
connections; segregation in networks; and mobile computing and 
communication. These controls and their associated protection measures 
satisfy the enterprise top management at this stage to achieve the stated 
business objectives. The “Improve” phase is then used to cost effectively 
select the most economical security protection measures that should be 
implemented to achieve the required level of information security. The 
“Control” phase will be used to monitor and control the implemented security 
protection measures and to assess their effective use. 
The business, economical and operational benefits that the enterprise may 
have could be that the enterprise sees itself as dynamic, innovative and 
moving with latest technology. The decision to introduce wireless access to all 
employees could be a result from the belief that sales and profits would be 
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improved through better customer service in more remote locations. The failure 
to implement the required protection measures as a result of running the 
proposed EISRM framework could has a profound impact on the profit of the 
enterprise. Confidential information might be disclosed to unauthorised people, 
the availability of the IT systems could be affected by inside and outside 
attackers and compliance with legal and regulatory regulations could be lost.  
3.3 The Information Security Policy 
As mentioned before, in Chapter 2, ISO/IEC 27002 emphasises the need for a 
policy document for information security management. The information security 
policy is used mainly to provide employees with a clear understanding of 
management’s direction and support for information security as stated by the 
ISO/IEC 27002 standard. This will influence the employee’s decision, action 
and behaviour in dealing with the business assets and in turn in achieving the 
business main goals. The six-sigma based approach is suggested by the 
researcher as a tool for the development, implementation and continuous 
improvement of the enterprise information security policy based on the TOPE 
view of ISO/IEC 27002 standard. The information security policy document is 
addressed, emphasising its structure and its continuous improvement. The 
information security policy document is one of the early requirements of 
ISO/IEC 27002, and it has priority when starting to manage information 
security inside any environment or business (Fulford and Doherty 2003). 
3.3.1 Information Security Policy Process 
The phases of the six-sigma cyclic process explained above are used also for 
the development of the information security policy. The process is briefly 
described in the following:  
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Table ‎3-6 Six-sigma based cyclic process for the use of ISO/IEC 27002: 2005 
Six Sigma Process Application of ISO/IEC 27002: 2005 
D Define  
Goals: 
requirements  
Application of international security 
management standard: ISO 27002: 2005 
(TOPE view), with continuous improvement. 
Reasons: 
explanation 
For world class information security quality 
and adaptability.  
Case: 
application 
specific issues 
Find: relevant legal issues, business and 
enterprise requirements, internal and external 
use. 
Indicators: 
measurability 
Identify relevant evaluation indicators, based 
on ISO/IEC 27002: 2005 TOPE view and on 
case specific issues. 
Policy 
document 
Construct policy document base (seeTable3-8)  
M Measure 
Current state: 
indicators  
Evaluate current state information security 
management using indicators (see Chapter 
4,5). 
Policy 
document 
Update policy document (see Table 3-8). 
A Analyse 
Evaluation Analyse current state identifying its strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
considering risks and protection measures 
using resulted indicators (see Chapter 4).  
Risk 
assessment / 
management 
Policy 
document 
Update policy document (see Table 3-8). 
I Improve 
Design: for 
improvement  
(new state)  
Design how the current state can be improved 
towards achieving the requirements using the 
results of the analysis given above. 
Implement: new 
state 
Put the new state into practical use. 
Policy 
document 
Update policy document (see Table 3-8). 
C Control 
Monitor: new 
state 
Monitor and evaluate the new state that 
resulted in emphasising the achievements 
resulting from the improvements. 
Evaluate: new 
state  
Look ahead:  
progress cycle 
Look for continuous improvement repeating 
the process. 
Policy 
document 
Update policy document (see Table 3-8). 
 The “define” phase of the process involves stating or restating the 
goals, the reasons behind the goals, the case considered together with 
its specific requirements, the ISO/IEC 27002 TOPE view indicators and 
the basic structure of the policy document as will be discussed later. 
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 The “measure” phase involves using the indicators to investigate the 
current state of information security management in the enterprise 
considered and updating the policy document accordingly.  
 The “analyse” phase includes the evaluation of the Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of the current state, 
considering the risks and the protection measures and using the 
indicators. The policy document should also be updated. 
 The “improve” phase responds to the “analyse” phase by providing 
new design state to improve information security management, and by 
giving the opportunity to implement the new state. Policy update is also 
needed here. 
 The “control” phase is concerned with the culture of continuous 
improvement. It involves monitoring and evaluating the new state, 
updating the policy document and looking ahead to repeating DMAIC 
six-sigma process. 
Table 3-6 illustrates how the process can be applied using ISO/IEC 27002 
TOPE view for information security management. 
3.3.2 The Policy Document Structure 
A TOPE view structure for the proposed information security policy document 
is introduced in Table 3-7. The table suggests building the progress of 
continuous improvement into the practical use of the document. In this respect, 
three versions of the documents are recommended: a version dealing with the 
required new improved state; a version dealing with the current state; and a 
version dealing with the previous state. The phases of DMAIC six-sigma 
process consider the development and continuous updates of the document. 
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Table ‎3-7 Information security policy document: structure and progress 
Document 
Structure 
Identification Cover Summary Table of Content 
Main parts 
An integrated view of goals and directions: 
Laws & regulations / Business & organisation 
specific issues / Intranet, Extranet & Internet / 
Continuous improvement 
Technology Organisation People Environment 
Evaluation 
SWOT: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities (for 
improvements), Threats (improvement obstacles) 
Progress 
Tools 
Document 
Versions 
Son: 
Required state 
Father: 
Current state 
Grandfather: 
Previous state 
3.4 EISRM Work Team 
As mentioned before in Chapter 2, the success of any risk management 
method stems from the expertise of people who apply the steps of the method. 
A well trained team from the enterprise itself which take the responsibility for 
the required work could achieve better results than outside expertise. Six-
sigma recommends the formation of an effective work team, in order to 
perform the above DMAIC process successfully. The structure of the 
recommended work team is supposed to carry the ingredients of the 
successful work. This structure is proposed by the author and presented in 
Table 3-8 with regard to information security management and some 
explanations are introduced in the following: 
 Leadership is associated with the top executive of the enterprise 
concerned, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The basis of this is that 
information security management affects the performance of the basic 
functions of any enterprise, and therefore it requires support from the 
top leader. 
 Championship is associated with the top management of the 
enterprise, maybe with a Vice President (VP), but the role of the person 
here is to provide close follow-up of what needs to be done for 
information security management and its continuous improvement. 
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Table ‎3-8 Six sigma team for the application of the ISO/IEC27002 standard 
Level Who Role 
Leadership 
Enterprise President /  
CEO: Chief Executive Officer  
Support for better organisation 
performance due to better 
information security 
management.  
Champions / 
Sponsors 
Six sigma leader: usually with 
high position (e.g. VP: Vice 
President / CIO: Chief 
Information Officer) 
Influential leader (at high 
position) providing close follow-
up and support. 
Master black 
belt 
CISO: Chief Information 
Security Officer (Highest 
technical level). 
Technical leader of six sigma 
information security management 
work. 
Black belt Technical IT staff. 
Involved in the technical issues 
of the work under the supervision 
of the Master Black Belt. 
Green belt 
Staff using IT with technical 
capabilities. 
Work with black belt staff to help 
achieving effective 
improvements.  
Staff level Staff using IT. Cooperation. 
 Master black belt is the technical manager of information security 
management. He should be experienced and well trained; similar in this 
respect to a top karate person. 
 Black belts are the technical staff concerned with information security 
management. 
 Green belts are selected from the IT users of the concerned enterprise 
to provide support to information security management. 
 Staff level consists of the IT users who should co-operate and support 
information security management. 
3.5 Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to develop a framework for enterprise’s 
information security risk management. The proposed framework has two 
structural dimensions, and two procedural dimensions. From a structural 
viewpoint, the TOPE scope of the framework enables it to incorporate the wide 
range of issues associated with EISRM in a well structured manner, and the 
use of six-sigma DMAIC process allows it to accommodate the various 
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methods concerned with EISRM. In addition, the framework responds to the 
need of using a management criteria and permits various criterion to be taken 
into account, including ISO information security controls and considering pre-
determined benchmarks. The framework also considers the support tools for 
performing the various phases efficiently; and in this respect it allows the use 
of different tools for this purpose. In addition, to support the developed EISRM 
framework, a methodology, based on the six-sigma principles, on how to apply 
the TOPE view of the standard to the evaluation and continuous improvement 
of enterprise information security policy document is presented. Finally, the 
structure of the proposed six-sigma based work team is presented in order to 
effectively perform the risk management process. 
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Chapter 4  
ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SECURITY 
ASSESSMENT MEASURES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The ISO/IEC 27001 (2005) information security management standard 
requires enterprises to undertake regular reviews of the effectiveness of their 
information security management system. This process, according to ISO, 
should measure the effectiveness of the implemented information security 
controls to verify that the security requirements, according to the business 
objectives, have been met. In light of the above, ISO/IEC 27001 requirement 
and the main objective of the “measure” phase of the developed EISRM 
framework, this chapter focuses on the identification of a set of assessment 
measures that could be used in assessing enterprise information security 
readiness according to the recommended security controls of the ISO/IEC 
27002 information security management standard. This chapter, therefore 
addresses partially the second research question stated in Chapter 1 which 
relates to the choice of the suitable security measures that could be used as 
an input to an analytical model for numerically assessing enterprise information 
security readiness. 
4.2 Development of ISO Based Assessment Measures 
An information security measurement programme provides enterprises with a 
number of organisational and financial benefits. Major benefits include 
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increasing accountability for information security performance; improving 
effectiveness of information security activities; demonstrating compliance with 
laws, rules and regulations; and providing quantifiable inputs for resource 
allocation decisions (NIST SP 800-55 rev1 2008, pp.19). The ISO/IEC 27004 
(2009) information security management – measurement standard summaries 
the main requirements that contribute to the success of information security 
measurement programme as follows: 
 Management commitment supported by appropriate resources; 
 existence of ISMS process and procedures; 
 a repeatable process capable of capturing and reporting meaningful 
data to provide relevant trends over a period of time; 
 quantifiable measures based on ISMS objectives; and 
 easily obtainable data that can be used for measurement. 
To fulfil the above stated requirements by NIST SP 800-55 and ISO/IEC 27004 
standards towards the development of an effective information security 
assessment model, enterprises should first choose the most suitable 
assessment measures. The theory of measurement states that goodness of an 
assessment is specified in terms of validity and reliability (King et al. 1994). 
Good validity of the measure is often defined as the extent to which a measure 
accurately reflects the concept that it is intended to measure. On the other 
hand, good reliable measure is defined as the extent to which a measure 
yields consistent, stable and uniform results over repeated measurements of 
the same unit (Wang 2005). 
Regarding the validity of the assessment, it is important that the measure really 
assess what is considered as information security concerns. Also, these 
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measures should be consistent with common conceptions from both academic 
and practitioners point of view, and be based on valid information security 
source. Regarding the reliability of the assessment, the measures should 
reflect objective rather than subjective view of the evaluated controls. Also, the 
selected measures should be operationalised with respect to aggregation of 
the assessment data. The former requirement is discussed in this chapter, and 
the later will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
4.2.1 Knowledge Acquisition 
In searching for measures that represent information security domain, the 
researcher uses hybrid knowledge acquisition techniques. The preliminary 
analysis, text analysis and interview analysis knowledge acquisition techniques 
are used in this research in searching for a valid and reliable information 
security measures. These measures, in turn, will represent an input for the 
developed assessment model presented in Chapter 5. 
4.2.1.1 Preliminary Analysis 
The preliminary literature survey was performed to obtain an overview of the 
problem and to determine potential categories that would be useful in 
classifying the various types of measures. The preliminary knowledge 
acquisition utilises text and interview analysis. The literature was searched for 
documented manuals for information security controls and for investigating the 
common characteristics of these controls. The data obtained in these two 
steps was used to identify the source of information security controls and to 
assign domains or categories for these controls to address the primary security 
measures that could be associated with any type of enterprise.  
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The first step in the preliminary analysis was based on a literature survey 
(Chapter 2), including three families of sources that fully support the research 
scope as follows: 
 Standard risk management methods including: AS/NZS 4360, NIST SP 
800-30 and ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 standards. 
 Professional risk management methods including: CRAMM, OCTAVE, 
CORAS and EBIOS. 
 Information security management standards including: SOGP and 
ISO/IEC 27002 standards. 
The ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice for information security management 
standard was chosen as a base for the development of the assessment 
measures. Reasons of interest in choosing this standard are summarised as 
follows: 
 The standard is accepted internationally as code of practice for 
information security management standard. 
 It contains most of the required controls for practically representing the 
information security concerns, as discussed before in Chapter 2 and 
shown in Table 2-11. 
 The standard is referenced in most of the key information security risk 
management methods, and in other standards. 
 The design of the standard eases the alignment of its contents with the 
TOPE (Technology, Organisation, People and Environment) view 
presented in this thesis, and consequently facilitates the process of 
elicitation of the information security measures. 
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In this respect, the proposed enterprise information security assessment model 
developed in Chapter 5 will utilise the ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice for 
information security management standard, as a base for the development of 
its information security assessment measures.  
The second step of the preliminary analysis was devoted for developing a 
modular approach for classifying the information security controls of the 
ISO/IEC 27002 standard along categorical lines that represent technology, 
organisation, people and environment. Table 4-1 shows the suggested 
alignment between the TOPE domains and the ISO/IEC 27002 main clauses.  
Table ‎4-1 TOPE view of ISO/IEC 27002 main clauses 
Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 Main Parts 
Part No. Clause 
T Technology 
10 Communications and Operations Management 
11 Access Control 
12 
Information Systems Acquisition, Development 
and Maintenance  
O Organisation 
5 Security Policy 
6 Organisation of Information Security 
7 Asset Management 
13 Information Security Incident Management 
14 Business Continuity Management 
P People 8 Human Resources Security 
E Environment 
9 Physical and Environmental Security 
15 Compliance 
This alignment was validated through experts view. The validation was carried 
out by practitioners, academic researchers and standardisation experts. Five 
practitioners (IT managers from the participated enterprises), five academic 
researchers (Professors working at King Saud University) and three 
standardisation experts (Researchers from King Abdulaziz City of Science and 
Technology) were involved in this review. The evaluation was based on open 
discussions about the TOPE domains, and the most suitably aligned ISO/IEC 
27002 clause to each of these domains. All of their comments were analysed 
and discussed to reach the optimum alignment which appeared in Table 4-1.  
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4.2.1.2 Text Analysis 
The knowledge acquisition continue with an in-depth text analysis of the 
ISO/IEC 27002 clauses, objectives and controls to identify the most suitable 
information security assessment measures associated with each ISO security 
control. The results of this analysis yielded extensive security measures (682 
measures). Considering the number of controls and measures to be aligned 
through the TOPE domains, it is not realistic to describe in a detailed manner 
the alignment and iteration performed. An example to show how the process of 
choosing and refining the security measures of the ISO/IEC 27002 information 
security policy clause will be presented in the next section.  
4.2.1.3 Security Policy Measures 
The information security policy objective of ISO/IEC 27002 is stated as follows: 
“to provide management direction and support for information security in 
accordance with business requirements and relevant laws and regulations”. 
The required response, to this main objective, is expressed in terms of the 
following two controls (ISO 2005). 
 “An information security policy document should be approved by 
management, and published and communicated to all employees and 
relevant external parties”. 
 “The information security policy should be reviewed at planned intervals, 
or if significant changes occur, to ensure its continuing suitability, 
adequacy and effectiveness”.  
The above strategic objective and associated controls indicate that the 
information security policy of organisations should take the following main 
factors into consideration. 
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 “Relevant laws and regulations”, so that no violation of the “legal 
infrastructure” of both the organisation concerned, and its work 
environment, can take place. 
 “Business requirements”, so that the protection measures associated 
with business in general, and with the target business in particular, are 
taken into account. 
 “Employees of the organisation”, so that the Intranet activities of the 
organisation are protected. 
Table ‎4-2 Assessment measures considering the ISO/IEC 27002 security 
objective of "information security policy document" with two controls 
ISO Objective 
Information security policy document “to provide 
management direction and support for information 
security in accordance with business requirements 
and relevant laws and regulations” 
ISO Controls Security Measures 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
1
 
An information 
security policy 
document 
should be 
approved by 
management, 
and published 
and 
communicated 
to all employees 
and relevant 
external parties 
1 A clear definition of information security 
2 
The policy document contain statement of 
management intent, in supporting the goals and 
principles of information security 
3 
The policy document contains a framework for 
setting control objectives 
4 
The policy document contains a brief explanation of 
the security policies, principles and standards 
5 
The policy document contains definition of general 
and specific responsibilities for information security 
management 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
2
 
The information 
security policy 
shall be 
reviewed at 
planned 
intervals or if 
significant 
changes occur 
to ensure its 
continuing 
suitability, 
adequacy and 
effectiveness. 
6 
The policy document contains references to 
documentation, which may support the policy (e.g. 
more detailed security policies). 
7 
The policy document is reviewed at planned intervals 
to check its suitability 
8 
The policy document is reviewed at planned intervals 
to check its adequacy 
9 
The policy document is reviewed at planned intervals 
to check its effectiveness 
10 
The policy document is reviewed if significant 
changes occur to check its suitability 
11 
The policy document is reviewed if significant 
changes occur to check its adequacy 
12 
The policy document is reviewed if significant 
changes occur to check its effectiveness 
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 “External parties”, so that Extranet and Internet activities of the 
organisation are also protected. 
 “Continuous attention”, so that response to change is achieved, and so 
that the required protection is sustained. 
Table 4-2 presents the elected twelve primary assessment measures 
associated with the security objective of the information security policy 
document. These measures will be refined later in the interview analysis 
knowledge acquisition step. 
4.2.1.4 Interview Analysis 
The main purpose of this step was to refine the number of the measures 
revealed from the text analysis step and to give the importance weight for each 
of these measures and its associated controls, objectives and clauses. The 
experts in this step of the knowledge acquisition analysis were selected based 
upon their expertise in concerned domain and years of experience. A total of 4 
experts for each TOPE domain were chosen. The domain expert selection was 
devoted to obtain individuals with well understanding of aspects of each of the 
four domains identified in the preliminary analysis. The output of this step 
reveals 283 most important security measures out of the 682 security 
measures that represent effectively the 133 ISO/IEC 27002 security controls. 
The steps used to refine the number of the extracted measures of the above 
text analysis step and to assign weights for each of the 283 measures, 133 
controls, 39 objectives, 11 clauses and 4 TOPE domains are as follows: 
 Present the expert with a list of measures for each of the 133 ISO 
controls and let the expert express his/her perception of the importance 
of these measures to each of the ISO controls using the scale in Table 
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4-3. In this study, the multiple-item Likert scales are used to measure 
the variables because it is an appropriate interval scale that measures 
behavioural variables. There are no general rules in deciding on the 
type and number of scale point. It could be odd or even numbers and it 
normally ranges between five and ten categories (Parasurman 1986).  
Table ‎4-3 Reference table for the importance values of the measures 
Grade Explanation 
Very High 
The measure is directly associated with the conformance of 
the ISO/IEC 27002. The absence of the measure is directly 
associated with a sever vulnerability. 
High 
The measure is somewhat associated with the conformance 
of ISO/IEC 27002. The absence of the measure is directly 
associated with an important vulnerability. 
Moderate 
The measure is a moderate associated with the conformance 
of the ISO/IEC 27002. The absence of the control is directly 
associated with an insignificant vulnerability. 
Low 
The measure is a little associated with the conformance of 
the ISO/IEC 27002. The absence of the control is directly 
associated with an insignificant vulnerability. 
Not at all 
The measure has no importance associated with the 
conformance of the ISO/IEC 27002. 
 For each control, a matrix of “n*m” is extracted which “n” represents the 
number of experts and m represents the number of measures. 
 The calculation of the aggregated weight for each measure is performed 
using the average for each measure. 
The output of this step is a refined list of these measures appeared in Table 4-
4, and the details appeared in Appendix A. In addition, the calculated weights 
for 283 security measures, 133 controls, 39 objectives, 11 clauses and 4 
TOPE domains are also appeared in Appendix A.  
The purpose of using hybrid of knowledge acquisition methodologies was to 
ensure thorough coverage of the knowledge necessary to identify the 
information security measures. The details of the mapping process between 
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the TOPE domains and the ISO/IEC 27002 standard will be introduced in the 
following sections.  
Table ‎4-4 TOPE view of ISO/IEC 27002 main security clauses, objectives, 
controls and assessment measures 
Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 Basic Parts 
Part 
No. 
Clause 
No. of 
Objectives 
No. of 
Controls 
No of 
Measures 
Technology 
(T) 
10 
Communications and 
Operations 
Management 
10 32 65 
11 Access Control 7 25 41 
12 
Information Systems 
Acquisition, 
Development and 
Maintenance  
6 16 27 
Organisation 
(O) 
5 Security Policy 1 2 5 
6 
Organisation of 
Information Security 
2 11 25 
7 Asset Management 2 5 14 
13 
Information Security 
Incident Management 
2 5 14 
14 
Business Continuity 
Management 
1 5 11 
People 
(P) 
8 
Human Resources 
Security 
3 9 25 
Environment 
(E) 
9 
Physical and 
Environmental Security 
2 13 32 
15 Compliance 3 10 24 
Total objectives, controls and measures 39 133 283 
4.3 ISO/IEC 27002 Assessment Measures 
In the knowledge acquisition steps explained above, the main clauses of the 
standard, together with their objectives and security controls, are structured 
according to the TOPE domains. For each security control, measures are 
introduced, as shown in Table 4-4. The tables appeared in the following 
sections are the results of applying the methodology explained above 
(preliminary analysis, text analysis and interview analysis), and after several 
iterations of each step, based on the updated information at each of the 
previous knowledge acquisition steps. 
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4.3.1 Technology Issues 
Technology issues in the management of information security are the issues 
associated with the technology itself that enables ICT applications and 
services, and with accessing and using the technology applications and 
services. Based on this, three parts of ISO/IEC 27002 would be associated 
with technology issues, and these are the following: 
4.3.1.1 Communications and Operations Management 
This part is concerned with ten main technology issues: operational 
procedures, third party service delivery, system planning and acceptance, 
protection against malicious codes, software and information back-up, network 
security, media handling, exchange of information and software, e-commerce 
services and monitoring activities. The protection measures associated with 
these issues are given in Table 4-5. These measures are derived from the 
“controls” of the standard, as shown above. It should be noted here that the 
protection measures introduced in the following tables are given in the same 
way. 
Table ‎4-5 Technology:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“communications‎and‎
operations‎management” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Operational 
procedures and 
responsibilities: 
correct and 
secure operation 
of‎“Information‎
Processing 
Facilities‎(IPF)”‎ 
IPF operating procedures (Documented / Maintained / Made 
available to the right users)  
Control of changes to IPF 
Segregation of duties: to reduce unauthorised or 
unintentional or misuse of IPF 
Separation of development, test and operational system: to 
reduce risk of unauthorised access or change to the 
operational system 
Third Party (TP) 
service delivery 
management 
Agreement with TP: service definitions, service delivery, and 
security controls (Implemented/Operated/Maintained) 
TP: services, reports, and records  
(Monitored / Reviewed / Audited regularly) 
Changes to TP services (Maintaining & improving security / 
Matching business requirements / Risk-reassessment) 
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System planning 
and acceptance: 
minimising 
system failure 
Performance protection: capacity of resources (Monitoring / 
Tuning / Future need) 
Acceptance of new & upgraded systems (Criteria / Testing) 
Protection 
against malicious 
and mobile code: 
software & 
information 
integrity 
Protection against malicious code: such as viruses (User 
awareness / Detection / Prevention / Recovery) 
Use of mobile code: software that moves between computers 
for automatic execution (Authorisation / Policy) 
Back-up: 
software & 
information  
Back-up policy (Back-up copies / Regular testing) 
Network security 
management: 
network 
operation and 
services 
Protection of network function (Authorisation / 
Responsibilities / Techniques) 
Services agreements: in-house and outsourced 
(Management requirements / Service level / Security 
features) 
Media handling: 
information & 
software 
protection 
Protection procedures for “removable” media 
Protection procedures for “disposable” media 
Protection procedures for  information (Handling/Storage) 
Preventing unauthorised access to system document  
Exchange of 
information & 
software: within 
an organisation 
and with any 
external entity 
Protection of information exchange through all types of 
communication facilities 
Agreements on information exchange with external parties 
Protection of physical media in transit 
Protection of electronic messaging 
Protection of information in interconnected business systems 
Electronic 
commerce 
services 
Protection associated with the public media (Fraud / Dispute / 
Unauthorised action) 
Protection of on-line transactions (Incomplete transmission / 
Miss-routing / Unauthorised action) 
Protecting the integrity of public information 
Monitoring: 
detecting 
unauthorised 
processing 
activities 
Producing and keeping audit logs: user activities, security 
events 
Monitoring the use of IPF, with regular reviews 
Protection of Logging (Facilities / Information) 
Logging the activities of system (Administrator / Operator) 
Fault (Logging / Analysis / Action) 
Clock synchronisation of relevant systems 
4.3.1.2 Access Control 
This part is concerned with seven main technology issues: access to business 
resources, user access management, user access responsibilities, network 
access, operating systems access, access to applications and information and 
access to mobile computing and tele-working. The protection measures 
associated with these issues are given in Table 4-6. 
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Table ‎4-6 Technology:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“access‎control” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Access to 
business  
Access policy according to business requirements  
(Established / Recommended / Reviewed) 
User access 
management: 
authorisation 
User registration & de-registration procedures 
Privileges allocation control 
Password allocation procedure 
Regular reviews of access rights 
User access 
responsibilities 
Selection and use of passwords according to security 
practices 
Appropriate protection of unattended equipment 
Clear desk (Paper / Media) / Clear screen policy 
Network access 
control: network 
services 
Access to services should be restricted to the right users 
Remote access control using appropriate authentication  
Automatic equipment identification to authenticate  
connections from specific locations 
Physical and logical access control to remote  
Diagnostic and configuration ports 
Segregation of (Information services / Users / Information 
systems) 
Access control to shared networks according to the  
requirements of business applications    
Routing control along with the access control policy  
Operating 
system access 
control 
Secure log-on procedures for access to operating systems 
Unique user identifier (ID) / ID authentication technique 
Interactive password management system that ensures 
quality passwords 
Control of utility programmes that may override system and 
application controls 
Shutdown policy after a defined period of inactivity 
Limit on connection time for high-risk applications 
Application and 
information 
access control 
Control of access to information and application system 
functions according to access policy 
Dedicated (isolated) environment for sensitive systems  
Mobile 
computing and 
tele-working 
Security policy and protection measure for  
(Mobile computing / Communication facilities) 
Control of tele-working activities  
(Policy / Operational plans and procedures) 
4.3.1.3 Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance 
This part is concerned with six main technology issues: information systems 
security requirements, correct processing in applications, cryptographic 
controls, security of system files, security in development and support 
processes and technical vulnerability management. The protection measures 
associated with these issues are given in Table 4-7. 
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Table ‎4-7 Technology:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“information‎systems‎
acquisition,‎development‎and‎maintenance” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Information 
systems 
security 
requirements  
Security controls should be specified with the business 
requirements of new or renewed information systems 
Correct 
processing in 
applications(*) 
Validation of input data: to applications 
Incorporating validation checks into applications 
Ensuring message integrity in applications 
Validation of output data: from applications 
Cryptographic 
controls  
Cryptography policy: for confidentiality, authenticity & integrity 
(Developed / Implemented) 
Key management policy to support the use of cryptographic 
techniques 
Security of 
system files 
Control procedures for the installation of software on 
operational systems  
Care for test data (Selection / Protection / Control) 
Control of access to source code of programmes  
Security in 
development 
and support 
processes 
Control procedures for the implementation of changes  
Protection of critical business applications from change in 
operating systems (Reviewing / Testing) 
Limiting changes to software packages / Strict control on 
necessary changes 
Preventing information leakage 
Controlling outsourced software (Supervision / Monitoring) 
Technical 
vulnerability 
management(*) 
Protection against technical vulnerabilities (Obtaining 
information / Evaluation / Risk assessment / Developing 
measures/ Implementation) 
4.3.2 Organisation Issues 
The organisation issues are concerned with handling resources and managing 
events. ISO/IEC 27002 has five parts associated with these issues as shown 
in Table 4-4, and these are given below. 
4.3.2.1 Information Security policy document 
This part has one main organisation issue: security policy. The protection 
measures associated with this issue are given in Table 4-8. 
Table ‎4-8 Organisation:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“security‎policy” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Information 
Security 
Policy 
Information security policy (approved / published / communicated) 
Review of the information security policy (suitability / adequacy / 
effectiveness) 
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4.3.2.2 Organisation of Information Security 
This part has two main organisation issues: internal organisation, i.e. within the 
enterprise concerned, and the enterprise concerned with external parties. The 
protection measures associated with these issues are given in Table 4-9. 
Table ‎4-9 Organisation:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“organisation‎of‎information‎
security” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Internal 
organisation 
Management commitment to information security  
(Directions / Commitment / Assignment of responsibilities) 
Coordination of information security activities by representatives 
from different departments (Roles / Job functions)  
Clear definition of information security responsibilities(*)  
Authorisation process for new information processing facilities 
(Identified/Implemented) 
Organisation’s confidentiality requirements agreements  should be 
(Identified / Regularly reviewed) 
Maintaining appropriate contacts with relevant authorities 
Maintaining appropriate contacts with  
(Special security forums / Professional associations) 
Regular reviews by an independent body, or in case of change, 
should take place (Objectives / Policy / Procedures) 
External 
parties 
Risks to IPF from business processes involving “external parties” 
should be (Identified & Appropriate controls implemented) before 
access is granted 
Security requirements should be addressed before granting 
“customers” access to information or assets 
Agreements with third parties should cover all relevant security 
requirements (Accessing / Processing / Communicating / Managing 
IPF) 
4.3.2.3 Asset Management 
This part also has two main organisation issues: responsibility for 
organisation’s assets, and the classification of information. The protection 
measures associated with these issues are given in Table 4-10. 
Table ‎4-10 Organisation:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“asset‎management” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Responsibility 
for assets 
Assets (Identification / Inventory) 
Assigning owner, “a responsible person or entity: not a property 
owner”, to the relevant assets (Information / IPF) 
Rules of acceptable use should be (Identified / Documented / 
Implemented) 
Information 
classification 
Classification of information according  
(Value / Legal requirements/Sensitivity/Criticality to organisation)  
Procedures  for information (Labelling / Handling) 
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4.3.2.4 Information Security Incident Management 
This part also has two main organisation issues: reporting information security 
events and weaknesses, and managing information security incidents. The 
protection measures associated with these issues are given in Table 4-11. 
Table ‎4-11 Organisation: protection‎measures‎for‎“information‎security‎incident‎
management” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Reporting 
information 
security 
events and 
weaknesses 
Reporting security events as quickly as possible 
Reporting security weaknesses in (Systems/ Services) by 
(Employees / Contractors / Third party users) 
Management 
of information 
security 
incidents(*)  
Response procedures (Quick / Effective / Orderly) 
Mechanisms to (Quantify / Monitor) security incidents according 
to (Type / Volume / Cost)  
Evidence on incident (Collecting / Retaining / Presenting to 
jurisdiction) 
4.3.2.5 Business Continuity Management 
This part is concerned with the security aspects that enable managing 
interruption events and ensures keeping business continuity. The protection 
measures associated with these issues are given in Table 4-12. 
Table ‎4-12 Organisation:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“business‎continuity‎
management” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Information 
security 
aspects of 
business 
continuity 
management 
(*) 
Management process addressing information security 
requirements for business continuity (Developed / Maintained)  
Business interruption events should be  
(Identified with their Probability / Impact / Consequences) 
Plans to restore operation and information at the required level 
and in the required time scale should be (Developed / 
Implemented)  
A framework of business continuity plans should be maintained for 
consistency  in (Addressing security requirements / Identifying 
priority for testing & maintenance) 
Regular (Testing / Update) of business continuity plans 
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4.3.3 People Issues 
Three main types of issue are associated with people; they include: issues of 
concern prior to employment, issues of importance during employment and 
issues related to employment termination or change of employment. The 
protection measures associated with these issues are given in Table 4-13. 
Table ‎4-13 People:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“human‎resources‎security” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Prior to 
employment 
Security roles and responsibilities of (Employees / Contractors / 
Third party users) should be (Defined and Documented) 
according to security policy 
Verification checks on all candidates for (Employment / 
Contractors / Third party users) should be carried out in 
accordance with relevant (Laws / Regulations / Ethics) 
considering (Business requirements / Classification of 
information to be accessed / Risks) 
Contractual security obligations should be agreed and signed by 
(Employees / Contractors / Third party users) 
During 
employment 
(Employees / Contractors / Third party users) should apply 
security in accordance with established policies  
(Employees / Contractors / Third party users) should receive 
appropriate awareness and training with regular updates(*) 
Establishing a formal disciplinary process for employees who 
have committed a security breach   
Termination or 
change of 
employment 
Clear (Definition / Assignment) of responsibilities for performing 
employment termination or change of employment  
(Employees  / Contractors / Third party users) should return all 
assets in their possession upon termination of their work 
Access rights of (Employees  / Contractors / Third party users) 
should be removed upon termination of their work 
4.3.4 Environment Issues 
The environment issues are concerned with the physical environment on the 
one hand, and with professional environment on the other hand. ISO/IEC 
27002 has two parts associated with these issues, and these are given below. 
4.3.4.1 Physical and Environmental Security 
This part has two main issues: an issue concerned with providing secure 
areas, and another concerned with equipment security. The protection 
measures associated with these issues are given in Table 4-14. 
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Table ‎4-14 Environment:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“physical‎and‎environmental‎
security” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Secure 
areas 
Barriers (Walls / Card controlled entry gates / Manned reception 
desks) to protect information and information processing facilities 
Entry controls to secure areas 
Physical security to (Offices / Rooms, / Facilities)  
Physical protection from environmental threats  
(Flood / Earthquake / Explosion / Civil unrest / Other threats) 
Protection and guidelines for working in secure areas should be 
 (Designed / Applied) 
Access points including (Delivery & Loading areas) should be 
(Controlled / Isolated) from IPF. 
Equipment 
security 
Equipment sitting or protection to: reduce environmental threats 
(Flood / Earthquake / Explosion / Civil unrest / Other threats) / 
avoid unauthorised access 
Equipment protection from (Power failures / Other disruptions)  
Protection of cabling (Power / Telecommunications) carrying data 
or supporting information services from interception or damage 
Correct maintenance of  equipment 
Protection of off-site equipment from the different risks of working 
outside the organisation’s premises  
Checking media prior to disposal to ensure the absence  
(Sensitive data / Licensed software)  
No movement of (Equipment / Software / Information) without prior 
authorisation  
4.3.4.2 Compliance 
This part has three main issues: compliance with legal requirements, 
compliance with security policies and standards and information system audit 
considerations. The protection measures associated with these issues are 
given in Table 4-15. 
The above view of the ISO/IEC 27002 has integrated the various issues of the 
standard around the TOPE domains. It has also summarised the protection 
measures around these domains with indicators that can help future 
evaluation.  
It should be noted here that the standard gives more emphasis to some of the 
protection measures given above. The policy document of the organisation 
domain is one of these measures, the rest are marked by (*) in the above 
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tables. These can be assigned extra weight in the assessment process as will 
be discussed later in Chapter 5. 
Table ‎4-15 Environment:‎protection‎measures‎for‎“compliance” 
Issue ISO/IEC 27002 Controls (Protection Measures) 
Compliance 
with legal 
requirements 
Relevant requirements (Statutory / Regulatory / Contractual) & 
Approach to meet them should be (Defined / Documented / Kept 
up to date) for (Each information system / the Organisation) 
Implementing technical procedures that ensure compliance with 
(Legislative / Regulatory / Contractual) / and are Concerned with 
the (The use of material that may enjoy Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) / The use of proprietary software products)(*) 
Protection of important records from (Loss / Destruction / 
Falsification) in accordance with (Statutory / Regulatory / 
Contractual / Business requirements)  
Data protection and privacy according to requirements in  
(Legislation / Regulations / Contracts)  
Deterring users from using IPF for unauthorised purposes 
Cryptographic controls should be used in compliance with 
(Relevant agreements / Laws / Regulations) 
Compliance 
with security 
policies and 
standards,  
Managers should ensure that all security procedures, (Within 
their area of responsibility) are carried out correctly according to 
(Security policy / Standards) 
Regular checks of information systems for compliance with 
security implementation standards  
Information 
systems audit 
considerations 
Audit requirements and activities involving (Checks on 
operational systems)  should be carefully planned and agreed to 
minimise disruption 
Access to audit tools should be protected to prevent (Misuse / 
Compromise) 
4.4 Incremental Assessment Approach 
This section presents an incremental approach for the assessment of 
enterprise information security. The assessment approach is based on the 
TOPE scope, on one hand, and on the information security management 
recommendations of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard, on other hand. The 
proposed approach is of incremental nature, and has three levels of 
assessment, as shown in Figure 4-1, with increasing security controls. The first 
level considers the ISO/IEC 27002 19 essential and common security controls, 
as stated by the standard, which are refined into 45 measures. The second 
level is concerned with all the ISO/IEC 27002 133 base-line security controls, 
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including those of level one, which are refined into 283 basic measures. The 
third level adds to the second level other security controls considered by other 
standards related to the ISO/IEC 27002, or required by various individual 
enterprises, depending on their business and information security strategies. 
The method has the following features: 
 It provides an incremental approach for assessing and consequently 
applying information security according to three levels of increasing 
protection. 
 It considers the refinement of each security control into a number of 
basic measures that ease both assessment and application of the 
ISO/IEC 27002 information security controls. 
Level 1 : Essential Security (ISO/IEC 27002) 
 Level 2 : Base-line Security (ISO/IEC 27002) 
 Level 3 : Detailed Security (ISOIEC 27002 & related standards) 
 
Technology 
Organisation 
People 
Environment 
Level 1 
Level 3 
Enterprise 
Level 2 
Figure ‎4-1 A TOPE scope for information security requirements 
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The incremental method considered here has three levels of increasing 
information security protection. Figure 4-1 illustrates these levels which are 
described in the following. 
4.4.1 Level 1: Essential and Common Security Measures 
The first level is concerned with the essential and common ISO/IEC 27002 
eight security objectives, and their associated 19 information security controls 
as shown in Table 4-16 (ISO/IEC 27002 2005, p.x). This level represents the 
initial starting level that should enjoy priority in enterprises seeking information 
security protection. The controls of this level have been refined into 45 security 
protection measures that ease the assessment and support the application of 
this level. Table 4-16 gives the security objectives and protection controls of 
this level according to the TOPE scope; and it also shows the number of 
measures associated with each control. 
Table ‎4-16 TOPE view of ISO/IEC 27002 essential security objectives, controls, 
together with the number of measures associated with each control 
D Clause Objective Protection Control measure 
T 
Information 
systems 
acquisition, 
development 
and 
maintenance 
Correct 
processing in 
applications 
Validation of input data: to applications 1 
Incorporating validation checks into 
applications: to detect any corruption of 
information through processing errors 
or deliberate acts 
1 
Ensuring message integrity in 
applications 
2 
Validation of output data: from 
applications 
1 
Technical 
vulnerability 
management 
Protection against technical 
vulnerabilities (obtaining timely  
information / evaluation / risk 
assessment / developing measures/ 
implementation) 
3 
O 
Security policy 
Information 
security policy 
document 
Information security policy document 
should be approved by management, 
and published and communicated to all 
employees and relevant external 
parties. 
3 
Organisation of 
information 
security 
Internal 
organisation 
Clear definition of information security 
responsibilities 
2 
Information 
security 
Management of 
information 
Response procedures (quick / effective 
/ orderly) 
3 
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incident 
management 
security 
incidents and 
improvement 
Mechanisms to (quantify / monitor) 
security incidents according to(type / 
volume / cost) 
3 
Evidence on incident (collecting / 
retaining / presenting to jurisdiction) 
3 
Business 
continuity 
management 
Information 
security aspects 
of business 
continuity 
management 
Management process addressing 
information security requirements for 
business continuity (developed / 
maintained) 
2 
Business interruption events should 
be(identified with their: probability / 
impact / consequences) 
2 
Plans to restore operation and 
information at the required level and in 
the required time scale should be 
(developed / implemented) 
2 
A framework of business continuity 
plans should be maintained for 
consistency  in (addressing security 
requirements / identifying priority for 
testing & maintenance) 
3 
Regular (testing / Updating) business 
continuity plans 
3 
P 
Human 
resources 
security 
During 
employment 
People (employees / contractors / third 
party users) should receive appropriate 
awareness and training with regular 
updates in organisational policies and 
procedures relevant to their job 
functions 
3 
E Compliance 
Compliance 
with legal 
requirements 
Implementing technical procedures 
that ensure compliance with 
(legislative / regulatory / contractual) 
/ and are concerned with the (use of 
material that may enjoy intellectual 
property rights: IPR / use of 
proprietary software products) 
3 
Protection of important records from 
(loss / destruction / falsification) in 
accordance with (statutory / 
regulatory / contractual / business 
requirements) 
3 
Data protection and privacy 
according to requirements 
in(legislation / regulations / 
contracts) 
3 
Total 8 19 45 
4.4.2 Level 2: ISO/IEC 27002 Security Measures 
The second level is associated with all ISO/IEC 27002 39 objectives and their 
associated 133 controls, including those of the first level. This level represents 
the internationally recommended base-line information security protection that 
should be followed by all enterprises. The controls of this level have been 
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refined into 283 basic security protection measures, as shown in Table 4-4 that 
ease the assessment and support the application of this second level.  
4.4.3 Level 3: ISO Other Security Standards 
The third level goes beyond the base-line security protection provided by 
ISO/IEC 27002. It considers the additional security controls of other ISO 
standards.  
Table ‎4-17 TOPE view of ISO/IEC 27002 related ISO standards 
TOPE 
ISO/IEC 27002  Related Standards 
Clause Objective Standard Related Issues 
T  
Communications 
and Operations 
Management 
Network 
security 
management 
ISO/IEC 18028 
IT security 
techniques: 
IT network security 
Information 
Systems 
Acquisition, 
Development 
and 
Maintenance 
Security 
requirements 
ISO/IEC 13335 
Risk management 
processes to identify 
requirements for 
security controls 
ISO/IEC 15408 
Evaluation criteria for 
IT security products 
Cryptographic 
controls 
ISO/IEC 11770 
Management of 
cryptographic keys 
ISO/IEC 9796 Public key encryption 
and digital signature ISO/IEC 14888 
Other cryptographic control standards:  
JTC 1  SC 27 and other standards 
Security of 
system files 
ISO/IEC 10007:  
TC 176 
Management 
Configuration 
management 
ISO/IEC 12207:  
SC 7 Software 
Software lifecycle 
process 
Security in 
development 
and support 
processes 
ISO/IEC 15408 
Evaluation of 
systems and software 
for high integrity 
O  
Security Policy 
Information 
Security 
Policy 
ISO/IEC 13335-3 Risk assessment 
ISO/IEC 13335-1 
Concepts and models 
for security 
management 
Organisation of 
Information 
Security 
Internal 
organisation 
ISO/IEC 13335-1 
Management 
commitment to 
information security 
ISO 19011: 
TC 176 
Management 
The establishment 
and recommendation 
of a review 
programme 
Asset Responsibility ISO/IEC 13335-3 To value assets and 
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Management for assets represent their 
importance 
Information 
Security Incident 
Management 
Reporting 
events and 
weaknesses 
ISO/IEC 18044 
Reporting of 
information security 
events and 
management of 
incidents 
E Compliance 
Compliance 
with legal 
requirements 
ISO 15489-1  
TC 46 
Information and 
documentation 
Managing 
organisational 
records 
Table 4-17 gives a TOPE view of the other ISO standards associated with the 
various clauses of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard, and it also shows the related 
issues addressed by these standards. This level may also consider other 
security controls related to various national standards, and it may also include 
the special information security protection requirements of individual 
enterprises, that related to their business objectives.  
4.5 Summary 
The work presented in this chapter supports the future use of the ISO/IEC 
27002 information security management standard in two main ways. On the 
one hand, it gives an integrated view of the standard, according to the TOPE 
domains, with illustrations of how to provide valid security measures for 
evaluating the effectiveness of applied information security management 
practices, according to the standard. On the other hand, it introduces an 
incremental approach for assessing and consequently managing information 
security inside enterprises according to three levels of increasing protection 
measures. The chapter promotes the use of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard and 
helps enterprises to move gradually and in a well structured approach toward 
enhancing their information security according to the ISO international 
information security management standards. 
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Chapter 5  
A MODEL FOR ENTERPRISE INFORMATION 
SECURITY READINESS ASSESSMENT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a mathematical model that enables numerical 
investigation of enterprise information security readiness, with regards to the 
security requirements of the ISO/IEC 27002 information security management 
standard. The proposed model has a multi level structure that coincides with 
the hierarchical design of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard. It depends on a 
modelling technique that enables aggregation of lower level information 
security assessment values into upper level comprehensive scores. It has the 
ability to capture the employees’ perception about the effective use of 
information security protection measures. The developed model serves as a 
base for designing an information security investigation form that can be used 
to collect the required enterprise information security assessment data. 
Chapter 5, therefore, contributes in addressing the second research question 
stated in Chapter 1 which is related to the assessment of enterprise 
information security readiness by using an efficient, valid and reliable 
modelling technique. 
5.2 Assessing Enterprise Information Security  
Enterprises willing to obtain ISO/IEC 27001 information security certification 
that promotes their e-services image should normally pass through three 
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successive stages as follows: 
 The first stage is for the alignment of the enterprise’s information 
security management system with the one in the ISO standard.  
 The second stage is the conformance with the ISO requirement which 
typically involves the enterprise to implement ISMS using ISO/IEC 
27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 standards. By doing so, the enterprise 
asserts internally that its ISMS system is compliant with the standard, 
but without any proof.  
 The third stage is to have a formal certification of the enterprise’s ISMS 
against ISO/IEC 27001 by an accredited certification body. 
The first and second stages stated above are running internally by the 
enterprise information technology department. The results of the conformance 
process are a list of the missing ISO/IEC 27002 security controls that should 
be implemented before the enterprise moves to the third stage of getting a 
formal certificate. In this respect, the assessment model presented in this 
thesis is expected to provide enterprises with a tool that helps in the 
identification of the missing ISO/IEC 27002 controls. In addition, it will provide 
these enterprises with an assurance measure of the effective use of these 
controls.  
The ISO/IEC 27004 (2009) measurement standard recommends the following 
general steps for the development and implementation of enterprise 
information security measurement system.  
 Developing measure (i.e. base measures, derived measures and 
indicators); 
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 implementing and operating an information security management 
programme; 
 collecting and analysing data; 
 developing measurement results; 
 communicating developed measurement results to the relevant 
stakeholders; 
 using the measurement results as contributing factors to ISMS-related 
decisions; 
 using the measurement results to identify the needs for improving the 
implemented ISMS, including its scope, policies, objectives, controls, 
processes and procedures; and 
 facilitating continual improvement of the information security 
measurement programme. 
The above steps are found to be aligned with the approach presented in this 
thesis for developing an information security assessment model. The proposed 
model could be used by enterprises to measure the effective use the ISO/IEC 
27002 security controls and to provide an assurance measure of enterprises’ 
information security management system (Saleh et al. 2007). 
5.3 Information Security Assessment Approach 
The approach described below can be used for practical investigation of an 
enterprise with the ISO/IEC 27002 information security management standard 
and with its associated standard ISO/IEC 27001. The approach is described in 
terms of the following: 
 The TOPE view of the approach that re-arranges the clauses, objectives 
and controls of the ISO/IEC 27002 according to the TOPE domains (see 
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Chapter 4). This will present the structure of the evaluation that is the 
structure of the quantitative indicators for evaluating information security 
readiness. 
 The assessment model that enables the evaluation of enterprises with 
the ISO/IEC 27002 controls upon which the assessment provided by the 
method is based.  
 The basic steps of the assessment method to show how the measures 
are evaluated. 
5.3.1 The TOPE View of the ISO/IEC 27002 Standard 
Chapter 4 suggests mapping between the TOPE domains and the main 
clauses of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard. Table 4-4 showed how the ISO/IEC 
27002 clauses, and their associated objectives, controls and measures have 
been mapped to the TOPE domains of technology, organisation, people and 
environment. The numbers of measures required for investigating information 
security readiness with regards to the ISO/IEC 27002 protection controls 
associated with each TOPE domain are as follows: 133 for the technology 
domain, 69 for the organisation domain, 25 for the people domain and 56 for 
the environment domain. Appendix A holds a complete list of these measures. 
5.3.2 The Assessment Model 
The proposed mathematical model for practical investigation of information 
security readiness within an enterprise is presented in the following three 
stages: 
 The first stage is concerned with identifying the TOPE based structure 
of the model that integrates the various parts and issues of the ISO/IEC 
27002 standard. 
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 The second stage is associated with describing how the information 
security readiness assessment, for the various issues of the TOPE 
based structure, can be investigated. 
 The third stage is related to providing guidelines on the application of 
the model in the investigation of practical case-studies. 
5.3.2.1 Model Structure 
The proposed approach considers the evaluation of the indicators to be 
associated with the following five main levels:  
 The first level is concerned with the assigned information security 
measures, that developed in Chapter 4, for the evaluation of the 
effective use of security controls of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard; 
 the second level is associated with the security controls recommended 
by the standard for the achievement of its objectives;  
 the third level is related to the security categories of the clauses of the 
standard, which are concerned with its objectives; 
 the fourth level is concerned with the clauses of the standard organised 
according to their relationship with each of the TOPE domains; and 
 the fifth level is associated with the TOPE domains. 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the multi-level structure explained above. This structure 
integrates the issues of the standard over the TOPE domains and provides five 
main levels of detail for each domain, considering the divisions of the 
document of the standard. The four domains give the integrated scope of the 
standard, while the five levels of detail provide the depth according to which 
each domain can be investigated. 
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5.3.2.2 Investigation of Information Security Readiness 
The investigation of information security readiness, described below, has the 
following main features: 
 It provides evaluation indicators for each of the TOPE domains, and at 
all levels of detail, as shown in Figure 5-1; 
 it recognises that the evaluation of the indicators starts at the bottom 
level and moves gradually from one level to another, where the 
evaluation of each of the higher levels is based on the evaluation of its 
preceded level; and 
 in accumulating the indicators from one level to another, it assigns 
weights to the values of the indicators, so that each indicator is valued 
according to its importance weight to the information security of the 
enterprise considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Main 
Domain 
4. ISO Related Clauses 
3. ISO Related Objectives 
2. ISO Related Controls 
1. Measures: Use of Controls 
ENVIRONMENT 
PEOPLE 
ORGANISATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
Four Main Domains: 
TOPE Scope 
Five 
Evaluation 
Levels of 
Detail 
Figure ‎5-1 The structure of the TOPE model concerned with the investigation 
of enterprises with the ISO/IEC27002 standard 
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The investigation also provides an overall ISO/IEC 27002 information security 
indicator for the enterprise considered. This can be called the security(s)-
readiness indicator of the enterprise.  
5.3.2.3 The Mathematical Model 
Table 5-2 translates the above investigation features into mathematical forms. 
It provides mathematical representations of the issues of the TOPE domains 
and their levels of detail. It defines the investigation indicators and provides 
the mathematical equations needed for their evaluation. It refines the target 
investigation of information security readiness assessment into the following 
five main steps: 
 The first step considers the investigation of indicators at the bottom 
level. It is concerned with the information security measures associated 
with the evaluation of the effective use of the ISO/IEC 27002 security 
controls. In this respect, it considers that various measures of using a 
security control have different relative weights representing their shared 
effect on the use of that control, as discussed before in Chapter 4. In 
addition, it also considers that the performance grades of these security 
measures can be evaluated based on the following four metrics:  
 Whether management is aware of the importance of the 
measure; 
 if monitoring of the measure is performed; 
 if the measure and its inputs and outputs are documented; and 
 if the measure improvement actions take place on regular basis. 
These four metrics are used to evaluate each measure, and finally the average 
represents the performance grade of the concerned measure.  
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The assessment of the security measures at the lower levels will be conducted 
using the scale in Table 5-1. 
 The second step moves up to the investigation concerned with the 
achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 objectives. It shows how the 
indicators of this achievement can be found. The evaluation of these 
indicators depends mainly on the evaluation indicators of the effective 
use of security controls related to the objectives concerned. Relative 
weights are also taken into account here, with respect to the 
relationships of the security controls with their related objectives. 
Table ‎5-1 Reference table for performance values of the assessment measures 
Grade Explanation 
Excellent 
The management is aware of the importance of the 
measure. The measure is monitored. Documentation is present. 
The measure is under continuous improvement.  
Very Good 
The management is somewhat aware of the importance of the 
measure. No monitoring is performed. Documentation is present. 
No continuous improvement.  
Good 
The management is aware of the importance of the measure. 
No monitoring is performed. No documentation is present. No 
continuous improvement.  
Poor 
Some of the management personal aware about the importance 
of the measure. No monitoring performed. No documentation 
exists. No continuous improvement takes place.  
None 
The management is not aware of the importance of the measure. 
No monitoring performed. No documentation exists. No 
continuous improvement. 
 The third step is concerned with the investigation of information security 
readiness in accordance with ISO/IEC 27002 clauses. It shows how the 
indicators of this investigation can be found. The evaluation of these 
indicators depends on the achievement of ISO/IEC 27002 objectives. 
Relative weights are also taken into account, with respect to the 
relationships of the objectives with their related ISO/IEC 27002 clauses. 
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Table ‎5-2 The TOPE model issues, equations and steps concerned with the 
investigation of enterprises with the ISO/IEC 27002 standard 
Indexes of the 
issues of the 
TOPE 
structure and 
their ranges  
TOPE 
domains 
i Domain index. 
I Number of domains: I = 4 (TOPE) 
ISO 
clauses 
j ISO clause index. 
J[i] Number of ISO clauses related to domain [i] 
ISO 
objectives 
k ISO objective index. 
K[i, j] 
Number of ISO objectives related to part [j] of 
domain [i]. 
ISO 
controls 
l ISO security control index.  
L[i, j, k] 
Number of ISO security controls associated 
with objective [k] of clause [j] of domain [i]. 
Evaluation 
measures 
m 
Index of one measure of use of a security 
control. 
M[i, j, k, l] 
Number of measures concerned with the use 
of security control [l] of objective [k] of clause [j] 
of domain [i]. 
STEP 1: 
Use of ISO 
controls  
v[i, j, k, l, m] 
Value assigned to one measure concerned with the 
use of a security control. 
w[i, j, k, l, m] 
Relative weight of the measure for the security 
control considered. 
c[i, j, k, l, m] 
Relative value of the measure:  
c[i, j, k, l, m] = w[i, j, k, l, m] . v[i, j, k, l, m] 
C [I, j, k, l] Indicator of use of the security control considered. 



],,,[
],,,,[],,,[
lkjiM
m
mlkjiclkjiC
1  
STEP 2: 
Achievement 
of ISO 
objectives 
w[i, j, k, l] Relative weight of a security control for its objective 
b[i, j, k, l] 
Relative indicator of use of the security control 
considered for its objective: 
b[i, j, k, l] = w[i, j, k, l] . C[i, j, k, l] 
B[i, j, k] 
Indicator of achievement of the objective 
considered. 



],,[
],,,[],,[
kjiL
l
lkjibkjiB
1  
STEP 3: 
Conformance 
of ISO 
clauses  
w[i, j, k] Relative weight of an objective for its clause 
p[i, j, k] 
Relative indicator of objective achievement for its 
clause: 
p[i, j, k] = w[i, j, k] . B[i, j, k] 
P[I, j] Indicator of conformance of the clause considered. 



],[
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k
kjipjiP
1  
STEP 4: 
Compliance 
of TOPE 
domains  
w[i, j] Relative weight of a clause for its domain 
d[i, j] 
Relative indicator of clause conformance for its 
domain: 
d[i, j] = w[i, j] . P[i, j] 
D[i] Indicator of compliance of the domain considered. 



][
],[][
iJ
j
jidiD
1  
STEP 5: 
Security-
readiness 
w[i] Relative weight of a domain  
r[i] 
Relative indicator of the domain compliance: 
r[i] = w[i] . D[i] 
R Indicator of overall security readiness: s-readiness. 




5
1
I
i
irR ][
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 The fourth step is concerned with the investigation of compliance with 
one TOPE domains. It shows how the indicators of this compliance can 
be found. The evaluation of these indicators depends on the evaluation 
of the indicators of conformance of ISO/IEC 27002 clauses. Relative 
weights are also taken into account, with respect to the relationship of 
the ISO/IEC 27002 clauses with their related TOPE domains. 
 The fifth step is the final step, and it is concerned with the overall 
indicator of all TOPE domains, put together collectively, that is the 
indicator of enterprise security readiness. The evaluation of this 
indicator depends on the evaluation of the indicators of compliance of 
the four TOPE domains. The relative weights of these indicators are 
taken into account. 
5.4 The Proposed Assessment Process 
The proposed seven basic steps process to assess enterprise information 
security readiness are illustrated in Figure 5-2. The explanation of each step is 
given in the following:  
 Step 1: Mapping the ISO/IEC 27002 over the TOPE domains; this has 
been addressed in Chapter 4 and presented in Table 4-1. 
 Step 2: Providing measures for investigating enterprise conformance 
with each of the 133 ISO/IEC 27002 security controls; this step is 
explained also in Chapter 4 and presented in Table 4-4. The details of 
these measures are given in Appendix A. 
 Step 3: Preparing an analytical mathematical model that inter-relates 
the various factors involved and identifies s-readiness assessment 
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indicators, based on both performance grades and importance weights, 
as will be explained in the following sections and given in Table 5-2. 
 Step 4: Identifying the enterprise of the case-study considered. For this 
purpose, an investigation form including the following two main parts is 
designed as shown in Appendix A. 
 
v 0 to 4 
w 1 to 5 
 
Step 2 
Step 7 
Step 6 
Step 5 
TOPE-ISO/IEC 27002 measures 
Technology(133)/Organisation(69)/ 
People(25)/Environment(56) 
TOPE/ISO view 
Input 
IND T O P E TOPE 
S-readiness      
 
Output 
m1 
 

 
w2 m2 
 
mn 
wn 
w1 
Scale 
Assessment Model 
Measures level Controls level 
Example of 
Presentation 
of Results 
Case Study: Enterprise “A” 
Source of information Main features 
Data Collection (Investigation Form) 
 
TOPE  
Domains 
ISO/IEC 27002 
Standard 
40 
67 
67 
73 TECHNOLOGY 
ORGANISATION 
PEOPLE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Step 1 
Step 3 
Step 4 
Figure ‎5-2 The steps of the proposed information security readiness 
assessment process 
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o The first part is concerned with identifying the main features of 
the enterprise for the case-study considered.  
o The second part is associated with the person providing 
information on the state of information security of the concerned 
enterprise.  
 Step 5: Obtaining the required information on the case-study 
considered. For this purpose, the mathematical model described above 
is transformed into a questionnaire instrument which appeared in the 
third part of the proposed investigation form Appendix A. The resulting 
investigation form accepts performance grades and relative importance 
weights based on the scale presented in Tables 5-1 and Table 4-3 
respectively for the assessment measures associated with the ISO/IEC 
27002 security controls at the bottom level. It also accepts relative 
weights at the other levels for the controls, objectives, clauses and 
domains, as discussed before in Chapter 4 and presented in Table 4-3. 
 Step 6: Deriving the s-readiness indicators at all levels by using the 
equations of Table 5-2 and the information filled into the investigation 
form of Step 5.  
 Step 7: Presenting the obtained results in an illustrated manner. The 
results can be given at different levels, depending on the level of 
assessment that needs to be demonstrated. Since every intermediate 
level includes a number of elements associated with a lower level, the 
use of the radar graph is suggested to demonstrate the elements of an 
indicator at a specific level. 
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5.5 Practical Application of the Model 
The above model enables practical investigation of enterprises working in 
different businesses, with the security requirements of the ISO/IEC 27002 
standard, to be conducted. This type of investigations would produce 
indicators at the various levels of the proposed model structure. This would 
help diagnosing the strengths and the weaknesses of information security 
protection measures in the concerned enterprise; and it would also help 
directing their effort toward the issues that need improvements. The data 
derived from such assessment provides the enterprise with an indication of the 
level of assurance in their information security system according to the 
ISO/IEC 27002 standard, and whether there are areas that need improvement. 
In the application of the model to practical case-studies, the considerations, 
given below, would need to be taken into account. 
 The use of the steps of the model given in Table 5-2 would require a 
comprehensive investigation form to be designed. The form should 
cover the scope of the four TOPE domains and the depth of the five 
levels of the model. 
 For every measure concerned with the evaluation of a security control, 
two inputs need to be specified: the first evaluates the extent to which 
the measure is practically applied; and the second provides the relative 
weight of this measure, with regards to accomplishing the security 
control considered. Table 5-3(a) suggests the use of five grades for the 
evaluation of the measures depending on the scale presented in Table 
5-1. Table 5-3(a) suggests also the use of five grades for the evaluation 
of the importance of the measure depending on the scale presented in 
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Table 4-3. The state of different measures can be represented 
collectively by a radar graph to illustrate their strengths and 
weaknesses. Table 5-3(b) gives an example concerned with a security 
control, with three measures involved. Table 5-3(c) provides examples 
of how the relative weights of three measures can be assigned, based 
on the scales of Table 4-3 and Table 5-1, and how the state of their 
security control can be determined. 
Table ‎5-3 Evaluation grades, weights and examples of measures, relative 
weights and indicators 
 
 
Evaluation Grades (Performance) 
 0 1 2 3 4 
None Poor Good Very Good Excellent 
 
 
 
Evaluation Weights (Importance) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Low Moderate High Very high 
 
(a) Evaluation grades & weights: five states 
(b) Given performance 
grades of the measures 
v [1] = 4 
(Excellent) 
v [2] = 3 
(Very Good) 
v [3] = 2 
(Good) 
Given relative weights w [1] = 33 % w [2] = 50 % w [3] = 17 % 
Indicator: this can be 
applied at all levels 
C = v [1] * w [1] + v [2] * w [2] + v[3] * w [3] = 
 3.16 (Grade range: Very Good) 
(c) Radar graph illustrating 
the three given 
measures: this can be 
applied at all levels 
 
 For the evaluation of the achievement of an objective, the state of their 
security controls would be needed as an input. Another needed input 
value is the relative weight of each security control involved in the 
achievement of the objective. The radar graph and the relative weight 
considerations as shown before in Table 4-3 for the security controls 
can also be used here for the objective domain. The evaluation for the 
0
1
2
3
4
m[1]
m[2]m[3]
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higher levels: ISO/IEC 27002 clauses, TOPE domains and the s-
readiness levels can then go in the same way, with each taking an input 
from its preceded level, and another input for the weights of its related 
issues.  
The above guidelines are taken a step further in the following section which 
describes the basic components of the investigation form. 
5.5.1 The Investigation Form 
In the application of the above approach to practical case studies, an 
investigation form would be used for collecting the required data. The design 
and structure of the investigation form will be based on the assessment 
approach presented in the previous section. The developed investigation form 
was extensive, and it was comprised of four major sections as shown in 
Appendix A. 
Design of the Investigation Form 
The investigation form to be used in the assessment has to meet the 
objectives of the assessment process and must be effective in identifying 
issues related to the subject matter being assessed. Various researchers have 
established principles that must be considered when designing the questions 
of the investigation form that will provide valid and reliable data. These 
principles include the following: Brevity and clarity; respondent’s language 
ability and specialised knowledge; short sentences free of jargon; one concept, 
issue or problem; clearly diverging response choices and proper layout of 
questionnaire (Saunders et al. 2007). 
The concept of validity of the questions of the investigation form implies that 
care must be taken to ensure that these questions assess what it claims to 
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assess. In other words, validity is concerned with whether the question is 
measuring the right concept or not. A valid investigation form consistently 
yields reliable and stable results over time. In this respect, the information 
security readiness questions must, therefore, focus on what constitutes 
information security in an enterprise and the user’s perception thereof to 
correctly determine the effective use of the information security measures in 
the concerned enterprise (Bagozzi 1994; Cooper and Emory 1995). The main 
sections of the developed investigation form are described in the following: 
Section‎“A” 
The first section of the investigation form is used mainly to collect information 
about the investigated enterprises such as: type of enterprise, size, field, how 
long has the enterprise been in business and the existence of separate 
information security department. This information was used to draw a 
‘business profile’ for the participated enterprises in this research work. This 
helps providing and comparing assessment results associated with enterprises 
that share common features (Brace 2004). 
Section‎“B” 
The second section of the investigation form is concerned with collecting 
information about the respondents to the investigation form such as: their level 
in the enterprise, their nationality, age, degree, subject of study, special 
qualifications in information security and their years of experience working in 
IT. This information was used to draw the ‘Personal Profile’ for the respondents 
of the investigation form. This helps ensuring the credibility of the obtained 
information. 
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Section‎“C” 
The investigation form would use the mathematical model presented above 
that considers and inter-relates all the issues concerned, according to the five 
levels as shown in Figure 5-1, and the ISO/IEC 27002 clauses, objectives, 
controls and the associated measures extracted in Chapter 4. So, for each of 
the four TOPE domains, the following components are taken into account: 
 Every measure concerned with the evaluation of a security control, 
would need two inputs that is the two values explained above to be 
found manually or automatically if possible. 
 Each security control can be evaluated from these measures and can 
also receive a relative weight value concerned with its association with 
the related objective. 
 Each objective can then be evaluated in the same manner. 
 The evaluation process can then be continued gradually to include the 
evaluation of the ISO/IEC 27002 clauses. 
In this respect, the form was designed so that each question is given with the 
following two factors: 
 Indicator for the practical use (performance) of the security measure for 
information protection in the enterprise. Five levels of indication are 
given as shown in Table 5-1. 
 Indicator for using the security measure (importance) for information 
security. Five levels of relative importance are given as shown in Table 
4-3. 
The above components are given in the following tables for each TOPE 
domain. 
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Technology Domain 
Table 5-4 gives the three main clauses of the standard associated with the 
technology domain together with their 23 objectives, 82 protection controls and 
133 evaluation measures. 
Table ‎5-4 Technology domain: Related ISO/IEC 27002 clauses, objectives, 
protection controls and evaluation measures 
Subject:  
ISO Clauses 
Issue: ISO Objectives 
No. of 
Controls 
No. of 
Measures 
Communications 
and operations 
management 
Operational procedures and 
responsibilities 
4 8 
Third party service delivery 
management 
3 8 
System planning and acceptance 2 5 
Protection against malicious and 
mobile code 
2 6 
Back-up 1 3 
Network security management 2 5 
Media handling 4 6 
Exchange of information 5 9 
Electronic commerce services 3 3 
Monitoring 6 12 
Access control 
Business requirements for access 
control 
1 3 
User access management 4 6 
User responsibilities 3 5 
Network access control 7 9 
Operating system access control 6 10 
Application and information access 
control 
2 3 
Mobile computing and tele-working 2 5 
Information 
systems 
acquisition, 
development and 
maintenance 
Security requirements of 
information systems 
1 2 
Correct processing in applications 4 5 
Cryptographic controls 2 4 
Security of system files 3 4 
Security in development and 
support processes 
5 9 
Technical vulnerability 
management 
1 3 
Organisation Domain 
Table 5-5 presents the five main clauses of the standard associated with the 
organisation domain, together with their 8 objectives, 29 protection controls, 
and 69 evaluation measures. 
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Table ‎5-5 Organisation domain: Related ISO/IEC 27002 clauses, objectives, 
protection controls and evaluation measures 
Subject:  
ISO Clauses 
Issue: ISO Objectives 
No. of 
Controls 
No. of 
Measures 
Security policy Information security policy 2 5 
Organisation of 
information 
Security 
Internal organisation 8 18 
External parties 3 7 
Assets 
management 
Responsibility for assets 3 8 
Information classification 2 6 
Information 
security incident 
management 
Reporting information security 
weakness 
2 5 
Management of information security 
incidents 
3 9 
Business 
continuity 
management 
Information security aspects of 
business continuity management 
5 11 
People Domain 
Table 5-6 gives the ISO/IEC 27002 clause concerned with the people domain 
that is the human resources security which has 3 objectives, 9 protection 
controls, and 25 evaluation measures. 
Table ‎5-6 People domain: Related ISO/IEC 27002 clause, objectives, protection 
controls and evaluation measures 
Subject:  
ISO Clauses 
Issue: ISO Objectives 
No. of 
Controls 
No. of 
Measures 
Human 
resources 
security 
Prior to employment 3 9 
During employment 3 9 
Termination or change of employment 3 7 
Environment Domain 
Table 5-7 presents the two main clauses of the standard associated with the 
environment domain together with their 5 objectives, 23 protection controls, 
and 56 evaluation measures. 
Table ‎5-7 Environment domain: Related ISO/IEC 27002 clauses, objectives, 
protection controls and evaluation measures 
Subject:  
ISO Clauses 
Issue: ISO Objectives 
No. of 
Controls 
No. of 
Measures 
Physical and 
environmental 
security 
Secure areas 6 16 
Equipment security 7 16 
Compliance 
Compliance with legal requirements 6 19 
Compliance with security policies and 
standards 
2 4 
Information system audit consideration 2 4 
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It should be noted that only numbers are considered above for both the 
protection controls and their evaluation measures. This avoids unnecessary 
details; but of course the controls themselves and their measures are 
important components of the practical investigation form. In addition, the 
evaluation grades and the relative weights of the various indicators are also 
important components of the form. Appendix A holds a complete list of these 
measures. 
Section‎“D” 
The final section of the investigation form gives users the opportunity to 
present their views and comments and to identify the missing and/or the 
unnecessary factors in the developed investigation form using open ended 
questions.  
In addition the investigation form was accompanied by a cover letter that 
explained why the enterprise had to complete the questions, what would be 
done with the feedback, how long it would take to complete the questions and 
the response would be anonymous. 
Illustrating the Results 
The radar chart is a graphical method of displaying multivariate data in the 
form of two-dimensional chart of three or more quantitative variables 
represented on axes starting from the same point. The relative position and 
angle of the axes is typically uninformative. The radar graph can be used to 
answer the following questions: What variables are dominated for a given 
observation?; Which observations are most similar i.e. are there clusters of 
observations?; Are there outliers?. It is a useful way to display multivariate 
observations with an arbitrary number of variables. The radar graph was used 
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by Johansson and Johnson (2005) in comparing different information security 
standards based on three (purpose, scope and time) domains. Christian et al. 
(1996) use the radar graph to illustrate the distribution of funds among five 
(possession of control, confidentiality, availability, authenticity and integrity) 
data security factors. The radar graph will be used by the model developed in 
this chapter for demonstrating the assessment results. 
5.6 An Illustrative Example 
The example presented here illustrates the results that can be obtained from 
using the above approach and its investigation form for practical case-studies. 
The example emphasises the results concerned with the single objective and 
the two protection controls of the ISO/IEC 27002 clause of security policy, 
associated with the organisation domain. These results are related to two 
levels of the model which are the measures and the controls levels. 
Table ‎5-8 An example of the results concerned with the measures of the use of 
the protection controls of ISO/IEC 27002 “security policy” 
Measures of Protection 
Controls of Security Policy 
Results Illustration of 
Results v w 
Control (1): 
Policy 
document 
Approval by 
management 
3 .5 
 
Published 
throughout the 
organisation 
4 .3 
Communicated to 
concerned people 
3 .2 
Indicator of use of security 
policy  control no.1 =  
3*.5+4*.3+3*.2 = 3.3 
Control (2): 
Policy 
review 
Continuing review 2 .7 
 
Review if 
significant change 
occur 
3 .3 
Indicator of use of security 
policy control no.2 = 2*.7+3*.3 
= 1.32 
0
1
2
3
4
v[1]
v[2]v[3]
0
1
2
3
4
v[1]
v[2]
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 Table 5-8 gives the results concerned with the evaluation of use of the 
two protection controls, of the ISO/IEC 27002 security policy, using the 
five measures specified for this purpose. The measures of each control 
are illustrated in a radar graph. In addition, an indicator of the use of 
each control is given, considering the weights of the measures with 
respect to implementing the control. 
 Table 5-9 gives the results concerned with the evaluation of the 
achievement of the single objective of ISO/IEC 27002 security policy, 
using the evaluation of the use of the related protection controls given 
in Table 5-8. The grades of the controls are illustrated in a radar graph. 
In addition, an indicator of objective achievement is given, considering 
the weights of the controls with respect to achieving the objective. 
Table ‎5-9 An example of the results concerned with the achievement of ISO/IEC 
27002 security policy objective, considering the results of Table 5-8 
Protection Controls of Security 
Policy Objective 
Results Illustration of  
Results c w 
ISO 
Objective: 
Security 
Policy 
Information security 
policy document 
3.3 .7 
 
Review of the 
information security 
policy 
1.3 .3 
Indicator of achievement of 
security policy objective = 
3.3*.7+1.32*.3= 2.71 
The results concerned with other objectives and controls of the other ISO/IEC 
27002 clauses, associated with the other TOPE domains would be of similar 
nature. 
5.7 Impact of the Assessment 
The above contribution of this research study will be of practical benefit for 
both enterprises wishing to test their own information security protection state 
relative to the information security standards for the purpose of improvement; 
0
1
2
3
4
v[1]
v[2]
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and for customers or potential partners concerned with testing the 
conformance of the enterprises with these standards.  
The practical results of the assessment model will indicate the effectiveness of 
the implemented information security systems from the user perspective and 
will illustrate the state of their information security readiness. These results will 
show the weaknesses at all levels with numerical indicators that could be used 
by the directors of the considered enterprise to assign priorities and direct 
resources to improve their information security practices. The assessment 
results also provide the enterprise’s officials with the following information: 
 Evidence about the effectiveness of security controls in protecting the 
enterprise information resources. This will help to Identify information 
system weaknesses and deficiencies and to confirm that the identified 
weaknesses and deficiencies in the information system have been 
addressed; 
 an indication of the quality of the risk management processes employed 
within the enterprise as the results of the assessment model will be 
used in the developed EISRM framework presented in Chapter 3; 
 information about the strengths and weaknesses of information systems 
protection measures, which are supporting enterprise missions and 
business functions in an environment of increasing challenges; 
 prioritise risk mitigating decisions and the associated risk mitigation 
activities; and 
 support continuous monitoring activities and information security 
situational awareness. 
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5.8 Summary 
The mathematical model presented in this chapter provides a tool for the 
investigation of the conformance of enterprises information security system 
with the ISO/IEC 27002 information security management standard, and with 
its related standard ISO/IEC 27001. The investigation form associated with the 
model shows how the investigation can be conducted, and how results can be 
derived and presented. The presented example illustrates the multi-level, 
results concerned with one TOPE domain, and provides overall higher-level 
results associated with the TOPE level, together with the s-readiness indicator. 
Once the enterprise has applied the proposed model, it can assess the 
effectiveness of their information security system and identify the weaknesses 
security areas that need improvement.  
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Chapter 6  
AN ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SECURITY COST-
BENEFIT MODEL 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 aims to develop an analytical model concerned with the analysis of 
the cost of the recommended protection measures that could be used by 
enterprises for facing the information security challenges versus the benefits 
from acquisition and deployment of these protection measures in reducing the 
effects of these challenges. One of the essential objectives of the proposed 
EISRM framework presented in Chapter 3 is to base the mitigation process 
(the improve phase) on suitable financial metrics and to find the optimal 
enterprise security budget in the selection of the best-practice controls subset 
that is appropriate to its needs from the set of all possible best practices 
security controls. Herewith research question 3 is addressed namely to base 
the selection of the recommended information security protection measures on 
an economical analysis.  
6.2 Background 
The information security management, from the perspectives of business 
managers, is an investment to be measured in saved cost because of reducing 
loss (Lee et al. 2002; Borodin et al. 2005; Ryan J. and Ryan D. 2006). In 
contrary, information security management, from the perspectives of technical 
managers, is only the technical tools and organisational procedures that 
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should be implemented to reduce the expected risk to an acceptable level 
(Venter and Eloff 2003). The later approach was prevailing for decades in 
formulating the information security management financial decisions inside 
enterprises. The former one started recently to balance the information security 
expenditures with the expected benefit from these expenditures (Bojanc and 
Jerman-Blazic 2008; Schrecher 2004; Boehmer 2009). 
Recently, a number of important surveys indicates that financial metrics start to 
direct the decision between the alternatives of information security protection 
measures. The computer crime and security survey started from 2008 to 
include a question to determine the popularity of Return on Investment (ROI), 
Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) as financial metrics 
for quantifying the cost and benefits of computer security expenditures. The 
survey shows that 39% of the respondents indicated that their enterprises 
used ROI as a metric, 21% used NPV, and 17% used IRR (CSI, 2008, pp 9-
10). The global information security breach survey also shows that 44% of the 
large UK business companies consider the decision on what to spend on 
information security as formal business, while 38% quantify the quality to 
business technique and 12% evaluate the ROI (ISBS 2006). 
The remainder of this section is as follows: the economical directions stated by 
standard organisations will be presented first. Then a number of the most 
important financial metrics and their suitability in investigating information 
security mitigation plans will be discussed. Finally, the cost-benefit approach 
for information security risk management will be investigated in detail. 
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6.2.1 Standard Organisations Economic Directions 
The ISO/IEC 27002 information security management standard stated that 
appropriate controls for risk treatment should be selected and implemented to 
meet not only the requirements identified by the risk assessment, but also to 
satisfy other requirements including the cost of implementation and operation 
in relation to the risks being reduced and the need to balance the investment in 
implementation and operation of controls against the harm that is likely to 
result from security failures (ISO/IEC 27002 2005, pp.5-6).  
In addition to the above ISO direction, different other standards and 
professional organisations also include directions and general guidelines for 
basing the selection of the information security protection measures on an 
economical analysis. Three of such standards and documents will be 
presented in the following. 
6.2.1.1 AS/NZS 4360 
The AS/NZS 4360 risk management standard states that enterprises should 
adopted specific cost-effective strategies and action plans for risk treatment, 
development and implementation. The standard also added that the selection 
of the most appropriate mitigation option involves balancing the costs of 
implementing each option against the benefits derived from it. Furthermore, 
the standard suggests that when making such cost versus benefit judgments, 
the context of the enterprise under consideration should be taken into account 
considering all direct and indirect costs and benefits whether tangible or 
intangible, and measured in financial or other terms (AS/NZS 4360 2004, pp. 
21-22). 
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6.2.1.2 NIST SP 800-30 
The NIST SP 800-30 document suggests running cost-benefit analysis for 
each of the proposed controls to determine which control is required and 
appropriate for the enterprise circumstances. The document emphasises 
encompassing the following steps in running cost benefit analysis for the new 
controls: 
 Determining the impact of implementing the new or enhanced controls; 
  determining the impact of not implementing the new or enhanced 
controls;  
 estimating the costs of the implementation; and  
 assessing the implementation costs and benefits against system and 
data criticality to determine the importance of implementing the new 
controls to the enterprise, given their costs and relative input (NIST SP 
800-30 2002, pp.36-37). 
6.2.1.3 Microsoft 
The Microsoft document for information security risk management states that 
the main goal of conducting decision support in selecting the treatment 
controls is to identify and evaluate control solutions based on a defined cost-
benefit analysis process. The document also suggests considering the 
acquisition, implementation, ongoing, communication, training of both staff of 
IT & users, productivity & convenience and auditing & verifying the 
effectiveness of costs in conducting cost-benefit analysis. Table 6-1 provides 
an explanation for the different types of costs recommended by the Microsoft 
document (Microsoft 2006, pp.89-90). 
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Table ‎6-1 Microsoft detailed new or enhanced control costs 
Cost Type Explanation 
1 Acquisition  
Software, hardware or services related to a proposed new 
control. 
2 Implementation 
For staff or consultants who will install and configure the 
proposed new control. 
3 Ongoing  
Relates to continuing activities associated with the new 
control such as management, monitoring and 
maintenance. 
4 Communication  
Relates to communicating new policies or procedures to 
users. 
5 
Training for IT 
Staff 
Associated with the IT staff that would need to implement, 
manage, monitor and maintain the new control. 
6 
Training for 
Users 
Associated with users who would have to incorporate new 
behaviour in order to work with the new control. 
7 
Productivity and 
Convenience 
Associated with users whose work would be impacted by 
the new control. 
8 
Auditing and 
Verifying 
Effectiveness 
For ensuring that the control is actually doing what it was 
supposed to do. 
6.2.1.4 Summary 
The previous discussion revealed that all reviewed standard and professional 
organisations concerned with information security risk management 
recommend the use of economical analysis in the selection of the most 
appropriate protection measures for mitigating the discovered security flaws. 
However, enterprises wanted to manage risks based on economical analysis 
would be faced with a lack of indicators, rigorous methodologies and standard 
tools for conducting the suggested economical analysis (Liu et al. 2006; 
Cavusoglu et al. 2004b; Bernard 2007). Most of the above reviewed 
documents did not suggest standard procedures or systematic approach for 
developing and using financial metrics in adjusting the overall information 
security expenditures (Cavusoglu et al. 2004a; Tsiakis and Stephanider 2005; 
Anderson and Moore 2006; Johansson et al. 2006). In the paragraphs that 
follow, a summary is provided for the most important financial metrics that 
could be used in building the required cost-benefit model that will be presented 
later in this chapter. 
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6.2.2 Information Security Financial Metrics  
There are a number of financial metrics that evolved from the information 
security risk management literature to assess information security risks. A brief 
description of each of these metrics and their related issues, as shown in 
Table 6-2, will be discussed in the following sections. 
Table ‎6-2 Information security financial metrics 
Metric/Symbol Way of Calculation / Source 
a 
Annual Loss 
Expected 
(ALE) 



n
i
ii FOIALE
1
)(
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t  is the time of the cash flow 
i  is the discount rate 
Rt  is the net cash flow 
(Tsiakis and Stephanides 2005; Anderson and Moore 2006) 
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of Return 
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C0  is the initial cost of an 
investment 
Ct  respective cost in year t 
Bt  respective benefit in year t 
(Tsiakis and Stephanides 2005; Anderson and Moore 
2006). 
6.2.2.1 Annual Loss Expected (ALE) 
In 1979, the national bureau of standards of the USA published the 
quantitative method for performing risk analysis known as the annual loss 
expectancy (FIPS PUB 65 1979). ALE metric became a common measure for 
the risk of a harmful event, which is the product of the yearly rate of occurrence 
of the event times the expected loss resulting from each occurrence. The main 
limitation of this metric is that it cannot distinguish between high-frequency, 
 
- 142 - 
 
low-impact events and low-frequency, high-impact events. In many situations, 
the former may be tolerable, while the later may be catastrophic.  
Gordon and Loeb (2001) suggested using an improved version of ALE metric 
that is modified for situations in which at most one loss will occur. Thus, the 
dollar cost of a loss is multiplied by the likelihood of a loss, rather than the 
expected frequency of loss that used to calculate ALE. The probability that a 
breach will occur is modelled as a function of the dollars invested in security. 
Their theoretical work is considered as a step forward to solve the problem of 
estimating the frequency of harmful events. Bodin et al. (2008) suggested 
solving the problem of estimating the expected frequency of loss by using 
three measures: the expected loss, the expected severe loss and the standard 
deviation of the loss instead of using one measure in the ALE method. In their 
method, the calculation of the expected loss is by adding the product of each 
loss with its respective probability. The expected severe loss is focused on the 
breaches that would put the survivability of the enterprise at risk, and it is 
calculated by adding together the product of each loss, that is greater than or 
equal to the specified threshold loss, with its respective probability. The 
standard deviation of loss represents the dispersion around the expected loss. 
It is computed by taking the square root of the product of squares of the 
deviation of each loss from the expected loss with the probability of the loss.  
The calculation of the frequency of occurrence of loss is not an easy task, 
especially in different environments and with scarcity of the available data and 
its suitability to the environment under consideration. The estimations of the 
factors of the ALE equation, as shown in Table 6-2(a), are mainly depending 
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on the expert judgment and on the little published data from insurance 
companies, academic research and independent surveys. 
6.2.2.2 Return on Investment (ROI) 
The ROI metric, as shown in Table 6.2(b), measures the productivity of an 
investment. A company‟s productivity is the ratio between the total outputs and 
the total inputs. The total inputs being the external and internal resources used 
by the company to make its activity work and the total outputs being the value 
of the production (Tsiakis and Stephanides 2005; Anderson and Moore 2006). 
The ROI metric is considered in terms of finance as the most important 
financial indicators. It clearly indicates how well money is used. ROI also helps 
to determine whether it is wise to invest in a project or in something else. Mizzi 
(2005) emphasised the need to precisely calculate the return on information 
security investment. His work identified specific factors concerned with the 
needed security expenditures, and it also introduced related factors concerned 
with the viability of these expenditures. 
6.2.2.3 Return on Security Investment (ROSI) 
Purser (2004) suggests using an improved equation for the ROI metric used in 
financial arena to be more suitable for information security. The risk mitigation, 
when security initiatives are concerned, is considered as an important 
component of the ROI and it is important to include it as an explicit factor in the 
ROI calculation. Sonnenreich et al. (2006) suggest using an improved 
equation, as shown in Table 6-2(c), for calculating the ROSI. According to their 
equation, measuring risk exposure is conducted by investigating the loss of 
highly confidential information and the productivity loss associated with a 
security incident. They recommended doing so using a good survey and 
scoring system by the enterprise itself. The mitigated risk, or in other words, 
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the benefits of security solutions could be calculated also by evaluating risk 
mitigation within the context of the considered problem. In quantifying solution 
cost, the impact of the solution on the productivity is considered an important 
factor.  
6.2.2.4 Net Present Value (NPV) 
The NPV metric is defined as the total present value of a time series of cash 
flows. It is a standard method for using the time value of money in assessing 
the financial value of long-term projects (Anderson and Moore 2006). The NPV 
metric, as shown in Table 6-2(d), is an indicator of how much value an 
investment or project adds to the value of the enterprise. In financial theory, if 
there is a choice between two mutually exclusive alternatives, the one yielding 
the higher NPV should be selected. The problem with using NPV for security 
investments is that the accuracy is quite critical in obtaining comparatively 
meaningful results. 
6.2.2.5 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
The IRR metric is often used in order to decide in which alternative to invest. 
Using IRR metric, as shown in Table 6-2(e), involves calculating the 
investments expected return, and can be used to compare different investment 
alternatives. The choice might stand between investing in a machine, and 
simply investing the money in a bank account that gives an interest on the 
money (Tsiakis and Stephanides 2005; Anderson and Moore 2006). The 
comparison is always done by calculation of the IRR factor between different 
alternatives using a discount factor compared to the bank account. The 
outcome of the calculation should equal zero and, therefore the better of the 
alternatives is then likely to invest in. There is no one perfect discount factor, 
and therefore different companies use different discount factors as they 
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believe it fits their enterprise and investment best suit their context. The IRR 
metric is considered as an indicator of the efficiency or quality of an 
investment, as opposed to NPV, which indicates value or magnitude. 
6.2.2.6 Summary 
In spite of the importance of each of the above financial metrics in assessing 
the information security expenditures, each one of them cannot work alone in 
producing reasonable results. Bojanc and Jerman-Blazic (2008) concluded 
that each of the previous metrics (ROI, NPV and IRR) has its benefits, and for 
producing better results they should be used together. In this respect a new 
approach is needed for addressing the financial considerations in dealing with 
information security expenditures. 
6.2.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Cost-benefit analysis is a technique for comparatively assessing the costs and 
benefits of an activity or project over a relevant time period. It may also be 
defined as the process of comparing the various costs of acquiring and 
implementing an information security system with the benefits which the 
enterprise derives from the use of the system (Roper 1999; Tipton and Krause 
2010). The cost-benefit analysis is generally developed to build a business 
case for the use of a particular technology solution by comparing the 
investment amount, net benefit, return on investment and cost effectiveness. 
Hoo (2000) provides a traditional decision analytic framework to evaluate 
different IT security policies based on cost-benefit trade-off. The framework 
considers not only the costs of security controls and expected loss from 
security breaches, but also takes care of the additional profits expected from 
new opportunities. There is clear limitation to the applicability of this model. 
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This model overstates the reduction in risk resulting from the use of safeguards 
that act as substitutes for each other. In addition, the model fails to capture the 
effects of complimentary safeguards. Finally, the model leaves an open 
question of how to forecast the rate at which loss events will occur, and how to 
forecast the reductions in these rates that will result from adding safeguards. 
Instead, the methodology of the model requires, as its input, the fractional 
reduction in security breaches that can be expected from implementing each of 
the safeguards under consideration.  
Gordon and Loeb (2001) suggested an economical model for the evaluation of 
information security investment based upon cost benefit technique. In their 
model, three quantities are identified: the total benefits of implementation of 
information security infrastructure „B‟, the total cost of that implementation „C‟ 
and different levels of information security „S‟. The goal is to determine the 
point where the gain denoted as „G‟, related to „S‟ is maximum. From 
mathematical point of view that point can be found by differentiating the related 
equation and making it equal to zero. 
Butler (2002) summarises the results of using a cost-benefit analysis method 
called Security Attribute Evaluation Method (SAEM) to compare alternative 
security design in financial and accounting information system. The case study 
presented in his paper starts with a multi-attribute risk assessment that results 
in a prioritised list of risks. Security specialists estimate countermeasure 
benefits, and how the enterprise‟s risk is reduced. Using SAEM, security 
design alternatives are compared with the enterprise‟s current selection of 
security technologies to see if a more cost-effective solution is possible. 
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6.3 Information Security Economical Analysis  
The previous sections present a review of the recent literature in the subject. 
This review shows a gap that exists in the current research regarding the 
absence of a generic practical model for assessing the cost of the protection 
measures versus the benefit from applying these measures in reducing or 
eliminating the discovered risk. For addressing this problem, the following 
sections start by introducing the common technologies and management 
practices that are used by enterprises for mitigating the discovered information 
security risks. Second, the proposed model for information security cost-benefit 
analysis is presented. In this respect, the following sections will address the 
answers to the following three main related questions:  
 How to protect the important asset of information in IT-based 
applications; 
 how much information security is enough for such applications; and  
 how to evaluate the resulting security benefits. 
These questions given above, and of course their answers are of interrelated 
nature. They collectively provide a background for the target cost-benefit 
model for information security context.  
6.3.1 Protection of Information 
The question of how to protect information in IT-based applications has been 
answered by professional organisations concerned with IT. They produced 
information security products including: firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), antivirus programmes, cryptographic techniques and other security 
products and tools. These tools increased very fast and became very 
sophisticated and powerful in providing different levels of protection to security 
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challenges. Venter and Eloff (2003) introduce taxonomy of the most used 
technologies by enterprises in controlling risk. These technologies are divided 
into two groups, proactive and reactive. Each of these groups has three layers 
of security technologies, network layer, host layer and application layer. 
Table 6-3 gives related data from the annual computer crime and security 
survey of the computer security institute (CSI 2007). The data shows that the 
most frequently used information protection tools by enterprises, depending on 
information technology systems in their business, for the years 2006 and 2007. 
Table ‎6-3 Protection tools and their use according to the annual computer crime 
and security survey (CSI 2007) 
Seq. Security Technologies 
Percent Used (%) 
2006 2007 
1 Anti-virus software 97 98 
2 Firewall 98 97 
3 VPN (Virtual Private Network) -- 84 
4 Anti-Spyware software 79 80 
5 Intrusion detection system 69 69 
6 Encryption for data in transit 63 66 
7 Vulnerability/ patch management -- 63 
8 Server-based access control list 70 56 
9 Static account login / password 46 51 
10 Encryption for data in storage 48 47 
11 Intrusion prevention system 43 47 
12 Application-level firewall 39 45 
13 Log management software 41 44 
14 Forensics tools 38 40 
15 Smart card/one-time password token 38 35 
16 Public key infrastructure 36 32 
17 Specialised wireless security system 32 28 
18 Endpoint security client software  31 27 
19 Biometrics 20 18 
20 Other 4 4 
6.3.2 Required Protection 
The question of how much security is enough has been addressed by national 
and international organisations concerned with IT risk management and 
information security management standards, as shown in Chapter 2. These 
organisations provided risk management methods and information security 
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management standards that recommend the use of various management rules 
and technical tools for the protection of information security. These 
recommendations usually provide common, or just enough security protection 
practices and not necessarily best possible practices. The ISO/IEC 27002 
information security management standard is considered as one of the most 
important examples. Other examples of related standards are given in chapter 
2. Chapter 5 presents an approach for enterprise information security 
readiness assessment that could be used to share in answering the above 
question.  
6.3.3 Evaluation of Information Security Benefits 
The question of the evaluation of security benefits is of an economic nature. 
Such benefits usually come as a result of investment, where cost is the major 
factor. Different researchers have addressed this problem with various 
considerations. The Incident Cost Analysis Modelling Project (I-CAMP) is an 
early example in applying the Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) in computer security 
(Mercuri 2003). The model was developed by the big ten universities during 
the 1990s. The model is appropriate for situations where the related usage 
losses are considered to be modest or ignored entirely. Xie and Mead (2004) 
investigated the System Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) model 
and applied the cost-benefit analysis framework for information security 
improvement in small companies. 
Anderson and Choobineh (2008) provided an extensive discussion of the cost 
and benefits of information security in enterprises. The discussion explored 
various factors concerned with the development of enterprise information 
security strategies. This is useful in highlighting what should be taken into 
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account in conducting cost-benefit analysis from which an information security 
strategy can be developed. 
6.3.4 Summary 
The above discussion shows that information security protection tools are not 
only available, but they are also in practical use (CSI 2007; Khadraoui and 
Hermann 2007; Brotby 2009); standards for guiding the implementation of the 
security protection measures exist (ISO/IEC 2005; BSI 2004); and evaluations 
of protection benefits, considering protection cost, have been addressed from 
different angles by different researchers (Gordon and Loeb 2002; Mizzi 2005; 
Anderson and Choobineh 2008). A gap exists in current research for providing 
a practical generic model that can be easily used as a common guide toward 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of security protection measures in 
different enterprises, and under different circumstances. Such a model would 
be able to accommodate different factors and considerations associated with 
the applications concerned. It would provide a wise calculating guide to the 
implementation of the recommendations of information security standards.  
6.4 The Proposed Cost-Benefit Model 
The mathematical model presented here provides practical generic tools for 
the cost–benefit analysis of security challenges versus protection measures. 
The cost of security challenges can be very high if no protection measures are 
provided. While such measures support reducing the security challenges and 
their cost, they obviously do not come without cost of their own. In some 
cases, where many sophisticated protection measures are used, their cost 
may out-weigh the savings they cause to the cost of security challenges. This 
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common problem is illustrated in Figure 6-1, and it is the concern of the model 
presented here. 
The model provides analytical tools for dealing with the cost-benefit 
assessment tasks illustrated in the procedure of Figure 6-2; these tasks 
include the following:  
 Identifying the security challenges that need to be taken into account; 
 specifying the protection measures that can be considered; 
 estimating the actual protection resulting from the use of the protection 
measures; 
 finding the saved cost of security challenges resulting from the use of 
the protection measures; 
 finding the residual cost of security challenges resulting from the saving 
caused by the use of the protection measures; and 
 finding the cost function that considers the total cost and illustrates the 
cost-benefit state. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Protection 
Measures 
Figure ‎6-1 Protection measures versus security challenges: Cost-benefit 
analysis 
Protection 
measures 
reduce risk, 
but may have 
considerable 
cost 
Cost of risk 
is reduced, 
as protection 
measures 
increase 
Risk 
Challenges 
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The analytical tools that deal with the above tasks are described in the 
following sections. 
6.4.1 Security Challenges 
Table 6-4 identifies the basic factors associated with the security challenges 
and their inter-relationships. The number of these challenges is considered to 
be a variable. For each challenge, it gives its estimated cost if it occurs and it 
Start 
 
Consider protection 
measures 
 
Identify security 
challenges 
Estimate cost of 
protection measures 
Estimate cost of 
challenges 
Estimate probability of protection from challenges 
resulting from protection measures 
Find saving of cost of challenges resulting 
from protection measures 
Find residual cost of challenges 
resulting from protection measures 
Find cost function: cost-benefit 
analysis 
Repeat for future 
investigations 
Figure ‎6-2 Cost-benefit analysis procedure 
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considers its expected annual frequency of occurrence. The same table gives 
the expected annual cost of each challenge and the annual cost of all 
challenges. 
Table ‎6-4 Security challenges and their cost  
Symbol Description 
i Challenges index. 
I Number of identified challenges. 
G[i] Estimated cost of challenge [i] in case of occurrence. 
F[i] Expected frequency of challenge [i] per year. 
g[i] 
Expected cost of challenge [i] per year. 
][].[][ iGiFig   
g 
Expected cost of all identified challenges per year. 




Ii
i
igg
1
][  
6.4.2 Protection Measures 
Table 6-5 gives the basic factors concerned with the protection measures and 
their inter-relationships. The number of these protection measures is 
considered as a variable. For each measure, it addresses its annual cost. The 
annual total cost of all protection measures is also taken into account. 
Table ‎6-5 Protection measures and their cost 
Symbol Description 
j Protection measures index. 
J Number of protection measures considered. 
K[j] Average cost of protection measure [j] per year. 
k 
Average cost of all identified protection measures per year: 
“J protection measures”. 




Jj
j
jKk
1
][  
A point of clarifications is needed here, that is the distinction between a 
protection measure and a protection tool. A protection tool, such as those 
listed in Table 6-3, can be used with different controls leading to different 
protection measures that result in different protection levels. For example, the 
anti-virus software tool may be used with or without information back-up 
security control leading to two different protection measures.  
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6.4.3 Resulting Protection 
Of course the use of the protection measures would lead to reducing the effect 
of the challenges and consequently to saving their cost, partially or fully. Table 
6-6 is concerned with estimating the probability of protection provided by the 
protection measures considered, individually and collectively, that is with 
regards to each identified challenge.  
Table ‎6-6 Protection from challenges 
Symbol Description 
P[i, j] 
Expected probability of protection from challenge [i] due to 
using protection measure [j]. 
p[i] 
Accumulated probability of protection from challenge [i], 
due to using all protection measures considered: “J 
protection measures”. 
1],[][
1



Jj
j
jiPip  
6.4.4 Cost Saving 
Achieving a certain level of protection would lead to a certain level of saving of 
the cost of the challenges and, this is expressed in Table 6-7. The table 
considers the saving caused by each protection measure and associated with 
each challenge. The accumulated savings are also taken into account. 
Table ‎6-7 Saving of challenges cost 
Symbol Description 
S[i,j] 
Cost saving from cost of challenge [i], due to using protection 
measure [j]. 
],[].[],[ jipigjiS   
s[i] 
Cost saving from cost of challenge [i], due to using all protection 
measures considered: “J protection measures”. 
][].[][ ipigis   
s 
Total cost saving of all identified challenges “I challenges”, due 
to using all protection measures considered: “J protection 
measures”. 




Ii
i
iss
1
][
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6.4.5 Residual Cost 
As shown above, protection measures cannot fully eliminate challenges. 
Therefore, the challenges will keep certain residual cost, and this is addressed 
in Table 6-8. Various residual costs are given in the same table, both 
individually and collectively. 
Table ‎6-8 Residual cost of challenges 
Symbol Description 
R[i,j] 
Residual cost of challenge [i], due to using protection 
measure [j]. 
]),[1].([],[ jipigjiR   
r[i] 
Residual cost of challenge [i], due to using all protection 
measures considered: “J protection measures”. 
])[1].([][ ipigir   
r 
Total residual cost of all identified challenges “I challenges”, 
due to using all protection measures considered: “J 
protection measures”. 




Ii
i
irr
1
][
 
6.4.6 Cost Function 
From the above analysis, cost functions can be developed at different levels. A 
cost function would combine the cost of the protection measures with the 
residual cost of the challenges. This can be viewed at each protection 
measure and challenge level and can also go up to the overall level of all 
protection measures and challenges, as given in Table 6-9.  
The analytical tools given above are of comprehensive nature, and can be 
applied to a wide variety of case-studies. Their practical application, 
considering different challenges and protection measures, would provide an 
insight into the state of cost under different circumstances. Of course minimum 
value for the overall cost function is desired, but this would also depend on the 
policy and objectives of the concerned enterprise. 
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Table ‎6-9 Cost functions: challenges with protection 
Symbol Description 
C[i,j] 
Cost of protection measure [j], combined with the residual cost 
of challenge [i], due to using the protection measure. 
],[][],[ jirjkjiC   
c[i] 
Cost of all protection measures considered “J protection 
measures”, combined with the residual cost of challenge [i], due 
to using these protection measure. 
][][ irkic   
c 
Cost of all protection measures considered “J protection 
measures”, combined with the residual cost of identified 
challenges “I identified challenges”, due to using these 
protection measures. 
rkc   
A real illustrative example of the application of the above cost-benefit model 
that considers the available protection tools and recommendations associated 
with ISO standards will be presented later in Chapter 7.  
6.5 Summary 
Chapter 6 aims to develop a practical model for economical analysis of 
information security investments that enterprises can use as guidance when 
applying the recommended risk mitigation plans. Chapter 6 presents a review 
of the standard organisation economical directions. In addition, the economical 
metrics associated with enterprises information security risk management are 
also presented. Finally, an approach is then presented based on an 
economical analytical model that enables the assessment of the necessary 
investment in the recommended information security. This model would be 
useful for both information security professionals and researchers in assessing 
the cost of the security measures versus the benefit of these measures in 
reducing the identified information security challenges. 
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Chapter 7  
EVALUATION CASE STUDIES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, evaluation case studies are presented for investigating 
information security readiness of nine well-established business enterprises 
working in different fields in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The main 
objective is to investigate the information security readiness of these 
enterprises and consequently validate the developed information security 
assessment model, therefore providing a valid and reliable tool that can be 
used by enterprises in numerically assessing their information security 
readiness with regards to the security requirements of the ISO/IEC 27002 
information security management standard. Chapter 7, therefore contributes, 
in addressing the fifth research question by illustrating the practical use of the 
developed analytical models in investigating the current state information 
security readiness of the participated Saudi enterprises, and in evaluating the 
most economical security solutions. 
7.2 The Collected Data 
This research was supposed to collect data from several Saudi enterprises to 
have an overall view of the effective use of each of the assigned 283 ISO/IEC 
27002 security protection measures presented in Chapter 4. A website was 
developed and an investigation form was prepared in Chapter 5 and presented 
in Appendix A for collecting the required data. In addition, the investigation 
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form was sent by email to more than 100 business enterprises inside Saudi 
Arabia. Due to the sensitivity of the subject, the response to the website and to 
the mailed investigation form was very weak. Therefore, the decision was 
taken to use the triangulation technique (the use of multiple methods) in 
collecting the required data, and to limit the number of investigated enterprises 
to nine only. 
Using two or more methods for data collection is called triangulation or multi-
method approach, which is believed to achieve a greater understanding and 
grasp of the real world. Denzin (1978) explains that triangulation is an 
approach in which multiple observers, theoretical properties, sources of data 
and methodologies are combined. Patton (1990) argues that studies which use 
only one method are more susceptible to error linked to that particular method. 
Bryman (1995) claims that each of the qualitative and quantitative data 
collection methods has several features which can be regarded as advantages 
or disadvantages and by using triangulation, the validity of conclusions are 
enhanced.  
Considering the number of assigned information security measures (283) and 
the several visits to each of the nine investigated Saudi enterprises for 
collecting the required data, so limiting the number of investigated enterprises 
to nine only satisfies the research objectives at this stage. The main objective 
of this research was devoted for exploring the applicability of the developed 
theoretical model for assessing enterprises‟ information security readiness in 
real world. In addition, the collected data about the effective use of the 
assigned 283 ISO/IEC 27002 information security measures would provide a 
picture of the practical use of the ISO/IEC 27002 information security 
management standard inside Saudi Arabia. This will help in evaluating the 
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approach presented in the thesis from one hand, and in recommending means 
for improving information security management practices inside these 
enterprises from the other hand. 
7.2.1 The Concerned Enterprises 
The enterprises considered in this research study include two banks, three 
governmental enterprises and four private enterprises. The choice of these 
enterprises was based on the following main requirements: 
 Management was willing to discuss in an open manner the information 
security aspects as a part of this research study; 
 management was agreeable to conduct a security review of the 
enterprise‟s current practices and procedures by the researcher; 
 information security managers, employees and users were agreed by 
the top management to be interviewed by the researcher; 
 management provided all written documentation requested to support 
the research including policies, procedures, job descriptions, etc..; and 
 the selected enterprise was depending mainly on the information 
systems in conducting its business objectives with a minimum of 100 
employees. 
It is considered that when an enterprise meets the above requirements, this 
provide an indication that the investigation of its information security readiness 
will gain some success. 
7.2.2 Data Collection 
The information security officer, information technology personnel, head of IT 
administration, programme management officer, data governance officer, risk 
and compliance officer, information security consultants, a human resources 
representative, risk and security personnel, deployment teams, training 
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department, service managers, service desk/incident managers, a marketing 
or communication representative, an internal auditor, as well as general 
computer users were some of the enterprises‟ employees who took part in 
responding to the investigation form. Each of these individuals interacts with 
information security and is being involved in management, implementation, 
communication and compliance. 
A number of interviews with the above stakeholders were carried out to collect 
the required data. Written material was consulted, including documents, 
policies and reports. Observation of practices was performed on site for each 
studied enterprise. In most of the cases, collection of data involved numerous 
visits to the site and observation of activities on several occasions.  
The effectiveness of each 283 information security measures was rated 
between zero and four (in Likert style), according to how extensively the 
measure was used effectively by the enterprise according to the scale 
presented in Table 5-1. A rating of zero indicated that the information security 
measure was absent or not used, and a rating of four denoted that the 
measure was implemented effectively, documented, constantly monitored and 
regularly improved.  
The final ratings, assigned for the effective use of information security 
measures and the occurrence of security problems, were jointly decided by the 
researcher and the managers at each enterprise. This necessitated discussion 
and agreement upon appropriate ratings based upon the information gathered. 
Consistency across cases was also considered by the researcher in the final 
assignment of ratings. 
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7.3 General Enterprises Information 
In the following, the investigated enterprises are introduced. Then, in order to 
give a complete picture of the investigated enterprises, a number of general 
variables about these enterprises are also collected. These variables were 
categorised in two groups namely, the business profile and the personal profile 
as discussed before in Chapter 5.  
7.3.1 The Investigated Enterprises 
In this research study, the decision was taken to not publish the individual 
enterprises‟ names so as to protect the confidentiality of the participated 
enterprises. Therefore, the nine enterprises are ordered from E1 to E9. In 
addition, these enterprises were arranged into three groups (from group A to 
group C). Each group has common features and represents a specific type of 
business as follows:  
 Group “A” includes two banks, “E2 and E9”. This group is for financial 
sector and it represents the state of security inside banks.  
 Group “B” includes three governmental enterprises, “E4, E7, and E8”. 
This group represents the public sector. 
 Group “C” includes four business companies of, “E1, E3, E5, and E6” 
and it represents the private sector which includes business companies 
working in different fields. 
7.3.1.1 Group “A”: Banks 
This group contains two financial enterprises, E2 and E9. The first enterprise, 
E2, is a bank which commenced business on February 2, 1980. This bank 
operates through its 113 branches & 12 women sections, plus 1 branch in 
London, UK since 1991. This bank plays a pivotal role in serving the Saudi 
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economy, making a steady progress over the past years in different areas of 
banking. To enrich the customers‟ experience, the bank offers a variety of 
innovative new products through an expanded retail network. 
The second enterprise E9 has been playing a crucial role in the consolidation 
and development of the financial system at Saudi Arabia. At the time of its 
establishment, the country did not have a monetary system exclusively of its 
own. Foreign currencies circulated in the country as a medium of exchange, 
along with silver coins. The bank notes had not yet been issued. There were 
no banks in existence and the banking business was being conducted by 
foreign bank branches. One of the foremost tasks of this enterprise in its early 
stage was the development of a national currency. This enterprise also 
considered the need for promoting the growth of a national banking system. 
From 1960 to 1972, this enterprise focused on banking regulations against the 
background of expanding banking business and the country‟s acceptance of 
full convertibility of the national currency. From mid 1980s, the enterprise 
priorities were to introduce financial market reforms. Over the years, with the 
growth of the economy and expansion of the financial system, the enterprise 
responsibilities have increased. 
7.3.1.2 Group “B”: Governmental Enterprises 
This group contains three enterprises E4, E7 and E8. These enterprises will 
represent the governmental or public sector in this research study. The first 
enterprise, E4, in this group is considered as a very critical governmental 
enterprise, supporting IT technology inside Saudi Arabia.  
The ruler of the KSA established the general directory of the second enterprise 
E7 in 1926. Four years later, a royal decree was issued to change this 
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enterprise to a ministry. It was the first ministry to be announced in the 
government. Upon the establishment of the general directorate of foreign 
affairs, there were no diplomatic missions abroad. In 1936, the number of the 
country diplomatic missions abroad increased to five (three missions in 
London, Baghdad and Cairo, in addition to two consulates in Swiss and 
Damascus). In the year 1951, the number of branches of this enterprise 
increased to 18 in 16 different countries. This expansion in the international 
relations is in line with the development of this enterprise. This includes the re-
structuring of the enterprise and its administrative team in order to enable them 
to fulfil their duties accordingly. 
The third enterprise E8 is an independent scientific enterprise of the 
government, established in 1977. This enterprise is governed by a supreme 
committee, which is chaired by the Prime Minister and is composed of the 
ministers of the major ministries to which science and technology are of 
greatest relevance as follows: to be a world-class research enterprise vital to 
the country's future and a vital source of science & technology for national 
societal mission, that combines technology with human needs. From its 
inception in 1977, it had been carrying out its mission in the promotion of 
science & technology in the country. This is achieved by coordinating and 
cooperating with various universities, agencies and institutions concerned with 
research and technology. It is also concentrated on encouraging experts to 
undertake research that will help promote the development and evolution of 
the society.  
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7.3.1.3 Group “C”: Business Companies 
This group contains four enterprises E1, E3, E5 and E6. These enterprises will 
represent the private sector in this research study. The first enterprise, E1, is a 
business company that runs a series of restaurants, located in heart of Riyadh, 
which opened its door in February 1992.  
The second enterprise, E3, is a technology company which is one of the 
leading IT infrastructure solutions providers in the country. It is well positioned 
to lead the IT service industry in the Middle East by leveraging its strategic 
partnerships with world class technology vendors, solid service infrastructure 
and its commitment to the region. This enterprise concentrated on the mission 
of enabling the best business results through ideas, people and technology. As 
a total IT infrastructure solutions provider, the company provides a full 
spectrum of services that includes consulting, design, implementation, 
integration and a whole host of outsourcing services. In short, this company 
addresses the entire cycle of a typical IT that include consult, build, deploy and 
manage. Committed to its full-service proposition, it linked itself with strong 
alliances of the world's most renowned technology companies including Cisco, 
HP, Oracle, Veritas, Computer Associates, Microsoft, Symantec, Spirent, 
Redline Communications, CommScope - to provide the most effective and 
competitive solutions to their customers. Recognised for its excellent service, 
quality and business performance, this company has been awarded several 
local and regional achievement recognitions: from country e-business awards 
as the best networking solutions company in 2004, from HP as the best 
enterprise channel in 2003 and from Cisco the gold partner of the year award 
in 2004 for the region of Russia, Middle East and Africa. 
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The third enterprise, E5, is a telecommunication company, better known as 
“network company”. It has offices in the important cities inside and outside the 
country. This company represents global telecom vendors like Nortel, Tellabs, 
Polycom, SatComglobal, Nexans, Juniper Networks and many others. 
The last investigated enterprise in this group, E6, is an electric company, 
reformed in 2000. The company helped to establish generating facilities, 
transmission and distribution systems and substations throughout the country. 
A long-term goal of this company was to increase the capacity of steam 
stations and desalination plants to enable them to generate half of the 
electricity output for the whole country. 
In the following, the business profile results of the nine investigated enterprises 
are first discussed. The personal profile results of the main respondents to the 
investigation form are then introduced. 
7.3.2 The Business Profile 
Table 7-1 provides the collected data from the nine Saudi enterprises 
participated in this study. The table gives full detailed features of each of the 
investigated enterprises including: type of business, size of enterprise, 
business experience and existence of information technology department. The 
business profile results of the participated enterprises, as shown in Table 7-1, 
are summarised as follows: 
 The investigation form has been answered by the following business 
fields: 22% financial sector, 33% governmental sector and 45% private 
sector. This shows a good distribution that represents the main 
business sectors at Saudi Arabia. 
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Table  7-1 “Business Profile” results of the participated enterprises 
Group/ 
Enterprise 
Sector 
Size: No. 
Employees 
Field 
Experience 
Months 
Separate 
IS Dep. 
IT services. 
Computers 
A 
E2 Finance 1001 to 3000 Bank Over 24 Yes Over 3000 
E9 Finance 1001 to 3000 Bank Over 24 Yes 1001 to 3000 
B 
E4 Public 100 to 500 Government Over 24 No 100 to 500 
E7 Public 1001 to 3000 Government Over 24 No 1001 to 3000 
E8 Public 501 to 1000 Government Over 24 Yes Less than 100 
C 
E1 Private 100 to 500 Food Over 24 No Less than 100 
E3 Private 100 to 500 IT Over 24 Yes 100 to 500 
E5 Private 100 to 500 Communication Over 24 Yes 100 to 500 
E6 Private Over 3000 Electrical Over 24 Yes Over 3000 
 All of the investigated enterprises have been in business for more than 
two years. This indicates that these enterprises are settled in business 
and have reasonable IT experience. 
 75% of the investigated enterprises have a separate information 
technology department. This indicates that most of these enterprises 
are mature and depend mainly on the information technology systems. 
 45% of the investigated enterprises are large companies “from 100 to 
3000 employees”. This research study mainly targets the medium and 
large enterprises. 
 78% of these enterprises are mainly depending on IT services (Number 
of computers above 100). 
The results of the business profile assure that the selected enterprises achieve 
the main requirements set by the researcher to have a sample that represents 
different sectors with medium and large enterprises, reasonable IT experience 
and reliant mainly on IT services. 
7.3.3 The Personal Profile 
One of the main objectives of this study was to obtain a managerial 
perspective about the state of information security inside the investigated 
enterprises. The personal profile of the main respondents to the investigation 
form by their level in the enterprise reflects this objective. Consequently, clear 
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majority of the respondents fulfil the objective of the credibility of the collected 
data. It is also worth to mention here that the investigation form was answered 
under the direction of the stated person in Table 7-2, and for each TOPE 
domain, a number of employees according to their expertise in the investigated 
domain are also involved in answering the sub-questions of the investigation 
form. This assures the benefit of the categorisation of the information security 
measures in four specific domains.  
Table 7-2 provides the collected personal information of the respondents to the 
investigation form. It gives full details of the characteristics of the main person 
responsible for providing the data including: position, nationality, age, degree, 
field of study, special IS qualifications and experience. The personal profile 
results of the respondents to the investigation form, as shown in Table 7-2, are 
summarised as follows:  
 60% of the main respondents are at manager level. Consequently, the 
majority of respondents fulfil managerial roles in their enterprises. 
Table  7-2 “Personal Profile” of the respondents to the investigation form 
Group/ 
Enterprise 
Position Nationality 
Age: 
year 
Degree 
Field of 
Study 
Special 
Qual. 
Experience 
Months 
A 
E2 
IT 
Manager 
Saudi 25-40 Bachelor Business 
CISSP 
CIW 
13-18 
E9 
IS 
Manager 
Saudi 25-40 Master 
Computer 
Science& 
Business 
N/A Over 25 
B 
E4 
IT 
Manager 
Saudi 25-40 Master 
Computer 
Science 
N/A Over 25 
E7 
Telecom 
Manager 
Saudi 25-40 Master Engineering N/A 19-24 
E8 
IS 
Manager 
Saudi 25-40 Bachelor 
Computer 
Science 
CISSP
SANS 
M5 
Over 25 
C 
E1 
IT 
Manager 
Non-Saudi 25-40 Bachelor 
Computer 
Science 
N/A Over 25 
E3 
Network 
Engineer 
Saudi 25-40 Bachelor Engineering N/A 19-24 
E5 
System 
Engineer 
Non-Saudi 25-40 Master Engineering N/A Over 25 
E6 
IS 
Engineer 
Saudi 25-40 Bachelor Engineering N/A 19-24 
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 50% have an engineering background, and the rest have a degree in 
computer science.  
 80% are Saudi, and their age is between 25 and 40 years.  
 50% of the respondents have a Master degree, and 20% have Special 
Qualification (SQ) on IT. This indicates that more than 70% of the 
respondents are IT professionals which reflect on the credibility of the 
results. 
 50% of the respondents have more than 2 years experience in 
information security and information technology. 
 Most of the respondents have no special information security 
certificates. This indicates that the interest in information security is still 
not considered as a major concern in the investigated enterprises. 
7.4 Data Analysis and Findings  
In the following sections, the collected information security assessment data 
from the investigated enterprises will be analysed and presented. The obtained 
results provide important numerical and graphical information which illustrates 
the strengths and weaknesses of each enterprise with regards to ISO/IEC 
27002 security controls, objectives and clauses. 
7.4.1 Level-1 Assessment Results 
According to the gradual approach presented in Chapter 4, the assessment of 
the participated enterprises has three levels. Level-1 assessment includes the 
information security controls which is considered by the ISO/IEC 27002 
standard as common and essential for any enterprise. In this regard, the 
assessment starts with the ISO/IEC 27002 specified essential security controls 
concerned with legislative issues. This is followed by the investigation of the 
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security controls considered as common practice for information security 
(ISO/IEC 27002 2005, pp.x.). In the following sections, the existence of these 
controls is checked and presented before the numerical assessment that will 
be presented later in level-2 assessment. The assessment results indicate the 
awareness degree inside these enterprises about the importance of the priority 
in applying the ISO/IEC 27002 information security protection controls. 
7.4.1.1 Essential ISO/IEC 27002 Controls 
The investigation results of the controls, considered by the ISO/IEC 27002 
standard as essential to an enterprise from a legislative point of view, are 
given in Table 7-3. An inclusion tick (√) is used to indicate whether the 
concerned control is applied in the investigated enterprise. These controls 
apply to most enterprises and any environments as stated by the ISO/IEC 
27002 standard. 
Table  7-3 Level-1 assessment results of ISO/IEC 27002 essential controls 
Essential ISO/IEC 27002 Controls 
Enterprise 
A B C 
E2 E9 E4 E7 E8 E1 E3 E5 E6 
1 
Data protection and privacy 
according to requirements. 
√ √   √  √ √ √ 
2 
Protection of organisational important 
records. 
√    √  √ √ √ 
3 
Implementing technical procedures 
that ensure compliance. 
√ √   √  √  √ 
7.4.1.2 Common ISO/IEC 27002 Controls 
The investigation results of the ISO/IEC 27002 controls, which are considered 
common to all enterprises, are given in Table 7-4. An inclusion tick (√) is also 
used here to indicate whether the concerned control is applied in the 
investigated enterprise.  
7.4.1.3 Summary 
Tables 7-3 and 7-4 show that only five of the investigated enterprises E2, E9, 
E3, E5 and E6 scored more than 90% in the implementation of the 19 security 
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controls which are considered as essential and common for the success of the 
implementation of the information security management system inside 
enterprises. One enterprise E4 achieved 43% of these controls, while both of 
E7 and E8 scored 56%. Finally, E1 scored only 21% of these controls.  
Table  7-4 Level-1 assessment results of ISO/IEC 27002 common controls 
Common ISO/IEC 27002 Controls 
Enterprise 
A B C 
E2 E9 E4 E7 E8 E1 E3 E5 E6 
1 
ISP approved by management and 
published. 
√ √  √ √  √ √ √ 
2 
All information security responsibilities 
should be clearly defined. 
√ √ √ √ √  √  √ 
3 
Employees should receive 
appropriate awareness and training 
with regular updates. 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ 
4 Input data to applications validated. √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ 
5 
Validation checks incorporated into 
applications. 
√ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ 
6 
Message integrity in applications 
ensured. 
√ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ 
7 
Output data from applications 
validated. 
 √  √ √  √ √ √ 
8 
Protection against technical 
vulnerabilities. 
√ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ 
9 
Management process addressing 
information security requirements for 
business continuity. 
√ √ 
 
   √ √ √ 
10 
Business Impact Analysis carried out 
to identify the events that can cause 
interruptions. 
√ √ 
 
   √ √ √ 
11 
Plans to restore operation and 
information at the required level and 
in the required time scale developed. 
√ √ √    √  √ 
12 
Business continuity plans have a 
consistent framework addressing 
security requirements and a priority 
for testing and maintenance. 
√ √ 
 
 √  √ √ √ 
13 
Regular programme for testing and 
updating the Business Continuity 
Process. 
√ √ 
 
  √ √ √ √ 
14 
Quick and effective response 
procedures. 
√ √  √  √ √ √ √ 
15 
Mechanisms to quantify and monitor 
security incidents: according to type, 
volume and cost. 
 √ 
 
√  √ √  √ 
16 
Incidents collected, retained and 
presented on to Jurisdiction. 
√      √  √ 
There is a common problem which appeared in most of the investigated 
enterprises that according to the ISO/IEC 27002 standard, the 19 security 
controls appeared in Tables 7-3 and 7-4 are considered essential and common 
controls for any enterprise of any type, size and scale. Therefore, enterprises 
should achieve a high score (of 100%) in implementing these security controls 
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and this is not achieved in most of the investigated enterprises. These results 
indicate the weaknesses of these enterprises in understanding the main role of 
the priority in applying the information security protection measures, according 
to the ISO/IEC 27002 standard. 
7.4.2 Level-2 Assessment Results 
In the following, a comparison between three enterprises representing the 
three groups of the financial, public and private sectors will be introduced. The 
s-readiness assessment results are then presented with comments on 
information security weaknesses of each enterprise considering the TOPE 
domains and their associated ISO/IEC 27002 clauses, objectives, controls and 
measures. The detailed assessment result of one case study, E9, is presented 
in Appendix B as an example. The detailed calculations and assessment 
results of the nine enterprises are presented in Appendix C. 
7.4.2.1 Assessment Results Across the Groups 
This section uses the approach presented in Chapter 5 to present practical 
numerical s-readiness assessment results concerned with three Saudi 
enterprises participated in this research study. The chosen enterprises, 
presented in the following, are associated with different sectors. The 
enterprises considered including a bank, a government enterprise and a 
private company that represent the identified groups A, B and C respectively. 
The case studies given below demonstrate the use of the approach presented 
in the thesis and provide detailed results of the concerned enterprises. 
The Enterprises Considered 
The enterprises considered include: a Saudi bank, E9, which represents the 
financial sector “group A”; a Saudi governmental enterprise, E7, which 
represents the public sector “group B”; and a Saudi company, E5, which 
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represents the private sector “group C”. The three enterprises have the 
following features: 
 The employees of the enterprises are in the range from 1000 to 3000; 
 each enterprise has a separate IT department; and 
 the bank and the government enterprises have been in business for 
more than 30 years; while the private enterprise has only been in 
business for around 5 years. 
The information security managers of the bank and of the government 
enterprises have participated in answering the s-readiness assessment 
investigation form; while the IT manger of the private sector company was the 
one who participated in answering the investigation form. In the following 
sections, the information security assessment results for each of the TOPE 
domains will be presented.  
The Technology Domain 
Figure 7-1 gives the results obtained for the s-readiness assessment of the 
„technology‟ domain.  
 The financial enterprise E9 enjoys the highest scores in this domain for 
the ISO clauses of “communications and operations management”: 
92%, “access control”: 75%, and “information systems acquisition 
development and maintenance” 89%; 
 the government enterprise E7 comes second; while 
 the private sector enterprise E5 is last. 
The overall “technology” domain, non-weighted, scores for the enterprises 
concerned are: 85% for the financial enterprise E9, 72% for the government 
enterprise E7 and 53% for the private sector enterprise E5. 
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The Organisation Domain 
Figure 7-2 shows the results concerned with the “organisation” domain. These 
results illustrate the following: 
 The ISO clause of "business continuity" is at its best in the financial 
enterprise E9, at 100%, and at its worst in the government enterprise 
E7, at 0%; 
 the ISO clause of "organisation of information security" is best in the 
government enterprise E7, at 100%, and worst in the private enterprise 
E5, at 48%; 
 the ISO clause of "assets management" is at the same score of 100% 
both in the financial E9 and in the private enterprise E5, but for the 
government enterprise E7, it is only 52%; and 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance 
Government – E7 
Bank – E9 Company – E5 
Communication & operations 
Management 
Access Control 
92% 
89% 75% 
Communication & operations 
Management 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance 
Access Control 
56% 
55% 
49% 
Communication & operations 
Management 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance 
Access Control 
75% 
75% 
64% 
Figure  7-1 The assessment results of E9, E7 and E5 enterprises concerned with 
the “Technology” domain 
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 the ISO clause of "information security incident management" is 59% in 
the financial enterprise E9, 56% in the government enterprise E7 and in 
the private enterprise E5, it is 34%.  
The overall “organisation” domain, non-weighted, scores for the enterprises 
concerned are: 90% for the financial enterprise E9, 55% for the government 
enterprise E7 and 58% for the private enterprise E5. 
The People Domain 
Figure 7-3 shows the results of the “people” domain at two levels (level III, and 
level IV) of the assessment model presented in Chapter 5. In Figure 7-3 the 
upper graphs illustrate the objectives level “prior to employment”, “during 
employment”, and “termination of employment”, and the lower graphs illustrate 
the clause level “human resources security”. It is generally high in financial 
Figure  7-2 The assessment results of E9, E7 and E5 enterprises concerned  
with the “Organisation” domain 
Organisation of Information 
Security 
Business Continuity  
Management 
Company - E5 
Assets Management 
Information Security Policy 
Business Continuity  
Management 
Information Security Incident 
Management 
50% 
41% 
48% 
100% 
34% 
Bank - E9 
Organisation of Information 
Security 
Information Security Policy 
Information Security Incident 
Management 
89% 
100% 
96% 
59% 
100
% 
Organisation of Information 
Security 
Information Security Policy 
Assets Management 
Information Security Incident 
Management 
Business Continuity  
Management 
100% 
52% 
56% 
0% 
25% 
Government - E7 
Assets Management 
  
- 176 - 
 
enterprise E9 and the governmental enterprise E7 with scores of 90%, and 
100% respectively and poor for the private enterprise E5 with a score of 34%. 
The Environment Domain 
Figure 7-4 gives the results of the “environment” domain. The results show the 
following: 
 The ISO clause of “physical and environmental security” reached the 
highest score of 100% in the government enterprise E7 while this 
enterprise had the least score of 29% in the ISO “compliance” clause.  
Termination or change of 
Employment 
During Employment 
Government - E7 
Human Resources Security 
Prior to Employment 
During Employment 
Termination or change of 
Employment 
34% 
100% 
100% 100% 
Human Resources Security 90% 
Human Resources Security 100% 
Bank - E9 
Prior to Employment 
During Employment 
85% 
93% 93% 
Company - E5 
Prior to Employment 
Termination or change of 
Employment 
18% 
57% 25% 
Figure  7-3 The assessment results of E9, E7 and E5 enterprises concerned 
with the “People” domain 
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The overall “environment” domain, non-weighted scores for the enterprises 
concerned are: 77% for the financial enterprise E9, 68% for the government 
enterprise E7 and 43% for the private enterprise E5. 
Comparison of the Three Enterprises at the Clause Level 
In order to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the three 
enterprises E9, E7 and E5, an analysis of how each enterprise scored on each 
of the eleven ISO/IEC 27002 clauses was undertaken. The performance score 
for each enterprise, according to the assessment model presented in Chapter 
5, was computed and the results are shown in Table 7-5. The first column lists 
the code used for each of the eleven ISO/IEC 27002 clauses, and the second 
column lists the titles of each of the eleven ISO clauses. The columns from 
three to five list the calculated performance score. The data in Table 7-5 are 
shown graphically in Figure 7-5 using the radar graph. There is some 
Government - E7 
Company - E5 
49% 
Physical and Environmental 
Security 
100% 
29% 
Compliance 
Physical and Environmental 
Security 
37% 
Compliance 
Bank - E9 
Physical and Environmental 
Security 
83% 
71% 
Compliance 
Figure  7-4 The assessment results of E9, E7 and E5 enterprises concerned with 
the “Environment” domain 
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significant differences between the three enterprises. The private sector 
enterprise E5 has the worst scores on the majority of the eleven ISO/IEC 
27002 clauses (ISO-C10, ISO-C11, ISO-C12, ISO-C6, ISO-C13, ISO-C8 and 
ISO-C9). The governmental sector enterprise E7 comes second and achieved 
the worst scores in the rest of the ISO/IEC clauses (ISO-C5, ISO-C7, ISO-C14 
and ISO-C15), while the financial sector enterprise E9 has high scores in the 
majority of the ISO/IEC 27002 clauses. 
Table  7-5 E9, E7 and E5 scores on the ISO/IEC 27002 eleven clauses 
Code ISO/IEC 27002 Clauses 
Score (of 4) 
E9 E7 E5 
ISO-C10 Communications and Operations Management 3.6 3.0 2.2 
ISO-C11 Access Control 3.0 2.6 2.0 
ISO-C12 Information Systems Acquisition, Development and 
Maintenance  
3.6 3.0 2.2 
ISO-C5 Security Policy 3.8 1.0 1.7 
ISO-C6 Organisation of Information Security 3.6 4.0 1.9 
ISO-C7 Asset Management 4.0 2.1 4.0 
ISO-C13 Information Security Incident Management 2.3 3.2 1.4 
ISO-C14 Business Continuity Management 4.0 0.0 2.0 
ISO-C8 Human Resources Security 3.6 4.0 1.4 
ISO-C9 Physical and Environmental Security 3.3 4.0 2.0 
ISO-C15 Compliance 2.8 1.1 1.5 
 
 
ISO-C10 
ISO-C11 
ISO-C12 
ISO-C5 
ISO-C7 
ISO-C6 
ISO-C13 
ISO-C14 
ISO-C8 
ISO-C9 
ISO-C15 
Figure  7-5 Radar graph of the E2, E5 and E7 performance scores on the 
ISO/IEC 27002 - clause level 
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The TOPE Indicator 
The results obtained above can be presented collectively at the TOPE level, by 
collecting and weighting the results of each domain. Table 7-6 gives the results 
concerned with the TOPE overall s-readiness indicators for each enterprise, 
and these results are illustrated in Figure 7-6. For the financial enterprise E9, 
the TOPE indicator is (3.4 of 4); for the government enterprise E7, it is (2.8 of 
4) and for the private enterprise E5, it is (2 of 4). 
Table  7-6 TOPE weighted indicators 
Domain 
Assessment Scores – Domain Level 
E9 E7 E5 
D 
(0-4) 
w 
(of 1) 
r 
(%) 
D 
(0-4) 
w 
(of 1) 
r (%) 
D 
(0-4) 
w 
(of 1) 
r (%) 
T 3.39 0.50 42 2.86 0.50 36 2.13 0.50 27 
O 3.61 0.25 23 2.2 0.25 14 2.32 0.25 14 
P 3.6 0.10 9 4.0 0.10 10 1.35 0.10 3 
E 3.09 0.15 12 2.71 0.15 10 1.73 0.15 6 
Indicator 3.4 (86%) 2.8 (70%) 2 (50%) 
 
The presented case studies illustrate the use of the method for practical 
applications. The results show the weaknesses at all levels, with numerical 
indicators that help these enterprises to start security improvement programs. 
Government - E7 
Technology 
Organisation 
People 
Environment 
72% 
68% 
100% 
55% 
Company - E5 
Technology 
Organisation 
People 
Environment 
53% 
43% 
34%% 
58% 
Bank - E9 
Technology 
Organisation 
People 
Environment 
85% 
77% 
90% 
90% 
Figure  7-6 Illustration of E9, E7 and E5 assessment results concerned with the 
TOPE domains 
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The Missing Controls 
The evaluation results presented above would provide the investigated 
enterprises with guidelines for future information security improvements. Table 
7-7 gives a list of the missing controls for each enterprise. This list could be 
used to improve the security state in these enterprises. Also, a template of the 
required security controls could be developed as a result of the e-security 
experience gained from the comparison of the enterprises working in the same 
business.  
Table  7-7 A list of the missing controls for each of the investigated enterprises 
D 
The Missing Controls for Each of the Investigated Enterprises 
Bank - E9 Government - E7 Company - E5 
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 -Protection 
against malicious 
and mobile code 
-Mobile 
computing and 
tele-working 
- Electronic commerce 
services 
- Business 
requirements for access 
control 
- Mobile computing and 
tele-working 
- Cryptographic controls 
- System planning and 
acceptance 
- Exchange of information 
- Business requirements for 
access control 
- Mobile computing and tele-
working 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 
-Reporting 
information 
security 
weaknesses 
- Information security 
policy document. 
- Information 
classification 
- Information security 
aspects of business 
continuity management 
- change control on information 
security policy document 
- security incidents Monitoring 
- Reporting information security 
weaknesses 
- Clear definition of information 
security responsibilities 
- Regular reviews by an 
independent 
P
e
o
p
le
 -Contractual 
security 
obligations 
agreed 
 
- Prior to employment 
- During employment 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t 
-Compliance with 
security policies 
and standards 
- Compliance with legal 
requirements 
- information system 
audit consideration 
- Secure areas 
- information system audit 
consideration 
7.4.3 The Information Security Assessment Report 
An information security assessment report is compiled for each enterprise 
summarising the achieved scores in the five levels of the TOPE assessment 
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model, highlighting the key developmental areas and recommending the 
urgent needed plans as shown in Appendix B. This report was presented to 
the top management for each enterprise who used the assessment results as 
a guide in their information security improvement plans, based on the 
analytical cost-benefit model presented in Chapter 6. 
7.4.4 Assessment Results for All Case Studies 
In the following sections, the overall average s-readiness assessment results 
of the nine investigated enterprises are presented at TOPE s-readiness level, 
the TOPE domains level and the clauses level. In addition, the top ten ranked 
lowest scores at the objectives, controls and measures levels of the 
assessment model are also presented. 
7.4.4.1 The TOPE-Domains Level 
The average s-readiness assessment results of the TOPE domains together 
with the average overall TOPE indicator of the nine participated enterprises 
are presented in Table 7-8. The average TOPE indicator of these enterprises 
is 2.8 of 4 (70%). These enterprises achieved the lowest average score of 2.6 
(65%) in the “Technology” domain and had the highest average score of 3.1 of 
4 (77.5%) in the “People” domain. 
Table  7-8 The average scores of each of the TOPE domains and the TOPE 
indicator 
Issue 
Assessment Results 
A B C 
Avr 
E2 E9 E4 E7 E8 E1 E3 E5 E6 
Technology (of 4) 2.8 3.4 1.5 2.9 3.2 2.2 3.7 2.1 3.9 2.6 
Organisation (of 4) 3.5 3.6 1.6 2.2 2.6 0.6 3.9 2.3 3.8 2.7 
People (of4) 4.0 3.6 1.3 4.0 4.0 1.8 4.0 1.4 4.0 3.1 
Environment (of 4) 2.6 3.1 1.7 2.7 4.0 2.0 4.0 1.7 3.7 2.8 
TOPE s-readiness 
indicator (of 4) 
3.0 3.4 1.5 2.8 3.2 1.7 3.8 2.0 3.8 2.8 
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7.4.4.2 The TOPE-Clauses Level 
The average assessment results of the nine investigated enterprises for the 
eleven ISO/IEC 27002 information security clauses are presented in Table 7-9. 
The first column lists the TOPE domains, the second column lists the 
associated ISO/IEC 27002 clauses for each TOPE domain, the third column 
presents the average score of the nine enterprises in the concerned clause 
and the fourth column provides the percentage figures of the achieved average 
score for each of the ISO clauses. 
Table  7-9 The average score of the ISO/IEC 27002 clauses based on the 
collected data from the nine investigated enterprises 
D IOS/IEC 27002 Clause 
Average 
Score 
(of 4) 
Percent
% 
T 
10 Communications and Operations Management 2.9 72.5 
11 Access Control 2.9 72.5 
12 
Information Systems Acquisition, Development 
and Maintenance  
2.8 70.0 
O 
5 Security Policy 2.2 55.0 
6 Organisation of Information Security 3.3 82.5 
7 Asset Management 3.0 75.0 
13 Information Security Incident Management 2.3 57.5 
14 Business Continuity Management 3.1 77.5 
P 8 Human Resources Security 3.1 77.5 
E 
9 Physical and Environmental Security 3.1 77.5 
15 Compliance 2.5 62.5 
From the results presented in Table 7-9, it is evident that the “information 
security policy” clause achieved the lowest score of 55%. A recommendation is 
given for these enterprises to take care of the information security policy using 
the approach presented in Chapter 5 of the thesis, as will be discussed later in 
Chapter 8. The ISO/IEC 27002 clause of “information security incident 
management” achieved 57.5%. The “compliance” clause achieved 62.5%. This 
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also compiled into general recommendations that will be discussed later in 
Chapter 8. 
7.4.4.3 The TOPE-Objectives Level 
According to the assessment results, the ISO/IEC 27002 39 objectives are 
further investigated, based on the average data collected for the participated 
enterprises and according to the assessment model presented in Chapter 5, to 
identify the ten lowest-ranked objectives. The ten lowest-ranked objectives, as 
shown in Table 7-10, could be used by concerned enterprises inside Saudi 
Arabia to aid with action plans. 
Table  7-10 The ten lowest-ranked ISO/IEC 27002 objectives based on the 
analysed data from the nine investigated enterprises 
Rank The ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives 
Average 
Score 
Percent
% 
1 Electronic commerce services 1.81 45 
2 Mobile computing and teleworking 1.87 47 
3 Cryptographic controls 2.00 50 
4 
Management of information security incidents and 
improvements 
2.11 52 
5 
Information security aspects of business continuity 
management 
2.12 53 
6 Information security policy 2.20 55 
7 Information systems audit considerations 2.35 59 
8 Compliance with legal requirements 2.37 59 
9 Business requirements for access control 2.38 60 
10 Protection against malicious and mobile code 2.42 61 
7.4.4.4 The TOPE-Controls Level 
The ten lowest-ranked controls, as shown in Table 7-11, could be used in the 
development of action plans inside these enterprises. The ten lowest ranked 
controls are identified as a starting point to address the most critical areas. 
These controls are addressed to improve the information security practices 
inside Saudi Arabia and to give a list of recommendations for this purpose. 
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Table  7-11 The ten lowest-ranked ISO/IEC 27002 security controls based on the 
analysed data from the nine investigated enterprises 
Rank The ISO/IEC 27002 Controls 
Average 
Score 
Percent
% 
1 Collection of evidence 1.22 31 
2 Teleworking policy use 1.71 43 
3 Protection of organisational records 1.73 43 
4 On-line transactions 1.77 44 
5 Publicly available information 1.77 44 
6 Key management 1.77 44 
7 Physical media security 1.77 44 
8 Business continuity and risk assessment 1.94 49 
9 Reporting security weakness 1.95 49 
10 Policy on the use of cryptographic controls 2.00 50 
7.4.4.5 The TOPE-Measures Level 
The ten lowest-ranked assigned measures are presented in Table 7-12.These 
measures are identified as a starting point to address the most critical security 
areas which need improvement. 
Table  7-12 The ten lowest-ranked ISO/IEC 27002 assigned security measures 
based on the analysed data from the nine investigated enterprises 
Rank The ISO/IEC 27002 Measures 
Average 
Score 
Percent 
% 
1 
Do you have mechanism to ensure that no forensics 
work to be performed on original evidential material? 
1.11 28 
2 
Do you develop internal procedures to be followed in 
collecting evidence that conform to the rules for 
evidence laid down in the relevant jurisdiction? 
1.22 31 
3 
Do you develop internal procedures to be followed in 
presenting evidence that conform to the rules for 
evidence laid down in the relevant jurisdiction? 
1.33 33 
4 
Do you have control to prevent the execution of 
unauthorised mobile code? 
1.44 36 
5 
Do you develop and implement procedures, to 
control teleworking activities? 
1.55 39 
6 
Are the important records protected from loss in 
accordance with statutory, regulatory, contractual, 
and business requirements? 
1.66 42 
7 
Do you develop and implement operational plans, to 
control teleworking activities? 
1.67 42 
8 
Are the important records protected from falsification 
in accordance with statutory, regulatory, contractual, 
and business requirements? 
1.67 42 
9 
Do you have formal procedures for safely dispose 
the media? 
1.67 42 
10 Do you have a key management policy? 1.77 44 
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7.5 Application of the Cost-Benefit Model 
The application of the mathematical model presented in Chapter 6 is illustrated 
here through a real world example that uses its analytical considerations and 
procedure. The assessment model of enterprise E2 revealed that a score of 
50% is achieved in the ISO/IEC 27002 control concerned with protection 
against malicious codes. Accordingly, the decision was taken to replace the 
existing antivirus tool by a newer one that could achieve better performance to 
protect the enterprise information resources. The example presented in the 
following is described according to the same sequence through which the 
model is presented in Chapter 6. 
7.5.1 Security Challenges 
Table 7-13 identifies the challenges that the example takes into account. The 
estimated cost frequency and cost per year for each challenge are given. In 
addition, the total cost of all challenges per year is also given. The estimation 
of these factors is based on common knowledge, expert estimation or models 
that estimate the expected losses which include the damages to information 
assets, the cost of repair and restoration, as well as the negative impacts on 
commercial activity and equity valuation. 
Table  7-13 Challenges considered and their cost 
i Challenges 
Estimated Cost 
G[i] 
Frequency 
F[i] 
Annual Cost 
g (i)=G[i]*F[i] 
1 Virus 2000 6 12000 
2 Worm 1000 5 5000 
3 Trojan 1000 3 3000 
Cost of identified 
challenges per year 




Ii
i
igg
1
][  20000 
7.5.2 Protection Measures 
Anti-virus software is widely used for protection against viruses, worms, and 
trojan horses. According to the annual computer crime and security survey for 
  
- 186 - 
 
the year 2007 (CSI, 2007), anti-virus software has been used by 98% of 
computer users. The protection obtained by using this software depends on 
the security controls associated with its application. Considering the 
technology, organisation, people and environment (TOPE) view of ISO/IEC 
27002, as explained before in Chapter 4 (Saleh et al., 2006), the security 
controls that can be associated with the application of the anti-virus software 
are given in Table 7-11. Each control is identified and associated with its 
TOPE domain, its section number within ISO/IEC 27002 standard, its 
estimated annual cost and its application level (j). Application level-1 
represents the essential control of installing the anti-virus. Application level-2 
adds another control that is the information back-up control. Subsequent 
application levels keep adding other controls that can enhance the use of the 
anti-virus software. Each level would lead to a certain protection probability, 
and can be viewed as a protection measure against identified challenges.  
The above principle of using multi-levels in the application of protection 
measures has also been used in the empirical study presented in Tanaka et al. 
(2006). Unlike the above considerations of 12 levels associated with the 
ISO/IEC 27002 standard, the empirical study of Tanaka et al. considered only 
three levels and these were associated with: defence measures, security policy 
and human cultivation. It is important to mention here that the priority given 
here to each measure, as shown in Table 7-14, will be assigned by an expert 
in information security. That expert will first choose the most suitable security 
measures from the list of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard measures. Second, the 
expert will assign the most effective measure to mitigate the assigned risk to 
give it higher priority, so the arrangement of these security measures (shown in 
Table 7-14) will indicate the relative importance of these measures, and 
  
- 187 - 
 
consequently the application level. 
Table  7-14 ISO/IEC 27002 controls associated with application of the antivirus. 
Protection Measures 
ISO/IEC 
27002 Ref. 
ISO/IEC 27002 
Controls 
Explanation 
Yearly 
Cost 
($) 
j 
T 
10.3.1 
Capacity 
management 
For the implementation of the 
antivirus the capacity 
requirements should be identified 
to ensure and improve the 
availability and efficiency of 
systems. 
500 11 
10.3.2 
System 
acceptance 
According to the enterprise 
acceptance criteria and the 
suitable tests of the system 
carried out before acceptance. 
800 10 
10.4.1 
Controls against 
malicious code 
Detection, prevention and 
recovery controls to protect 
against malicious code. 
2000 1 
10.4.2 
Controls against 
mobile code 
Where the use of mobile code is 
authorised, the configuration 
should ensure that the authorised 
mobile code operates. 
900 9 
10.5.1 
Information 
back-up 
Back-up copies of information and 
software should be taken prior the 
installation of the software. 
1800 2 
10.10.6 
Clock 
synchronisation 
The correct interpretation of the 
date/time format is important to 
ensure that the timestamp reflects 
the reality. 
1700 3 
12.1.1 
Security 
requirements 
analysis and 
specification 
Statements of business 
requirements for new information 
systems should be stated  
1000 8 
O 
5.1.2 
Review of 
information 
security policy 
Update the information security 
policy by adding section for the 
antivirus software policy. 
400 12 
7.1.1 
Inventory of 
assets 
All assets should be clearly 
identified and an inventory of all 
important assets drawn up. 
1500 4 
P 8.2.2 
Information 
security 
awareness, 
education and 
training 
A programme for awareness 
training should be prepared . 
1300 6 
E 
15.2.1 
Compliance 
with security 
policies and 
standards 
All security procedures should be 
carried out correctly to achieve 
compliance with security policies 
and standards. 
1200 5 
15.2.2 
Technical 
compliance 
checking 
Information systems should be 
regularly checked for compliance 
with security implementation 
standards. 
1100 7 
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7.5.3 Achieved Protection 
Table 7-15 is concerned with the protection achieved from each protection 
level. At no protection, it is apparent that the annual cost is the cost of 
challenges given in Table 7-14. Each level of protection used is given in the 
table in terms of the following: 
 Its estimated annual cost, accumulated from Table 7-14; 
 its estimated protection probability; 
 annual saving of challenges‟ cost; 
 annual residual cost; and  
 total annual cost. 
7.5.4 Cost Function 
As would be expected, Table 7-15 shows the following: 
 The estimated value of the cost of protection increases as the level of 
protection increases; 
Table  7-15 Cost-benefit analysis for twelve protection levels  
Cost of identified challenges per year (Table 7-13) 



Ii
i
igg
1
][
 
= 20000 
j 
Accumulated 
Cost of 
protection: 
k 
Probability 
of 
protection: 
p 
Saving in 
challenge 
cost: 
g*p 
Residual 
cost: 
 
r 
Total cost: 
 
 
k + r 
0 0 0 0 20000 20000 
1 2000 0.5 10000 10000 12000 
2 3800 0.19 3800 6200 10000 
3 5500 0.13 2600 3600 9100 
4 7000 0.03 600 3000 10000 
5 8200 0.03 600 2400 10600 
6 9500 0.02 400 2000 11500 
7 10600 0.025 500 1500 12100 
8 11600 0.018 360 1140 12740 
9 12500 0.016 320 820 13320 
10 13300 0.009 180 640 13940 
11 13800 0.009 180 460 14260 
12 14200 0.006 120 340 14540 
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 the residual cost of challenges decreases as the level of protection 
increases; and 
 the estimated total cost changes with both: the increase of the 
protection cost, and the decrease of the residual challenges cost. 
The above cost functions are illustrated in Figure 7-7 based on the calculations 
of Table 7-15 and with the considerations above, it is shown that minimum 
total cost is achieved at protection level 3. 
7.6 Summary 
The work presented in this chapter presents the achievement of the fifth main 
objective of this research study, which is concerned with the application of the 
developed assessment model for investigating information security readiness 
of nine Saudi enterprises. This assessment is based on the security risk 
protection controls of ISO/IEC 27002. The results provide indicators associated 
with the various domains of the TOPE model and with its five levels of details. 
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Figure  7-7 The changes of enterprise E2 of : residual cost of challenges (r), 
cost of protection (k) and total cost (c) 
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These practical results indicate the effectiveness of the approach considered 
to illustrate the state of the information security inside these enterprises, 
showing the weaknesses at all levels of the model with numerical indicators 
that could be used by the directors of the enterprise to assign the priorities and 
direct the resources to improve the information security. The given results 
would also help these enterprises in obtaining the ISO/IEC 27001 information 
security certification that promotes their e-services image. A real example is 
presented, for applying the cost-benefit model presented in Chapter 6, to 
investigate the cost versus the benefits of using various protection measures 
to encounter the expected challenges under their own environment and 
considering specific circumstances. 
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Chapter 8  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
8.1 Introduction 
There is an increase in the interaction of different enterprises at the internal 
Intranet, business Extranet and public Interne levels. The need to conduct 
business or exchange confidential information between these enterprises 
raises the issues of information security risk management and security 
readiness assessment. The ultimate aim of this research project is to develop 
analytical models for enterprise information security readiness assessment and 
for cost-benefit analysis. These models are incorporated into a developed 
comprehensive enterprise information security risk management framework 
that serves as a reference framework for enterprise information security risk 
management. The developed information security assessment model could be 
used by enterprises for expressing the assurance level of their information 
security management system depending on the protection controls of the 
ISO/IEC 27002 information security management standard. The developed 
information security cost-benefit model could be used by enterprises for 
economically adjusting their expenditures on the recommended information 
security protection measures. Chapter 8, therefore concludes the work 
presented in this thesis and contributes in addressing the last research 
question by introducing a number of recommendations to improve the current 
situation of information security management practices at Saudi enterprises. 
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8.2 Conclusion 
The main objective of this research study was to develop analytical models for 
numerically assessing the current state enterprise information security 
readiness and for cost effectively helping in the selection of the recommended 
protection measures. For this purpose, an enterprise information security risk 
management framework (EISRM) is developed to integrate the information 
security risk management approaches in a comprehensive reference 
framework. The developed EISRM framework consists of four dimensions and 
depends on well established approaches for its structural and procedural 
dimensions. The TOPE scope is adopted for achieving the 
comprehensiveness of the framework while the DMAIC process is used to 
incorporate the main activities of the key risk management methods. The 
assessment of the current state information security, which incorporated in the 
proposed EISRM framework, is based on a multi-level analytical model and 
uses a developed investigation form for collecting and analysing the required 
assessment data. The evaluation of the information security assessment 
model is conducted in nine Saudi enterprises working in different fields. The 
results proved the effectiveness of the proposed approach in assessing the 
information security readiness using the ISO/IEC 27002 information security 
management standard with different levels of detail. The assessment results 
can be used by enterprises for directing their resources, based on a developed 
cost-benefit analytical model, to improve their information security readiness to 
an acceptable level. 
8.2.1 Study Main Objectives  
To achieve the overall objective of this research study in developing analytical 
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tools within a comprehensive information security risk management framework 
for assessing enterprise information security readiness and analysing the 
investment in protection measures, the research has carried out an extensive 
investigation of the related literature. Risk management methods, information 
security management standards and information security economic models 
have been investigated in detail. Consequently, there are six main objectives 
of this research study: 
 To develop a comprehensive framework for enterprise information 
security risk management which not only considers technological 
issues, but also considers organisational, human and environmental 
issues as well. 
 To extract enterprise information security assessment measures based 
on the ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice for information security 
management standard. 
 To develop an analytical model for enterprise information security 
readiness assessment that provides integrated multi-level security 
indicators based on the risk controls of the ISO/IEC 27002 information 
security management standard. 
 To develop a practical analytical model that provides cost-benefit trade-
off between enterprise information security risks, and the required 
protection measures. 
 To explore the application of the assessment model in investigating 
information security readiness of nine Saudi enterprises working in 
different fields and presenting the assessment results numerically and 
graphically using a developed computer tool. 
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 To suggest general recommendations for improving the information 
security practices at Saudi enterprises. 
8.2.2 Study Main Contributions 
This study makes several significant contributions towards research and theory 
of information security risk management. As the theory in the field of 
information security risk management is still not well developed, this study can 
be considered as a step towards building of a more robust theory. On the other 
hand, the study contributes in raising the level of awareness about the 
essential role of information security management in protecting the rapid 
development in information technology services at Saudi Arabia. In summary, 
the main contributions of this research study are as follows: 
The comprehensive enterprise information security risk management 
(EISRM) framework: The proposed EISRM framework has two structural 
dimensions and two procedural dimensions. The structural dimensions include 
EISRM scope and EISRM assessment criteria, while the procedural 
dimensions include EISRM process and EISRM assessment tools. The 
framework uses the comprehensive TOPE (Technology, Organisation, People 
and Environment) view for the EISRM scope, while its assessment criteria is 
considered open to various standards. For the procedural dimensions, the 
framework uses the widely known six-sigma DMAIC (Define, Measure, 
Analyse, Improve and Control) cycle for the EISRM process, and it considers 
the use of various assessment tools. 
The TOPE scope of the framework enables it to accommodate the wide range 
of issues associated with EISRM in a well structured and open manner. This 
does not only integrates the components that have been considered by other 
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methods, but also permits other or emerging components to be considered. 
The six-sigma DMAIC process of the framework allows it to accommodate the 
various processes of other EISRM methods in one unified and widely accepted 
process. 
In addition, the framework responds to the need of using a management 
criteria and permits various criterion to be taken into account including ISO 
information security controls, and considering pre-determined benchmarks. 
Furthermore, the framework considers the use of support tools for performing 
the various phases of the process efficiently as is the case with other EISRM 
methods.  
The proposed EISRM framework provides enterprises with a comprehensive 
approach for the effective implementation of information security risk 
management programme that addresses organisation, people and 
environment issues as well as the technical issues. The EISRM framework 
could be considered an open reference for conducting risk management and 
for improving the security level of information security systems. 
An ISO based information security assessment measures: The research 
assigns information security readiness assessment measures, based on the 
ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice for information security management 
standard. These measures are structured according to the TOPE domains of 
technology, organisation, people and environment. The suggested categories 
serves as a base for developing an investigation form that could be used as an 
assessment instrument for collecting the required data about the effective use 
of information security protection measures. In addition, the categorisation 
technique enables the assessment questions to be answered by different 
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employees from different departments and with different expertise which leads 
to achieving better results. 
The multi level analytical information security assessment model: The 
developed enterprise information security assessment model is based on the 
technology, organisation, people and environment (TOPE) scope that provides 
integrated and well structured view of the various parts and issues of the 
ISO/IEC 27002 information security management standard. The model has five 
main levels as follows:  
 The first level is associated with the TOPE domains; 
 the second level is concerned with the main clauses of the standard. 
These clauses are organised according to their relationship with each of 
the TOPE domains; 
 the third level is related to the security objectives of the standard; 
 the fourth level is associated with the security controls recommended by 
the standard for the achievement of its objectives; and 
 the fifth level is concerned with the measures, which are used for the 
evaluation of the effective use of the security controls. 
The developed mathematical model starts the evaluation of the indicators at 
the bottom level and moves gradually from one level to another, where the 
evaluation of each of the higher levels is based on the evaluation of its 
preceded level. In accumulating the indicators from one level to another, the 
model assigns weights to the values of the indicators, so that each indicator is 
valued according to its importance and performance to the information security 
of the concerned enterprise. 
This model provides useful tool for numerically investigating enterprises with 
the ISO/IEC 27002 information security management standard. The 
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investigation of real enterprises illustrates the multi-level results concerned 
with the TOPE domains and the overall higher-level result associated with the 
TOPE level together with the security readiness indicator for the investigated 
enterprises. 
The gradual approach for the application of the ISO information security 
standards: The proposed gradual approach for the application of the ISO 
security standards is of incremental nature, and has three levels of 
assessment, with increasing security controls. The first level considers the 19 
ISO/IEC 27002 essential and common security controls, as stated by the 
standard, which are refined into 45 basic security measures. The second level 
is concerned with all 133 ISO/IEC 27002 base-line security controls, including 
those of level one, which are refined into 283 basic security measures. The 
third level adds to the second level other security controls considered by other 
standards related to ISO/IEC 27002 or required by various individual 
enterprises, depending on their business and information security strategies. 
This approach helps enterprises to move gradually for enhancing their 
information security, according to the base-line standard protection measures 
and beyond.  
The practical analytical cost-benefit model: This practical analytical model 
is concerned with analysing the cost of threats facing information security in an 
enterprise versus the benefits of implementing the recommended protection 
measures that can be used to reduce the effect of these threats. The model is 
distinguished by its practicality and generic nature, which enables various 
considerations associated with different case studies to be analysed. 
Case studies: Case studies are presented for the application of the proposed 
approach in assessing information security state of nine Saudi enterprises. 
  
- 199 - 
 
The implementation studies have produced important practical numerical 
results associated with the information security readiness of these enterprises. 
The practical numerical results illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
information security at all levels from the ISO/IEC 27002 security controls up to 
the TOPE domains. 
The practical investigation of the participated enterprises includes evaluation of 
grades and weights for: “283” measures concerned with the use of the 
protection controls; “133” protection controls associated with the achievement 
of the security objectives; “39” objectives related to conformance with the 
clauses of ISO/IEC 27002; “11” ISO clauses concerned with compliance with 
the TOPE domains; four TOPE domains associated with the s-readiness 
indicator; and finally, the s-readiness indicator itself. The results of the practical 
investigations provide enterprises with guidelines for future information security 
improvements. They would also help them obtain ISO/IEC 27001 information 
security certification that promotes their e-services’ image. In addition the 
results presented in Chapter 7 of the thesis can give enterprises a numerical 
score at different levels that represent an assurance measure of their 
information security management systems. 
Computer Tool: The developed computer tool supports the use of the 
information security assessment model presented in the thesis and graphically 
presents the results for direct evaluation and comparison of s-readiness 
indicators at different levels of detail. 
8.2.3 Study Limitations 
This study, as the case with other research studies, has a number of 
limitations. These limitations are mainly related to the sensitivity of the subject 
of this research study, the time constrains, the bias in data collection and the 
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generalisation of the study. These limitations will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
8.2.3.1 Sensitivity of the Subject 
As mentioned before, the information security of any enterprise is a sensitive 
area and specific to the enterprise stakeholders. It is very difficult to achieve 
the goals of any study devoted to capture the reality of the information security 
situation and this was the case with this research study. The researcher faced 
critical problems in choosing the investigated enterprises, getting the 
permission and signing official papers for not announcing the real names of 
participated enterprises. The researcher faces also a major problem in 
assessing the information security depending mainly on the information 
security manager, who is responsible for information security, and trying only 
to pass the assessment exercise safely. 
8.2.3.2 Time Constraints 
With the use of a case study approach to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
developed framework and its associated models, more time would allow 
conducting more than one cycle of information security assessment of the 
investigated enterprises. This will enable the researcher to benchmark the 
collected data and identify whether the information security readiness indeed 
improved after the implementation of the suggested protection measures and 
how this reflects on the numerical scores at all levels of the model. In addition, 
more time is needed to investigate a bigger sample for developing a template 
specific for information security controls of each industry or business. The 
results in turn could be used to compare the level of information security 
readiness across different industries.  
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8.2.3.3 Bias in Data Collection 
The possibility of bias in the collection and interpretation of the collected data 
from interviews, observations and the investigation form are acknowledged. 
This research, whenever possible, utilised multiple data collection methods 
(the triangulation method) to increase validity and reliability of the collected 
data.  
8.2.3.4 Generalisation of the Study 
The sample, targeted by this study, was hard to reach with a full random 
selection, so it cannot be considered as a representative of its population. The 
application of the assessment model to only nine Saudi enterprises limits the 
generalisation of the findings. However, the main aim of this research was to 
assess the information security within these enterprises. Further research is 
needed for applying the model to other enterprises in different industries and in 
different countries before more global conclusions can be offered. The 
researcher, to overcome this limitation, developed a website to collect more 
sample size. The output of this website was very poor during the last ten 
months.  
8.2.4 Validation of the Results 
There are no past results that can be used for direct comparison, assessment 
and rigorous validation of the results obtained here. However, the strength of 
the approach and the validity of the obtained results stems from the past use 
of the TOPE scope in various problems associated with ICT use; the extensive 
use of the six-sigma process in different applications; and the experience 
behind the development of the ISO/IEC 27002 information security controls. In 
addition, the investigated enterprises later confirmed that the results from this 
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study did correspond well to their common feeling of the possible enterprise 
information security level. Furthermore, the regular publications of the research 
results in the information security conferences and journals assess the work 
and get valuable feedback from the reviewers (Saleh et al, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
8.3 Recommendations for Saudi Enterprises 
This section is devoted to present a number of recommendations revealed as 
a result from the present study. The following recommendations are concerned 
with improving the information security situation inside Saudi enterprises based 
on the assessment results of the nine investigated enterprises.  
1. A proactive approach toward managing information security, using 
preventive rather reactive methods, would improve the information 
security situation inside Saudi enterprises. The developed EISRM 
framework in Chapter 3 of the thesis could be used for this purpose. 
This framework is designed to help enterprises not only in running 
effective risk management programmes, but also in their decision at 
early stages about the need for running detailed risk-analysis exercise, 
or depend only on the best-practice standard security controls. This 
decision will help in managing enterprise resources in a better way.  
2. It is apparent that information security is an enterprise specific issue and 
should be managed by the employees of enterprise. The developed 
information security readiness assessment model in Chapter 5 of the 
thesis could be used for this purpose by Saudi enterprises. The 
application of the model in different Saudi enterprises proves the 
effectiveness of the model in assessing information security state 
according to the ISO/IEC 27002 standard with different levels of detail. 
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The model could be used for presenting the assessment results 
numerically and graphically to the top management to assign priorities 
and direct resources for applying the suggested mitigation plans. This 
model will increase the trustworthiness of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard 
and will provide an assurance measure in the enterprise information 
security management system. 
3. Implementing new security measures for the sake of better secured 
environment can be considered as waste of valuable resources. Saudi 
enterprises, therefore, need to analyse their information security 
thoroughly and ensure appropriateness of security controls based on 
economical analysis before any mitigation plans are undertaken. The 
cost-benefit analytical model presented in Chapter 6 of the thesis could 
be used as a base for directing the investment in the recommended 
information security protection measures. Thus the decision regarding 
the purchasing of new or additional information security protection 
measures could be evaluated according to an economical analysis that 
coincides with enterprise mission and business objectives. 
4. It is apparent, from the results of the investigated Saudi enterprises, the 
absence of the information security standards in managing information 
security inside these enterprises. This bring to the surface the urgent 
need to start a mandatory national information security certification 
programme based on the ISO/IEC 27001 international information 
security management standard. This will increase the trust between 
Saudi enterprises and achieve a common secured environment for 
running their business efficiently. 
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5. It is clear that the employees of the enterprise, where each has a 
responsibility towards securing information, should share in protecting 
enterprise information resources. In this respect, there is an urgent need 
to create a highly qualified trained security aware workforce from the 
employees of the enterprise itself that could contribute to improve 
information security and used to prevent inside as well as outside 
threats. The structured approach, according to the six-sigma model for 
assigning information security responsibilities to the employees of the 
enterprise presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis, could be used by Saudi 
enterprises for this purpose.  
6. The gradual approach presented in Chapter 4 of the thesis could be 
adopted by Saudi enterprises for moving gradually in three stages to 
achieve the main requirements by the information security standard 
parties. 
8.4 Future Work 
The study achieved the objectives set out for this research, but has certain 
limitations that call for future research work to supplement and support the 
current findings. In this respect, future potential studies based on the 
achievements of this thesis are introduced in the following: 
 Further research is possible to find techniques to automate the 
process of finding the parameters of the assessment model at the 
lower level. These parameters should automatically receive their 
values based on the input from real world. This could aid in providing 
more accurate results, as the failing of the current procedures for 
assessing information security readiness is because the assessment 
  
- 205 - 
 
process is conducted by human audit at one particular instance in 
time. 
 More practical investigation of the use of the cost-benefit model for 
improving current approaches in selecting the most economical 
information security controls. This will help in providing a tool to help 
the decision makers in their early decisions regarding the investment 
in the required security controls. 
 An important study would be concerned with using the TOPE view 
presented in this thesis for the development of evaluation bases for 
information security management in specified business fields, such 
as banking, health care, education and other fields. Such specific 
evaluation bases can start from the general common base, given in 
this thesis, and move on to the required specific bases through field 
studies that investigate the important issues associated with each 
specific business field and assign importance levels to these issues. 
Such investigations will help in drawing a map on the strengths and 
weaknesses of information security management in enterprises. This 
approach will help enterprises learning from one another’s issues of 
differences and working together in issues of common problems. 
 A second information security assessment should be conducted in 
the investigated enterprises. The results of the assessment 
conducted in this research study should serve as benchmark data 
that could be used to compare the second assessment. This will 
provide insight into whether the recommendations that were 
implemented as a result of the information security readiness 
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assessment model had a positive influence on the information 
security inside these enterprises. 
 The methodology presented in the thesis for numerically assessing 
enterprise information security readiness can be used by 
researchers to extend the developed model to integrate different 
information security standards. Such standards may include other IT 
security standards, like the BSI Germany standard, the SOGP 
standard and other related standards. This will help in improving the 
results by providing more detailed view of the enterprises information 
security state at lower levels that could be used as an input to the 
assessment model presented in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
 Human assessments contain some degree of subjectivity that often 
cannot be expressed in pure numeric scales and requires linguistic 
expressions. The research in assessing the security measures at the 
lower level of the information security assessment model used the 
categorical method in assessing these measures according to the 
“lickert scale”. The main problem with this method is that the 
subjectivity and imprecision associated with perceptions are lost by 
forcing the assessor to use numeric scales. In addition, this method 
is largely intuitive, heavily dependent on personal judgement of the 
assessor and all the criteria are assumed to have equal importance. 
The subjectivity of human assessments and beliefs can best be 
expressed in linguistic terms without the limitation of the numeric 
scales’ boundaries. Fuzzy logic techniques that allow the assessors 
to express their opinions in linguistic terms could be used to 
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enhance the developed assessment model in capturing this 
subjectivity. 
 Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) could be used in calculating the 
value of risk depending on the TOPE domains and considering the 
causes of the threats with different levels of inference on the 
enterprise assets. This will help in building probabilistic tables that 
could be used and reused to assess the risks to the enterprises main 
information resources. The BBN could also be used to illustrate the 
relationships between enterprise information security risks and its 
causes from the combined factors resulted from different levels of 
technical, organisational, people and environmental factors. 
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Appendix A 
THE INVESTIGATION FORM 
Enterprise Information Security Readiness 
Assessment Questionnaire 
This investigation form is associated with a research project which is 
concerned with the assessment of the effective use of the ISO/IEC 27002 
information security management standard by different enterprises. The 
assessment is based on a developed multi level structure analytical model that 
presents the results numerically and graphically at different levels of the 
model, according to the ISO/IEC 27002 standard. 
Your response and comments will be treated with utmost confidentiality. The 
information collected will neither be used to identify individuals or individual 
enterprises, nor will it be publicly disseminated. Space is also provided for 
open-ended responses. We encourage you to share with us anything you think 
might be useful in terms of supporting IT security efforts. 
Please complete the enclosed questionnaire. Your candid and thoughtful reply 
will help in providing reliable results that can be useful for the future 
improvement of information security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 222 - 
 
The following is a detailed list of information security measures associated with 
assessment questions. Please answer the questions and give your view of the 
performance of using these measures for assessing information security inside your 
respectable enterprise. Five levels of performance grades are given, as explained in 
the following Table.  
 
Performance 
0 1 2 3 4 
None Poor Good Very good Excellent 
 
 
 
Domain 1 :Technology Performance 
Clause 1:Communication and operations management 
Objective 1:Operational procedures and responsibilities 
Control 1:Documented operating procedures 
1 Do you have documented procedures for system activities? 0 1 2 3 4 
2 Does management authorise the changes in operating procedures? 0 1 2 3 4 
3 Are operating procedures documents available to the right users? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 2:Change management 
4 Do you formally control the changes to information processing facilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
5 Do you have audit logs for the changes in processing facilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 3:Segregation of duties 
6 Do you segregate duties to reduce unauthorised modification of assets? 0 1 2 3 4 
7 Do you segregate areas of responsibility to reduce misuse of assets? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 4:Separation of development, test and operational facilities 
8 Do you separate development, test and operational facilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 2:Third party service delivery management 
Control 5:Service delivery 
9 Do you ensure the implementation of the third party service delivery agreement? 0 1 2 3 4 
10 Do you ensure third party service delivery agreement services operation? 0 1 2 3 4 
11 Do you maintain the included services in third party service delivery agreement? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 6:Monitoring and review of third party services 
12 Do you regularly monitor services, reports and records provided by the third party? 0 1 2 3 4 
13 Do you regularly review service, reports and records provided by the third party? 0 1 2 3 4 
14 Do you regularly audit services, reports and records provided by the third party? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 7:Managing changes to third party services 
15 Do you manage changes to the provision of services provided by third party? 0 1 2 3 4 
16 Do you consider the criticality of business systems and process in managing changes to 
the provision of services provided by the third party? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 3:System planning and acceptance 
Control 8:Capacity management 
17 Do you monitor resources use to ensure the required system performance? 0 1 2 3 4 
18 Do you tune resources use to ensure the required system performance? 0 1 2 3 4 
19 Do you project future capacity requirements to ensure system performance? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 9:System acceptance 
20 Do you establish acceptance criteria for information systems? 0 1 2 3 4 
21 Do you have suitable tests for the systems against the acceptance criteria? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 4:Protection against malicious and mobile code 
Control 10:Controls against malicious code 
22 Do you have controls for detections of malicious code? 0 1 2 3 4 
23 Do you have controls for prevention of malicious code? 0 1 2 3 4 
24 Do you have controls for recovery from malicious code? 0 1 2 3 4 
25 Do you implement appropriate user awareness procedures? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 11:Controls against mobile code 
26 Do you have suitable security policy for the operation of mobile codes? 0 1 2 3 4 
27 Do you have control to prevent the execution of unauthorised mobile code? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 5:Back-up 
Control 12:Information back-up 
28 Do you have an agreed backup policy? 0 1 2 3 4 
29 Do you have a procedure for regularly taking backup of information and software? 0 1 2 3 4 
30 Do you have a procedure for regularly testing backup of information and software? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 6:Network security management 
Control 13:Network controls 
31 Do you have adequate management procedures to protect the network from threats? 0 1 2 3 4 
32 Do you have adequate controls to protect the network from threats? 0 1 2 3 4 
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Control 14:Security of network services 
33 Do you identify security features, service levels and management requirements of all 
network services? 
0 1 2 3 4 
34 Do you include security features, service levels and management requirements of all 
network services in the in-house network service agreement? 
0 1 2 3 4 
35 Do you include security features, service levels and management requirements of all 
network services in the outsource network service agreement? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 7:Media handling 
Control 15:Management of removable media 
36 Do you have management procedures for the removable media? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 16:Disposal of media 
37 Do you have formal procedures for securely disposing the media? 0 1 2 3 4 
38 Do you have formal procedures for safely disposing the media? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 17:Information handling procedures 
39 Do you establish procedures for handling information against unauthorised disclosure or 
misuse? 
0 1 2 3 4 
40 Do you establish procedures for the storage of unauthorised disclosure or misuse of 
information? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 18:Security of system documentation 
41 Do you protect the system documentation from unauthorised access? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 8:Exchange of information 
Control 19:Information exchange policies and procedures 
42 Do you have formal exchange policies to protect information through the use of all types of 
communication facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
43 Do you have procedures to protect information through the use of all types of 
communication facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
44 Do you have controls to protect information through the use of all types of communication 
facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 20:Exchange agreements 
45 Do you establish an agreement with external parties for the exchange of information? 0 1 2 3 4 
46 Do you establish an agreement with external parties for the exchange of software? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 21:Physical media in transit 
47 Do you establish procedures to protect media containing information against unauthorised 
access, misuse or corruption during transportation? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 22:Electronic messaging 
48 Do you appropriately protect the information included in electronic messages? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 23:Business information systems 
49 Do you develop policies and procedures to protect information associated with the 
interconnection of business information systems? 
0 1 2 3 4 
50 Do you implement policies and procedures to protect information associated with the 
interconnection of business information systems? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 9:Electronic commerce services 
Control 24:Electronic commerce 
51 Do you have protection measures for information involved in electronic commerce against 
fraudulent activity, contract dispute and modification? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 25:On-Line transactions 
52 Do you have protection measures for on-line transactions? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 26:Publicly available information 
53 Do you have protection measures to protect the integrity of publicly available information? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 10:Monitoring 
Control 27:Audit logging 
54 Do you produce audit logs for recording user activities, exceptions and information security 
events? 
0 1 2 3 4 
55 Do you keep the audit logs for an agreed period of time to assist in future investigation and 
access control monitoring? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 28:Monitoring system use 
56 Do you establish procedures for monitoring the use of information processing facilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
57 Do you regularly review the results of the monitoring activities? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 29:Protection of log information 
58 Do you protect the logging facilities and the log information against tampering? 0 1 2 3 4 
59 Do you protect the logging facilities and the log information against unauthorised access? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 30:Administrator and operator logs 
60 Do you have a log file for system administrator activities? 0 1 2 3 4 
61 Do you have a log file for system operator activities? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 31:Fault logging 
62 Do you log the reported faults by users or by system's programs? 0 1 2 3 4 
63 Do you analyse the reported faults? 0 1 2 3 4 
64 Do you take an appropriate action for the reported faults? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 32:Clock synchronisation 
65 Do you synchronize the clocks of all relevant information processing systems with an 
agreed accurate time source? 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Clause 2:Access Controls 
Objective 11:Business requirements for access control 
Control 33:Access control policy 
66 Do you establish an access control policy based on business and security requirements? 0 1 2 3 4 
67 Do you document the access control policy? 0 1 2 3 4 
68 Do you regularly review the access control policy? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 12:User access management 
Control 34:User registration 
69 Do you have formal user registration procedures for gaining access to all information 
systems and services? 
0 1 2 3 4 
70 Do you have formal user de-registration procedures for revoking access to all information 
systems and services? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 35:Privilege management 
71 Do you restrict the allocation of privileges? 0 1 2 3 4 
72 Do you control the use of privileges? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 36:User password management 
73 Do you have formal management process for allocation of passwords? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 37:Review of user access rights 
74 Do you have formal management process for regular review of users' access rights? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 13:User responsibilities 
Control 38:Password use 
75 Do you advise the users to follow good security practices in the selection of passwords? 0 1 2 3 4 
76 Do you advise the users to follow good security practices in the use of their passwords? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 39:Unattended user equipment 
77 Do you have appropriate protection for the unattended equipments? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 40:Clear desk and clear screen policy 
78 Do you adopt a clear desk policy for papers & removable storage media? 0 1 2 3 4 
79 Do you adopt a clear screen policy for information processing facilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 14:Network access control 
Control 41:Policy on use of network services 
80 Do you restrict access to services to the authorised users? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 42:User authentication for external connections 
81 Do you have appropriate authentication methods to control access by remote users? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 43:Equipment identification in networks 
82 Do you have an automatic equipment identification to authenticate connections from 
specific locations and equipments? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 44:Remote diagnostic and configuration port protection 
83 Do you have appropriate controls on physical and logical access to diagnostic ports? 0 1 2 3 4 
84 Do you have appropriate controls on physical and logical access to configuration ports? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 45:Segregation in networks 
85 Do you segregate the groups of information services, users and information systems? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 46:Network connection control 
86 Do you restrict the capability of users to connect with the network according to the access 
control policy? 
0 1 2 3 4 
87 Do you restrict the capability of users to connect with the network according to the 
requirements of the business application? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 47:Network routing control 
88 Do routing controls meet the access control policy? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 15:Operating system access control 
Control 48:Secure log-on procedures 
89 Do you control the access to operation systems by security log-on procedure? 0 1 2 3 4 
90 Do you design a procedure for logging into operating system to minimise the opportunity 
for unauthorised access? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 49:User identification and authentication 
91 Does each user have unique identifier (user ID) for his personal use only? 0 1 2 3 4 
92 Do you have authentication technique that substantiates the claimed identity of a user? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 50:Password management system 
93 Do you use interactive password management system? 0 1 2 3 4 
94 Does the password management system ensure the quality of passwords? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 51:Use of system utilities 
95 Do you restrict the use of utility programmes that might be capable of overriding system 
and application controls? 
0 1 2 3 4 
96 Do you tightly control the use of utility programmes? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 52:Session time-out 
97 Do you have sessions shutdown policy for inactive sessions? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 53:Limitation of connection time 
98 Do you have additional restrictions on connection time limit for high-risk applications? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 16:Application and information access control 
Control 54:Information access restriction 
99 Do you control the access to information and application system functions by the access 
control policy? 
0 1 2 3 4 
100 Do you base the restriction of the access to information and application system functions 
on individual business application requirements? 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Control 55:Sensitive system isolation 
101 Do you have an isolated environment for sensitive systems? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 17:Mobile computing and teleworking 
Control 56:Mobile computing and communications 
102 Do you have security policy for protection against the risks of using mobile computing and 
communication facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
103 Do you have the appropriate security measures against the risks of using mobile 
computing and communication facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 57:Teleworking policy for use 
104 Do you develop and implement policy for teleworking activities? 0 1 2 3 4 
105 Do you develop and implement operational plans to control teleworking activities? 0 1 2 3 4 
106 Do you develop and implement procedures to control teleworking activities? 0 1 2 3 4 
Clause 3:Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance 
Objective 18:Security requirement of information systems 
Control 58:Security requirements analysis and specification 
107 Do you specify the security controls requirements in the statements of business 
requirements for new or enhancements to existing information systems? 
0 1 2 3 4 
108 Do you analysis the controls requirements for new or enhancements to existing 
information systems? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 19:Correct processing in applications 
Control 59:Input data validation 
109 Do you validate the input data to applications to ensure its correctness & appropriateness? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 60:Control of internal processing 
110 Do you incorporate validation checks into applications to detect the corruption of 
information through processing errors or deliberate acts? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 61:Message integrity 
111 Do you identify the requirements for ensuring authenticity and protecting message integrity 
in applications? 
0 1 2 3 4 
112 Do you implement the appropriate controls for ensuring authenticity and for protecting 
message integrity? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 62:Output data validation 
113 Do you validate the output data from an application to ensure that the processing of stored 
information is correct and appropriate? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 20:Cryptographic controls 
Control 63:Policy on the use of cryptographic controls 
114 Do you develop a policy for cryptographic controls? 0 1 2 3 4 
115 Do you implement the policy for the use of cryptographic controls? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 64:Key management 
116 Do you have a key management policy? 0 1 2 3 4 
117 Do you protect all cryptographic keys against modification, loss and destruction? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 21:Security of system files 
Control 65:Control of operational software 
118 Do you have procedures for controlling the installation of software on operational system? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 66:Protection of system test data 
119 Do you carefully select the test data? 0 1 2 3 4 
120 Do you protect and control the test data? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 67:Access control to program source code 
121 Do you restrict access to the programme source code? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 22:Security in development and support process 
Control 68:Change control procedures 
122 Do you have formal control procedures for controlling the implementation of changes? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 69:Technical review of applications after operating system changes 
123 Do you review the business critical applications after the change of operating systems? 0 1 2 3 4 
124 Do you test the business critical applications after the change of operating systems? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 70:Restrictions on changes to software packages 
125 Do you discourage the modifications to software packages? 0 1 2 3 4 
126 Do you limit the modifications to software packages? 0 1 2 3 4 
127 Do you control the modifications to software packages? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 71:Information leakage 
128 Do you prevent the opportunities for information leakage? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 72:Outsourced software development 
129 Do you supervise the development of outsourced software? 0 1 2 3 4 
130 Do you monitor the development of outsourced software? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 23:Technical vulnerability management 
Control 73:Control of technical vulnerabilities 
131 Do you obtain timely information about technical vulnerabilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
132 Do you evaluate the organisation's exposure to the identified vulnerabilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
133 Do you take appropriate measures to address the associated risk to the identified 
vulnerabilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Domain 2:Organisation Performance 
Clause 1:Security policy 
Objective 1:Information security policy 
Control 1:Information security policy document 
1 Does management approve the information security policy? 0 1 2 3 4 
2 Do you publish the information security in the enterprise? 0 1 2 3 4 
3 Do employees & external parties have access to the information security policy? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 2:Review of the information security policy 
4 Do you review the information security policy at planned intervals? 0 1 2 3 4 
5 Do you review the information security policy when significant changes occur? 0 1 2 3 4 
Clause 2:Organisation of information security 
Objective 2:Internal organisation 
Control 3:Management commitment to information security 
6 Does the management have clear direction to support enterprise security? 0 1 2 3 4 
7 Does the management demonstrate commitment to support enterprise security? 0 1 2 3 4 
8 
Does the management have explicit assignment of responsibilities for supporting enterprise 
security? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 4:Information security co-ordination 
9 
Are information security activities co-ordinated by representatives from different parts of the 
enterprise with relevant roles? 
0 1 2 3 4 
10 
Are information security activities co-ordinated by representatives from different parts of the 
enterprise with relevant job functions? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 5:Allocation of information security responsibilities 
11 Do you clearly define the information security responsibilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
12 Do you document in detail the entity responsible for each asset or security process? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 6:Authorisation process for information processing facilities 
13 
Do you identify a management authorisation process for new information processing 
facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
14 
Do you implement the management authorisation process for new information processing 
facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 7:Confidentiality agreements 
15 
Do you identify a confidentiality agreement that reflects enterprise’s needs for the protection 
of information? 
0 1 2 3 4 
16 
Do you regularly review the confidentiality agreement to make sure that it covers the new 
requirements for protecting enterprise information? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 8:Contact with authorities 
17 Do you maintain appropriate contacts with relevant authorities? 0 1 2 3 4 
18 
Do you have procedures that specify when and by whom relevant authorities should be 
contacted? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 9:Contact with special interest groups 
19 Do you maintain appropriate contacts with special interest groups? 0 1 2 3 4 
20 Do you maintain appropriate contacts with special security forums? 0 1 2 3 4 
21 Do you maintain appropriate contacts with professional associations? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 10:Independent review of information security 
22 
Do you review independently at planned intervals the enterprise's approach for managing 
information security? 
0 1 2 3 4 
23 
Do you review the enterprise’s approach for managing information when significant changes 
occur? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 3:External parties 
Control 11:Identification of risks related to external parties 
24 
Do you identify risks to the enterprise's information processing facilities from business 
processes involving external parties before granting access? 
0 1 2 3 4 
25 
Do you implement appropriate controls to the enterprise's information processing facilities 
before granting access to external parties? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 12:Addressing security when dealing with customers 
26 
Are the security requirements addressed before giving customers access to the enterprise's 
information? 
0 1 2 3 4 
27 
Are the security requirements addressed before giving customers access to the enterprise's 
assets? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 13:Addressing security in third party agreements 
28 
Are the agreements with the third parties involving all relevant security requirements in 
accessing information processing facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
29 
Are the agreements with the third parties involving all relevant security requirements in 
processing information processing facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
30 
Are the agreements with the third parties involving all relevant security requirements in 
communicating information processing facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Clause 3:Asset management 
Objective 4:Responsibility of assets 
Control 14:Inventory of assets 
31 Do you clearly identify all the enterprise’s assets? 0 1 2 3 4 
32 Do you have inventory of all important assets? 0 1 2 3 4 
33 Do you have a procedure to maintain the inventory of all important assets? 0 1 2 3 4 
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Control 15:Ownership of assets 
34 Do you classify information and assets associated with information processing facilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
35 
Do you assign relevant owners to the enterprise information and assets associated with 
information processing facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 16:Acceptable use of assets 
36 
Do you identify rules that define the acceptable use of information and assets associated 
with information processing facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
37 
Do you document the rules that define the acceptable use of information and assets 
associated with information processing facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
38 
Do you implement rules that define the acceptable use of information and assets associated 
with information processing facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 5:Information classification 
Control 17:Classification guidelines 
39 Do you classify information according to its value to the enterprise? 0 1 2 3 4 
40 Do you classify information according to the legal requirements? 0 1 2 3 4 
41 Do you classify information according to its sensitivity to the enterprise? 0 1 2 3 4 
42 Do you classify information according to its criticality to the enterprise? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 18:Information labelling and handling 
43 Do you develop procedures for information labelling and handling? 0 1 2 3 4 
44 Do you implement procedures for information labelling and handling? 0 1 2 3 4 
Clause 4:Information security incident management 
Objective 6:Reporting information security events and weaknesses 
Control 19:Reporting information security events 
45 Do you have a formal information security event reporting procedure? 0 1 2 3 4 
46 Do you have a known point of contact for the reporting of information security events? 0 1 2 3 4 
47 
Are all employees, contractors and third party users aware of their responsibility to report 
any information security events as quickly as possible? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 20:Reporting security weakness 
48 
Do you have an easily accessible and available reporting mechanism for the security 
weaknesses in systems and services?  
0 1 2 3 4 
49 
Are employees, contractors and third party users informed to report the security weaknesses 
in systems and services as quickly as possible? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 7:Management of information security incidents and improvements 
Control 21:Responsibilities and procedures 
50 
Do you establish management responsibilities to ensure quick, effective and orderly 
response to information security incidents? 
0 1 2 3 4 
51 
Do you establish management procedures to ensure quick, effective and orderly response to 
information security incidents? 
0 1 2 3 4 
52 
Do you ensure that those responsible for information security incident management 
understand the enterprise’s priorities for handling information security incidents? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 22:Learning from information security incidents 
53 Do you have mechanisms to quantify and monitor security incidents according to their type? 0 1 2 3 4 
54 Do you evaluate the information security incidents to identify the recurring incidents? 0 1 2 3 4 
55 Do you evaluate the information security incidents to identify the high impact incidents? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 23:Collection of evidence 
56 
Do you develop internal procedures to be followed in collecting evidence that conform to the 
rules for evidence laid down in the relevant jurisdiction? 
0 1 2 3 4 
57 
Do you develop internal procedures to be followed in presenting evidence that conform to 
the rules for evidence laid down in the relevant jurisdiction? 
0 1 2 3 4 
58 
Do you have mechanism to ensure that no forensics work is performed on original evidential 
material? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Clause 5:Business continuity management 
Objective 8:Information security aspects of business continuity management 
Control 24:Including information security in the business continuity management process 
59 
Do you develop a management process for addressing information security requirements of 
business continuity? 
0 1 2 3 4 
60 
Do you maintain the management process which addresses information security 
requirements for business continuity? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 25:Business continuity and risk assessment 
61 Do you identify events that can cause interruptions to business processes? 0 1 2 3 4 
62 Do you identify the impact of the interruptions to business processes? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 26:Developing and implementing continuity plans including information security 
63 Do you develop plans to maintain operations and ensure availability of information? 0 1 2 3 4 
64 Do you implement plans to maintain operations and ensure availability of information? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 27:Business continuity planning framework 
65 Do you have a single framework of business continuity plans? 0 1 2 3 4 
66 Does the business continuity framework address the information security requirements? 0 1 2 3 4 
67 
Do you assign specific owners for each plan that is responsible for emergency procedures, 
manual fallback plans and resumption plans? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 28:Testing, maintaining and re-assessing business continuity plans 
68 
Do you test the business continuity plans to ensure that all members of the recovery team 
and other relevant staff are aware of these plans? 
0 1 2 3 4 
69 Do you regularly update business continuity plans to ensure they are up to date & effective? 0 1 2 3 4 
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Domain 3:People Performance 
Clause 1:Human resources security 
Objective 1:Prior to employment 
Control 1:Roles and responsibilities 
1 
Do you define and document roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third 
party users? 
0 1 2 3 4 
2 
Are the security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third party users 
clearly communicated before job assignment? 
0 1 2 3 4 
3 
Are the security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third party users 
comply with the enterprise information security policy? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 2:Screening 
4 
Do you have background verification checks on all users (candidates for employment, 
contractors and third party) in accordance with relevant laws, regulations and ethics? 
0 1 2 3 4 
5 
Do verification checks take into account all relevant privacy and protection of personal data 
legislation? 
0 1 2 3 4 
6 Do you have procedures that define criteria and limitations of verification checks? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 3:Terms and conditions of employment 
7 
Do the employees, contractors and third party users agree and sign terms and conditions of 
their employment contract? 
0 1 2 3 4 
8 
Do you use clear job descriptions to define the security responsibilities for new employees, 
contractors and third party users? 
0 1 2 3 4 
9 
Are the terms and conditions of employment contract clearly state the actions to be taken if 
the employee, contractor or third party users disregard the enterprise’s security 
requirements? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 2:During employment 
Control 4:Management responsibilities 
10 
Does management require employees, contractors and third party users to apply security in 
accordance with the enterprise established policies and procedures? 
0 1 2 3 4 
11 
Does management motivate employees, contractors and third party to fulfil the enterprise 
security policies? 
0 1 2 3 4 
12 
Does management continue to have personnel with appropriate security skills and 
qualifications? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 5:Information security awareness, education and training 
13 
Do employees, contractors and third party users receive appropriate awareness before 
access to information or services is granted? 
0 1 2 3 4 
14 
Do employees, contractors and third party users receive ongoing training that includes 
security requirements, legal responsibilities and business controls? 
0 1 2 3 4 
15 
Does the awareness program include information on known threats, and the contact person 
for further security advice? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 6:Disciplinary process 
16 
Do you have a formal disciplinary process for employees who have committed a security 
breach? 
0 1 2 3 4 
17 
Does the disciplinary process provide graduated response that takes into consideration the 
impact of the violation on the business?  
0 1 2 3 4 
18 
Does the disciplinary process allow instant removal of duties, access rights and privileges 
and immediate escorting out of the site? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 3:Termination or change of employment 
Control 7:Termination responsibilities 
19 Do you have a clear definition of responsibilities for performing termination of employment? 0 1 2 3 4 
20 Do you have a clear definition of responsibilities for performing change of employment? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 8:Return of assets 
21 
Does the termination process include formalised procedures for employees, contractors and 
third party users to return all assets in their possession upon termination of their work? 
0 1 2 3 4 
22 
Does the termination process include formalised procedures to ensure that all relevant 
information is transferred to the enterprise and securely erased from the outside users’ 
equipments? 
0 1 2 3 4 
23 
Does the termination process include formalised procedures to ensure that important 
information of ongoing operations of the enterprise possessed by the employees, 
contractors and third party users are documented and transferred to the enterprise?  
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 9:Removal of access rights 
24 Are the users’ access rights removed upon termination, or adjusted upon change? 0 1 2 3 4 
25 Do you have a policy to reduce access rights before the employment termination? 0 1 2 3 4 
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Domain 4:Environment Performance 
Clause 1:Physical and environmental security 
Objective 1:Secure areas 
Control 1:Physical security perimeter 
1 Do you clearly define the enterprise security perimeters? 0 1 2 3 4 
2 
Do you use security perimeters (barriers, walls and card controlled entry gates) to protect 
areas that contain information processing facilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
3 Do you monitor the fire doors on the enterprise security perimeters? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 2:Physical entry controls 
4 Do you protect the secure areas by appropriate entry controls to ensure authorised use? 0 1 2 3 4 
5 
Do you require employees, contractors, third party users and all visitors to wear some form of 
visible identifications? 
0 1 2 3 4 
6 
Do you restrict the access to areas where sensitive information is processed or stored to 
authorised persons only? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 3:Securing offices, rooms and facilities 
7 Do you design and apply physical protection for offices, rooms and facilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
8 
Do you hide the information about locations of sensitive information security processing 
facilities from the public? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 4:Protection against external and environmental threats 
9 Do you design and apply proper physical protection against environmental threats? 0 1 2 3 4 
10 Do you provide appropriate fire fighting equipment that is placed in suitable places?  0 1 2 3 4 
Control 5:Working in secure areas 
11 Do you have guidelines for working in secure areas? 0 1 2 3 4 
12 Do you make sure that vacant secure areas are physically locked and checked periodically? 0 1 2 3 4 
13 Do you restrict the use of photographic, video and audio equipments in the secure areas? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 6:Public access, delivery and loading areas 
14 
Do you isolate the access points, delivery and loading areas, from information processing 
facilities areas? 
0 1 2 3 4 
15 Do you secure external doors for delivery and loading when internal doors are opened? 0 1 2 3 4 
16 Do you physically segregate incoming and outgoing shipments? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 2:Equipment security 
Control 7:Equipment sitting and protection 
17 Do you protect enterprise’s equipments from environmental threats and hazards? 0 1 2 3 4 
18 Do you protect enterprise’s equipment from unauthorised access? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 8:Supporting utilities 
19 Do you protect enterprise’s equipments from power failures? 0 1 2 3 4 
20 
Do you protect enterprise’s equipments from disruptions caused by failures in supporting 
utilities? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 9:Cabling security 
21 
Are the telecommunication cables carrying data or supporting information services protected 
from interception? 
0 1 2 3 4 
22 Do you segregate power cables from communication cables? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 10:Equipment maintenance 
23 Do you maintain equipment according to the supplier’s recommendations and specifications? 0 1 2 3 4 
24 
Do you have records of all suspected or actual faults, and all preventive and corrective 
maintenance? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 11:Security of equipment off-premises 
25 
Does the management have procedure to authorise the use of any information processing 
equipments outside the enterprise’s premises?  
0 1 2 3 4 
26 Do you have adequate insurance that protects equipments off-site? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 12:Secure disposal or re-use of equipment 
27 Do you check all items of equipments which contain storage media prior to disposal? 0 1 2 3 4 
28 Do you overwrite or delete licensed software prior to disposal? 0 1 2 3 4 
29 
Do you have techniques to make the deleted enterprise sensitive information non-
retrievable? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 13:Removal of property 
30 Do you require prior authorisation for off-site moving of equipments? 0 1 2 3 4 
31 Do you identify employees, contractors and third party users who have authority to permit off-
site removal of assets? 
0 1 2 3 4 
32 Do you have a process to record the removed off-site equipment and record when returned? 0 1 2 3 4 
Clause 2:Compliance 
Objective 3:Compliance with legal requirements 
Control 14:Identification of applicable legislation 
33 
Do you explicitly define all relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for 
each system? 
0 1 2 3 4 
34 
Do you explicitly document all relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for 
each system? 
0 1 2 3 4 
35 
Do you keep all relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for each system 
up to date? 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Control 15:Intellectual property rights (IPR) 
36 
Do you implement procedures that ensure compliance with legislative requirements for the 
use of material and software? 
0 1 2 3 4 
37 
Do you implement procedures that ensure compliance with regulatory requirements for the 
use of material and software? 
0 1 2 3 4 
38 
Do you implement procedures that ensure compliance with contractual requirements for the 
use of material and software? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 16:Protection of organisational records 
39 
Do you protect the important records from loss in accordance with statutory, regulatory, 
contractual and business requirements? 
0 1 2 3 4 
40 
Do you protect the important records from destruction in accordance with statutory, 
regulatory, contractual and business requirements? 
0 1 2 3 4 
41 
Do you protect the important records from falsification in accordance with statutory, 
regulatory, contractual and business requirements? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 17:Data protection and privacy of personal information 
42 Do you insure that data protection and privacy is in accordance with relevant legislation? 0 1 2 3 4 
43 Do you insure that data protection and privacy is in accordance with regulations? 0 1 2 3 4 
44 Do you insure that data protection and privacy is in accordance with contractual clauses? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 18:Prevention of misuse of information processing facilities 
45 Are the users deterred from unauthorised use of information processing facilities? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 19:Regulation of cryptographic controls 
46 Does the use of the cryptographic controls comply with all relevant agreement? 0 1 2 3 4 
47 Does the use of the cryptographic controls comply with all relevant laws? 0 1 2 3 4 
48 Does the use of the cryptographic controls comply with all relevant regulations? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 4:Compliance with security policies, standards and technical compliance 
Control 20:Compliance with security policies and standards 
49 
Do managers ensure that all security procedures are carried out correctly to achieve 
compliance with security policies? 
0 1 2 3 4 
50 
Do managers ensure that all security procedures are carried out correctly to achieve 
compliance with security standards? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Control 21:Technical compliance checking 
51 Do you regularly check your information systems for compliance with security standards? 0 1 2 3 4 
52 Are technical compliance checks carried out by authorised persons? 0 1 2 3 4 
Objective 5:Information systems audit considerations 
Control 22:Information systems audit controls 
53 
Do you carefully plan audit requirements and activities to minimise the risk of disruptions to 
business process? 
0 1 2 3 4 
54 Are the audit requirements agreed to minimise the risk of disruptions to business process? 0 1 2 3 4 
Control 23:Protection of information systems audit tools 
55 Do you protect the access to audit tools to prevent misuse? 0 1 2 3 4 
56 Do you protect the access to audit tools to prevent compromise? 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other (Free) Comments / Suggestions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For further comments, please add an extra page. 
 
Give your views on the questionnaire: Missing Factors / Unnecessary Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For further views, please add an extra page. 
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Appendix B 
SAMPLE CASE STUDY (E9) 
 
This organisation has been playing a crucial role in the consolidation and 
development of the country financial system. At the time of its establishment, 
there was no monetary system exclusively of the country. Foreign currencies 
circulated in the country as a medium of exchange, along with country coins. 
The country bank notes had not yet been issued. There were no banks in 
existence and the banking business was being conducted by foreign bank 
branches. One of the foremost tasks of this organisation in its early stage was, 
therefore, the development of the country currency. This organisation also paid 
special attention to the need for promoting the growth of a national banking 
system. From 1960 to 1972, this organisation focused on banking regulations 
against the background of expanding banking business and the country’s 
acceptance of full convertibility of the currency in March 1961 in accordance 
with the Article VIII of the Articles of Agreements of the IMF. From 1973 to 
1982, this organisation preoccupation was to contain inflationary pressures in 
the booming economy, expansion of the banking system and manage the 
massive foreign exchange reserves. From mid 1980s, the organisation 
priorities have been to introduce financial market reforms.  
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Section (I): Technology Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Communications and operations management 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Technology Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective (1): 
operational 
procedures 
and 
responsibilities 
Documented operating procedures 3.7 .26 
 
Change management 3.4 .25 
Segregation of duties 3.5 .23 
Separation of development, test 
and operational facilities 
4 .26 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(1) 
=3.7*.26+3.4*.25+3.5*.23+4*.26=3.66 
Objective (2): 
Third party 
service 
delivery 
management 
Service delivery 3.4 .35 
 
Monitoring and review of third 
party services 
4 .34 
Managing changes to third party 
services 
4 .31 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(2) 
=3 4*.35+4*.34+4*.31=3.79 
Objective (3): 
System 
planning and 
acceptance 
Capacity management 3.7 .45 
 
System acceptance 4 .55 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(3) 
=3.7*.45+4*.55=3.87 
Objective (4): 
Protection 
against 
malicious and 
mobile code 
Control against malicious code 3 .6 
 
Control against mobile code 1 .4 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(4) 
=3*.6+1*.4=2.2 
Objective (5): 
Back-up 
Information back-up 3.55 1 
 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(5) 
=3.55*1.0=3.55 
Objective (6): 
Network 
security 
management 
Network controls 4 .55 
 
Security of network services 3.8 .45 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(6) 
=4*.55+3.8*.45=3.91 
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Continue: Communications and operations management 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Technology Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective (7): 
Media 
handling 
Management of removable media 4 .25 
 
Disposable media 3.5 .24 
Information handling procedures 3.6 .26 
Security of system documentation 4 .25 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(7) 
=4*.25+3.5*.24+3.6*.26+4*.25=3.78 
Objective (8): 
Exchange of 
information 
Information exchange policies 
and procedures 
3.4 .2 
 
Exchange agreements 3.5 .19 
Physical media in transit 4 .2 
Electronic messaging 4 .22 
Business information systems 3.5 .19 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(8) 
=3.4*.2+3.5*.19+4*.2+4*.22+3.5*.19=3.69 
Objective (9): 
Electronic 
commerce 
services 
Electronic commerce 4 .31 
 
On-Line transactions 4 .35 
Publicly available information 3 .34 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(9) 
=4*.31+4*.35+3*.34=3.66 
Objective 
(10): 
Monitoring 
Audit logging 4 .16 
 
Monitoring of system use 3.5 .16 
Protection of log information 3.5 .17 
Administrator and operator logs 3.6 .18 
Fault logging 3.6 .18 
Clock synchronisation 4 .15 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(10) 
=4*.16+3.5*.16+3.5*.17+3.6*.18*2+4*.15=3.69 
Figure B-1a Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
technical security objectives of the “communications and operations management” clause 
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Section (I): Technology Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Access control 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Technology Domain  
Results Illustration of the 
Results c w 
Objective (11): 
Business 
requirements 
for access 
control 
Access control policy 3.7 1.0 
 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(11) 
=3.7*1.0=3.7 
Objective (12): 
User access 
management 
User registration 3.5 .27 
 
Privileges management 3.4 .26 
User password management 3 .24 
Review of user access rights 0 .23 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(12) 
=3.5*.27+3.4*.26+3*.24+0*.23=2.55 
Objective (13): 
User 
responsibilities 
Password use 3.5 .34 
 
Unattended user equipment 4 .34 
Clear desk & Clear screen policy 3.5 .32 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(13) 
=3.5*.34+4*.34+3.5*.32=3.67 
Objective (14): 
Network 
access control 
Policy on use of network services 4 .15 
 
User authentication for external 
connections 
3 .16 
Equipment identification in 
networks 
4 .14 
Remote diagnostic and 
configuration port protection 
3.6 .15 
Segregation in networks 4 .14 
Network connection control 4 .14 
Network routing control  4 .12 
Indicator of achievement of Technical objective(14) 
=4*.15+3*.16+4*.14+3.6*.15+4*.14*2+4*.12=3.78 
 
0
1
2
3
4
m[1]
0
1
2
3
4
m[1]
m[2]
m[3]
m[4]
0
1
2
3
4
m[1]
m[2]m[3]
0
1
2
3
4
m[1]
m[2]
m[3]
m[4]m[5]
m[6]
m[7]
  
- 235 - 
 
Continue: Access control 
 
PROTECTION CONTROLS OF Technical 
SECURITY  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective (15): 
Operating 
system access 
control 
Secure log-on procedures 3 .18 
 
User identification and 
authentication 
3.3 .16 
Password management 
system 
4 .19 
User of system utilities 3.6 .17 
Session time-out 4 .15 
Limitation of connection time 4 .15 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(15) 
=3*.18+3.3*.16+4*.19+3.6*.17+4*.15*2=3.64 
Objective (16): 
Application and 
information 
access control 
Information access restriction 3.5 .52 
 
Sensitive system isolation 4 .48 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(16) =3.5*.52+4*.48=3.74 
Objective (17): 
Mobile 
computing and 
teleworking 
Mobile computing and 
teleworking 
0 .55 
 
Teleworking policy for use 0 .45 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(17) =0*.55+0*.45=0 
Figure B-1b Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
technical objectives of the “access control” clause 
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Section (I): Technology Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Information systems acquisition, development and 
maintenance 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Technology Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective (18): 
Security 
requirements of 
Information 
systems 
Security requirements analysis 
and specification 
4 1 
 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(18) =4*1.0=4 
Objective (19): 
Correct 
processing in 
applications 
Input data validation 4 .3 
 
Control of internal processing 3 .2 
Message integrity 3.5 .3 
Output data validation 4 .2 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(19) =4*.3+3*.2+3.5*.3+4*.2=3.65 
Objective (20): 
Cryptographic 
controls 
Policy on the use of 
cryptographic controls 
3.6 .5 
 
Key management  3.5 .5 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(20) =3.6*.5+3.5*.5=3.55 
Objective (21): 
Security of 
system files 
Control of operational software 4 .33 
 
Protection of system test data 0 .32 
Access control to program 
source code 
4 .35 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(21) =4*.33+0*.32+4*.35=2.72 
Objective (22): 
Security in 
development 
and support 
processes 
Change control procedures 3 .2 
 
Technical review of applications 
after operating system changes 
4 .2 
Restriction on changes to 
software packages 
3.8 .17 
Information leakage 4 .23 
Outsourced software 
development 
3.5 .2 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(22) 
=3*.2+4*.2+3.8*.17+4*.23+3.5*.2=3.67 
Objective (23): 
Technical 
vulnerability 
management 
Control of technical 
vulnerabilities 
3.8 1 
 
Indicator of achievement of Technical 
objective(23) =4*1=3.8 
Figure B-1c Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
technical objectives of the “information systems acquisition, development and maintenance” 
clause 
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ISO/IEC 27002 Clauses / Objectives of 
Technology Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
b w 
ISO 
Communications 
and Operations 
Management 
Operational procedures and 
responsibilities 
3.66 .08 
 
Third party service delivery 
management 
3.79 .07 
System planning and 
acceptance 
3.87 .09 
Protection against malicious 
and mobile code 
2.20 .08 
Back-up 3.55 .14 
Network security management 3.91 .13 
Media handling 3.78 .1 
Exchange of information 3.69 .1 
Electronic commerce services 3.66 .09 
Monitoring 3.69 .12 
Indicator of achievement of Technical ISO 
Part(1)=3.66*.08+3.79*.07+3.87*.09+2.2*.08+
3.55*.14+3.91*.13+3.78*.1+3.69*.1+3.66*.09+
3.69*.12=3.68 
ISO  
Access Control 
Business requirements for 
access control 
3.7 .13 
 
User access management 2.55 .15 
User responsibilities 3.67 .14 
Network access control 3.78 .15 
Operating system access 
control 
3.64 .14 
Application and information 
access control 
3.74 .15 
Mobile computing and tele-
working 
0 .14 
Indicator of achievement of Technical ISO 
Part(2) =4*.14*5+3.4*.14+0*.14=3.28 
ISO 
Information 
Systems 
Acquisitions, 
Development 
and Maintenance 
Security requirements of 
information systems 
4 .18 
 
Correct processing in 
applications 
3.65 .16 
Cryptographic controls 3.55 .19 
Security of system files 2.72 .17 
Security in development and 
support processes 
3.67 .15 
Technical vulnerability 
management 
3.8 .15 
Indicator of achievement of Technical ISO 
Part(3)  =4*.17*5+2.4*.17=3.81 
Figure B-1d Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
technology clauses, considering the results of Figures B-1a, B-1b and B-1c 
ISO/IEC 27002 Clauses of Technology Domain  
Results Illustration of the 
Results p w 
ISO 
Technical 
Security 
Communications and Operations 
Management 
3.68 0.33 
 
Access Control 3.28 0.33 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance 
3.81 0.33 
Indicator of compliance with ISO Technical security 
(Technology) =3.68*.33+3.28*.33+3.81*.33=3.55 
Figure B-1e Sample Case study results concerned with conformance with the technology domain 
considering the results of Figure B-1d 
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Section (II): Organisation domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Security policy 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Organisation Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective(1):  
Information 
Security 
Policy 
Information security policy 
document 
4 .6 
 
Review of the information 
security policy 
3.6 .4 
Indicator of use of Organisation security 
objective(1) =4*.6+3.6*.4=3.84 
Figure B-2a Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
organisation objective of the “security policy” clause 
 
Section (II): Organisation Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Organisation of Information Security 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Organisation Domain  
Results Illustration of the 
Results c w 
Objective 
(2): 
Internal 
organisati
on 
Management commitment to 
information security 
3.8 .14 
 
Information security co-
ordination 
3.5 .12 
Allocation of information 
security responsibilities 
3.6 .14 
Authorisation process for 
information processing facilities 
3.5 .1 
Confidentiality agreements 2 .1 
Contact with authorities 4 .13 
Contact with special interest 
groups 
3.7 .15 
Independent review of 
information security 
3.5 .12 
Indicator of use of Organisation security objective(2) 
=3.8*.14+3.5*.12+3.6*.14+3.5*.1+2*.1+4*.13+3.7*.15+3.5
*.12=3.49 
Objective 
(3): 
External 
parties 
Identification or risks related to 
external parties 
3.6 .35 
 
Addressing security when 
dealing with customers 
3.6 .35 
Addressing security in third 
party agreements 
3.8 .3 
Indicator of use of Organisation security objective(3) = 
3.6*.35*2+3.8*.3=3.66 
Figure B-2b Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
organisation objectives of the “organisation of Information Security” clause 
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Section (II): Organisation Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Assets Management 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Organisation Domain  
Results Illustration of the 
Results c w 
Objective (4): 
Responsibility 
for assets 
Inventory of assets 4 .35 
 
Ownership of assets 4 .35 
Acceptable use of assets 4 .3 
Indicator of use of Organisation security 
objective(4) =4*.35*2+4*.3= 4 
Objective (5): 
Information 
classification 
Classification guidelines 4 .55 
 
Information labelling and 
handling 
4 .45 
 
Indicator of use of Organisation security 
objective(5) = 4*.55+4*.45= 4 
Figure B-2c Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
organisation objectives of the “assets management” clause 
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Section (II): Organisation Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Information Security incident management 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Organisation Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective (6): 
Reporting 
information 
security 
events and 
weaknesses 
Reporting information security 
events 
3.7 .6 
 
Reporting security weakness 0 .4 
Indicator of use of Organisation security 
objective(6) =3.7*.6+0*.4= 2.22 
Objective (7): 
Management 
of 
information 
security 
incidents and 
improvements 
Responsibilities and procedures 3.4 .38 
 
Learning from information 
security incidents 
3.8 .35 
Collection of evidence 0 .27 
Indicator of use of Organisation security 
objective(7) =3.4*.38+3.8*.35+0*.27=2.62 
Figure B-2d Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
organisation objectives of the “information security incident management” clause 
 
Section (II): Organisation Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Business Continuity Management 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Organisation Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective (8): 
Information 
security 
aspects of 
business 
continuity 
management 
Including information security 
in the business continuity 
management process 
4 .22 
 
Business continuity and risk 
assessment 
4 .25 
Developing and implementing 
continuity plans including 
information security 
4 .17 
Business continuity planning 
framework 
4 .16 
Testing, maintaining and re-
assessing business continuity 
plans 
4 .2 
Indicator of use of Organisation security 
objective(8) =4*.22+4*.25+4*.17+4*.16+4*.2= 
4 
Figure B-2e Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
organisation objectives of the “business continuity management” clause 
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ISO/IEC 27002 Clauses / Objectives of 
Organisation Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
b w 
ISO 
Information 
Security 
Policy 
To provide management direction 
and support for information 
security in accordance with 
business requirements and relevant 
laws and regulations. 
3.84 1.0 
 
Indicator of compliance with ISO security policy 
(Organisation) =3.8*1.0 =3.8 
ISO 
Organisation 
of 
Information 
Security 
Internal organisation 3.49 .65 
 
External parties  3.66 .35 
Indicator of achievement of Organisation ISO 
Clause(1)= 3.4*.5+4*.5= 3.7 
ISO Assets 
Management 
Responsibility of assets 4 .6 
 
Information classification   4 .4 
Indicator of achievement of Organisation ISO 
Clause(2)= 4*.4+4*.6= 4 
ISO 
Information 
Security 
incident 
management 
 
Information security events and 
weaknesses   
2.22 .7 
 
Management of information 
security incidents and 
improvements 
2.62 .3 
Indicator of achievement of Organisation ISO 
Clause(3)= 2*.5+2.64*.5= 2.32 
ISO 
Business 
continuity 
management 
Information security aspects of 
business continuity management 
4 1 
 
Indicator of achievement of Organisation ISO 
Clause(4)= 4*1= 4 
Figure B-2f Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
organisation clauses, considering the results of Figures B-2a, B-2b, B-2c, B-2d and B-2e 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Clauses of Organisation 
Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
p w 
 
ISO 
Organisation 
security 
Information Security Policy 3.8 0.1 
 
Organization of Information 
Security 
3.7 0.2 
Assets Management 4 0.2 
Information Security incident 
management 
2.32 0.25 
Business Continuity 
Management 
4 0.25 
Indicator of conformance with Organisation 
domain = 
3.8*.1+3.7*.2+4*.2+2.32*.25+4*.25=3.5 
Figure B-2g Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of organisation domain, 
considering the results of Figure B-2f 
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Section (III): People Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Human resources security 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
People Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective (1): 
Prior to 
employment 
Roles and responsibilities 3.7 .36 
 
Screening 3.4 .31 
Terms and conditions of 
employment 
3 .33 
Indicator of use of Human resources security 
objective(1) =3.7*.36+3.4*.31+3*.33 =3.38 
Objective (2): 
During 
employment 
Management responsibilities 3.8 .36 
 
Information security 
awareness, education and 
training 
3.9 .32 
Disciplinary process 3.5 .32 
Indicator of use of  Human resources security 
objective(2) =3.8*.36+3.9*.32+3.5*.32=3.72 
Objective (3): 
Termination 
or change of 
employment 
Termination responsibilities 3.6 .34 
 
Return of assets 3.5 .33 
Removal of access rights 4 .33 
Indicator of use of  Human resources security 
objective (3) =3.6*.34+3.5*.33+4*.33=3.7 
Figure B-3a Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
people security objectives of the “human resources security” clause 
 
 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Clauses / Objectives of People 
Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
b w 
ISO 
Human 
Resources 
Security 
Prior to employment 3.38 .33 
 
During employment 3.72 .32 
Termination or change of 
employment 
3.70 .35 
Indicator of achievement of Human resources 
security objectives = 
 3.3*.3+4*.35*2=3.79 
Figure B-3b Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of ISO/IEC 27002 human 
resources clause, considering the results of Figure B-3a 
 
 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Clauses of People Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
p w 
ISO 
Human 
Resources 
Security 
Human Resources Security 3.79 1. 
 
Indicator of compliance with ISO Human 
resources security (people) =3.79*1.0 = 3.79 
Figure B-3c Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of people domain, 
considering the results of Figure B-3b 
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Section (IV): Environment Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Physical and environmental security 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Environment Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective 
(1): 
Secure 
areas 
Physical security perimeter 3.5 .19 
 
Physical entry controls 3.8 .17 
Securing offices, rooms and 
facilities 
0 .16 
Protection against external and 
environmental threats 
3.7 .17 
Working in secure areas 3.6 .16 
Public access, delivery and 
loading areas 
3.9 .15 
Indicator of use of  Environmental security 
objective(1) 
=3.5*.19+3.8*.17+0*.16+3.7*.17+3.6*.16+3.9*.15=3.
09 
Objective 
(2): 
Equipmen
t security 
Equipment sitting and protection 3.5 .14 
 
Supporting utilities 3.6 .15 
Cabling security 4 .15 
Equipment maintenance 3.5 .14 
Security of equipment off-
premises 
4 .15 
Secure disposal or re-use of 
equipment 
2 .14 
Removal of property 3.8 .13 
Indicator of use of  Environmental security objective 
(2) 
=3.5*.14+3.6*.15+4*.15+3.5*.14+4*.15+2*.14+3.8*.1
3= 3.48 
Figure B-4a Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
environmental security objectives of the “physical and environmental security” clause 
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Section (IV): Environment Domain 
ISO/IEC 27002 clause: Compliance 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objectives / Controls of 
Environment Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
c w 
Objective (3): 
Compliance 
with legal 
requirements 
Identification of applicable 
legislation 
3.8 .17 
 
Intellectual property rights 3.8 .17 
Protection of organisational 
records 
0 .16 
Data protection and privacy of 
personal information 
3.6 .16 
Prevention of misuse of 
information processing facilities 
4 .17 
Regulation of cryptographic 
controls 
4 .17 
Indicator of use of  Environmental security 
objective(3) =3.8*.17*2+0*.16+3.6*.16+4*.17*2= 
3.19 
Objective (4): 
Compliance 
with security 
policies, 
standards and 
technical 
compliance 
Compliance with security policies 
and standards 
0 .6 
 
Technical compliance checking 3.5 .4 
Indicator of use of  Environmental security 
objective (4)=0*.6+3.5*.4=1.75 
Objective (5): 
information 
systems audit 
considerations 
Information systems audit 
controls 
3.4 .6 
 
Protection of information systems 
audit tools 
4 .4 
Indicator of use of  Environmental security 
objective (5) =3.4*.6+4*.4= 3.64 
Figure B-4b Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
environmental security objectives of the “compliance” clause 
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ISO/IEC 27002 Clauses / Objectives of 
Environment Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
b w 
ISO 
Physical and 
Environmental 
security 
Secure areas 3.09 .47 
 
Equipment security 3.48 .53 
Indicator of achievement of Environmental 
ISO Part(1)=3.24*.6+3.8*.4=3.46 
ISO 
Compliance 
Compliance with legal 
requirements 
3.19 .33 
 
Compliance with security 
policies and standards 
1.75 .35 
Information system audit 
consideration 
3.64 .32 
Indicator of achievement of Environmental 
ISO Part(2)=2.4*.33+.1.6*.33+4*.33=2.64 
Figure B-4c Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
environmental security clauses considering the results of Figures B-4a, and B-4b 
 
 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 Clauses of Environment 
Domain  
Results 
Illustration of the Results 
p w 
ISO 
Environmental 
security 
Physical and 
environmental security 
3.46 0.5 
 
Compliance 2.64 0.5 
Indicator of compliance with ISO 
Environmental security (environment) = 
3.46*.5+2.64*.5=3.05 
Figure B-4d Sample Case study results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 27002 
environment domain considering the results of Figure B-4c 
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Domain 
Results 
Indicator 
d w (d*w) 
Technology 3.55 0.2 .71 
Overall TOPE s-readiness 
indicator: R = 3.55/4 
Organisation 3.6 0.2 .70 
People 3.79 0.2 .76 
Environment 3.05 0.2 .61 
Illustration of the Results 
 
Figure B-5 Sample case study results concerned with conformance  with TOPE domains 
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Appendix C 
DETAILED ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
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Table C-1 All case studies assessment results concerned with the achievement of the 
ISO/IEC 27002 security controls 
ISO/IEC 27002 Control W 
Assessment Scores – 
Controls Level  
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
1 Documented operating procedures .26 4.0 3.7 3.7 1.7 2.7 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.7 
2 Change management .25 4.0 3.2 3.6 2.0 2.6 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 
3 Segregation of duties .23 4.0 2.5 2.5 0.0 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
4 Separation of development, test, and operational facilities .26 3.0 3.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 
5 Service delivery .35 4.0 2.1 3.7 2.1 3.1 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.4 
6 Monitoring and review of third party services .34 4.0 2.8 4.0 2.3 3.3 4.0 3.5 3.8 4.0 
7 Managing changes to third party services .31 4.0 2.4 4.0 2.4 2.6 4.0 4.0 3.6 4.0 
8 Capacity management .45 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.4 3.0 0.0 3.7 3.7 
9 System acceptance .55 4.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 
10 Controls against malicious code .60 3.0 2.0 3.5 2.5 2.9 3.8 2.0 3.8 3.0 
11 Controls against mobile code .40 0.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 2.2 3.0 2.6 0.0 1.0 
12 Information back-up 1.0 4.0 2.2 3.5 2.0 2.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.6 
13 Network controls .55 4.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 
14 Security of network services .45 0.0 2.8 3.8 0.0 3.4 3.8 3.4 3.8 3.8 
15 Management of removable media .25 0.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 
16 Disposal of media .24 0.0 2.0 3.5 2.5 0.0 3.5 3.5 0.0 3.5 
17 Information handling procedures .26 0.0 2.6 3.6 2.4 2.6 4.0 4.0 3.4 3.6 
18 Security of system documentation .25 4.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 
19 Information exchange policies and procedures .20 4.0 2.2 3.8 0.0 2.8 3.8 0.0 3.8 3.4 
20 Exchange agreements .19 0.0 2.5 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
21 Physical media in transit .20 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 
22 Electronic messaging .22 4.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
23 Business information systems .19 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
24 Electronic commerce .31 0.0 2.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 
25 On-Line transactions .35 0.0 1.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 
26 Publicly available information .34 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 
27 Audit logging .16 4.0 2.2 4.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 4.0 3.6 4.0 
28 Monitoring system use .16 0.0 2.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 
29 Protection of log information .17 4.0 2.5 3.5 0.0 2.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
30 Administrator and operator logs .18 4.0 2.2 4.0 2.6 3.4 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.6 
31 Fault logging .18 4.0 1.6 3.4 2.6 2.1 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 
32 Clock synchronization .15 4.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 
33 Access control policy 1.0 0.0 4.0 3.7 2.4 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.7 3.7 
34 User registration .27 0.0 4.0 3.5 2.5 2.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
35 Privilege management .26 4.0 4.0 3.6 2.4 2.2 4.0 3.6 3.2 3.4 
36 User password management .24 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 
37 Review of user access rights .23 4.0 4.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 
38 Password use .34 4.0 4.0 3.5 0.0 2.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 
39 Unattended user equipment .34 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 
40 Clear desk and clear screen policy .32 4.0 4.0 3.5 2.5 2.5 4.0 3.5 2.5 3.5 
41 Policy on use of network services .15 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 
42 User authentication for external connections .16 4.0 4.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 
43 Equipment identification in networks .14 0.0 4.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 
44 Remote diagnostic and configuration port protection .15 0.0 4.0 3.4 2.6 2.6 4.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 
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45 Segregation in networks .14 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 
46 Network connection control .14 4.0 4.0 3.0 1.5 3.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 
47 Network routing control .12 4.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 
48 Secure log-on procedures .18 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.4 2.6 4.0 3.4 3.2 3.0 
49 User identification and authentication .16 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 1.7 4.0 3.7 3.0 3.3 
50 Password management system .19 0.0 4.0 3.5 0.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 
51 Use of system utilities .17 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.6 0.0 4.0 3.4 3.2 3.6 
52 Session time-out .15 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 
53 limitation of connection time .15 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 
54 Information access restriction .52 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 1.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
55 Sensitive system isolation .48 0.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 
56 Mobile computing and communications .55 0.0 4.0 3.4 0.0 3.6 4.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 
57 Teleworking policy for use .45 0.0 4.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 
58 Security requirements analysis and specification 1.0 4.0 1.6 4.0 1.6 2.5 4.0 3.6 3.5 4.0 
59 Input data validation .30 0.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 
60 Control of internal processing .20 0.0 1.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 
61 Message integrity .30 0.0 2.5 4.0 1.5 2.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
62 Output data validation .20 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 
63 Policy on the use of cryptographic controls .50 0.0 2.6 4.0 0.0 2.2 4.0 0.0 3.6 3.6 
64 Key management .50 0.0 2.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 2.5 3.5 
65 Control of operational software .33 4.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 
66 Protection of system test data .32 4.0 0.0 4.0 1.6 2.6 4.0 3.4 3.6 0.0 
67 Access control to program source code .35 4.0 2.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 
68 Change control procedures .20 3.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 
69 Review of applications after operating system changes .20 3.0 2.5 4.0 1.5 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 
70 Restrictions on changes to software packages .17 3.0 1.6 4.0 2.2 2.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 3.8 
71 Information leakage .23 3.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 
72 Outsourced software development .20 3.0 2.5 4.0 1.5 2.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
73 Control of technical vulnerabilities 1.0 0.0 1.8 4.0 2.4 2.2 4.0 3.8 3.2 3.8 
74 Information security policy document .60 0.0 3.0 3.3 0.0 2.8 3.5 1.0 3.3 4.0 
75 Review of the information security policy .40 0.0 2.4 4.0 1.6 0.0 3.0 1.0 3.4 3.6 
76 Management commitment to information security .14 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.3 3.8 4.0 3.3 3.8 
77 Information security co-ordination .12 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.5 3.5 4.0 2.5 3.5 
78 Allocation of information security responsibilities .14 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 2.6 3.6 
79 Authorisation process for information processing facilities .10 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.5 
80 Confidentiality agreements .10 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.4 3.6 4.0 2.0 2.0 
81 Contact with authorities .13 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.0 
82 Contact with special interest groups .15 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.6 3.9 4.0 2.0 3.7 
83 Independent review of information security .12 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 3.5 4.0 2.0 3.5 
84 Identification of risks related to external parties .35 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.6 4.0 4.0 2.0 3.6 
85 Addressing security when dealing with customers .35 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.4 3.6 4.0 2.4 3.6 
86 Addressing security in third party agreements .30 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.3 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.8 
87 Inventory of assets .35 0.0 4.0 4.0 2.2 4.0 4.0 3.4 3.4 4.0 
88 Ownership of assets .35 0.0 4.0 4.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 
89 Acceptable use of assets .30 0.0 4.0 4.0 2.4 4.0 4.0 3.4 3.4 4.0 
90 Classification guidelines .55 0.0 4.0 4.0 1.4 4.0 4.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 
91 Information labelling and handling .45 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 3.5 4.0 
92 Reporting information security events .60 0.0 2.9 4.0 0.0 2.6 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.7 
93 Reporting security weakness .40 0.0 2.6 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 0.0 
94 Responsibilities and procedures .38 4.0 2.6 4.0 0.0 2.4 4.0 3.8 0.0 3.4 
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95 Learning from information security incidents .35 4.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 
96 Collection of evidence .27 0.0 3.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
97 Including IS in the business continuity management process .22 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 2.4 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 
98 Business continuity and risk assessment .25 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 1.5 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 
99 Developing and implementing continuity plans including IS .17 0.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 1.5 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 
100 Business continuity planning framework .16 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 0.0 3.1 4.0 
101 Testing, maintaining and assessing business continuity plan .20 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 2.6 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 
102 Roles and responsibilities .36 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.7 
103 Screening .31 0.0 4.0 4.0 2.4 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.4 
104 Terms and conditions of employment .33 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 
105 Management responsibilities .36 3.3 4.0 4.0 1.8 2.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.8 
106 Information security awareness, education, and training .32 2.6 4.0 4.0 2.2 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 
107 Disciplinary process .32 0.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 
108 Termination responsibilities .34 3.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 2.4 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.6 
109 Return of assets .33 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 2.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 
110 Removal of access rights .33 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.6 2.2 40. 40. 4.0 4.0 
111 Physical security perimeter .19 0.0 2.3 4.0 2.0 3.3 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.5 
112 Physical entry controls .17 0.0 2.8 4.0 1.8 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.8 
113 Securing offices, rooms, and facilities .16 2.0 3.2 4.0 2.4 0.0 3.6 4.0 4.0 0.0 
114 Protection against external and environmental threats .17 4.0 3.3 4.0 2.7 0.0 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.7 
115 Working in secure areas .16 0.0 3.1 4.0 1.9 0.0 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.6 
116 Public access, delivery, and loading areas .15 0.0 2.4 4.0 2.4 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 
117 Equipment sitting and protection .14 4.0 2.5 4.0 1.5 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 
118 Supporting utilities .15 4.0 2.1 4.0 1.5 3.6 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.6 
119 Cabling security .15 4.0 1.4 4.0 2.0 2.6 3.4 4.0 4.0 4.0 
120 Equipment maintenance .14 4.0 3.5 4.0 1.5 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 
121 Security of equipment off-premises .15 4.0 2.0 4.0 0.0 1.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
122 Secure disposal or re-use of equipment .14 4.0 3.8 4.0 1.8 2.4 3.8 4.0 4.0 2.0 
123 Removal of property .13 2.0 2.5 4.0 1.8 2.3 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.8 
124 Identification of applicable legislation .17 4.0 3.4 4.0 1.8 2.0 3.6 0.0 3.8 3.8 
125 Intellectual property rights (IPR) .17 0.0 2.8 4.0 0.0 2.5 3.8 0.0 3.5 3.8 
126 Protection of organizational records .16 0.0 2.3 4.0 0.0 2.9 3.3 0.0 3.1 0.0 
127 Data protection and privacy of personal information .16 0.0 3.6 4.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 3.9 3.6 
128 Prevention of misuse of information processing facilities .17 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 
129 Regulation of cryptographic controls .17 2.0 3.2 4.0 1.8 2.8 3.8 0.0 0.0 3.8 
130 Compliance with security policies and standards .50 2.0 0.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 0.0 
131 Technical compliance checking .50 4.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
132 Information systems audit controls .60 0.0 3.4 4.0 2.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.6 3.4 
133 Protection of information systems audit tools .40 0.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 
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Table C-2 All case studies assessment results concerned with the achievement of the 
ISO/IEC 27002 security objectives 
ISO/IEC 27002 Objective W 
Assessment Scores – Objectives Level 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
1 Operational procedures and responsibilities  .08 3.7 3.1 3.5 .90 2.9 3.6 3.7 2.7 3.7 
2 Third party service delivery management  .07 4.0 2.4 3.9 2.2 3.0 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.8 
3 System planning and acceptance .09 4.0 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.0 3.6 1.9 3.6 3.9 
4 Protection against malicious and mobile code  .08 1.8 1.6 3.3 2.3 2.6 3.5 2.2 2.3 2.2 
5 Back-up .14 4.0 2.2 3.5 2.0 2.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.6 
6 Network security management .13 2.2 2.4 3.9 1.1 2.9 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.9 
7 Media handling  .10 1.0 2.4 3.8 2.5 1.4 3.9 3.6 1.9 3.8 
8 Exchange of information .10 1.7 2.4 3.5 .40 1.2 3.0 2.8 3.8 3.7 
9 Electronic commerce services  .09 0.0 1.0 4.0 0.0 2.1 3.7 0.0 2.3 3.7 
10 Monitoring .12 3.4 2.1 3.7 1.4 1.4 3.9 3.9 3.5 3.7 
11 Business requirements for access control  .13 0.0 4.0 3.7 2.4 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.7 3.7 
12 User access management  .15 2.9 4.0 3.3 2.0 2.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 
13 User responsibilities .14 4.0 4.0 3.7 1.5 2.3 4.0 3.7 2.8 3.7 
14 Network access control .15 2.8 4.0 3.4 1.4 2.4 4.0 3.6 2.9 3.8 
15 Operating system access control .14 2.0 4.0 3.9 0.5 1.9 4.0 3.4 3.2 3.6 
16 Application and information access control  .15 2.1 4.0 4.0 2.7 2.2 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.7 
17 Mobile computing and teleworking .14 0.0 4.0 3.5 0.0 2.0 4.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 
18 Security requirement of information systems .18 4.0 1.6 4.0 1.6 2.5 4.0 3.6 3.5 4.0 
19 Correct processing in applications .16 0.0 1.6 4.0 1.5 2.5 4.0 3.9 3.2 3.7 
20 Cryptographic controls  .19 0.0 2.3 4.0 0.0 1.1 4.0 0.0 3.1 3.6 
21 Security of system files .17 4.0 1.7 4.0 1.2 2.9 4.0 3.8 3.2 2.7 
22 Security in development & support processes  .15 3.0 2.1 4.0 1.8 2.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 3.7 
23 Technical vulnerability management .15 0.0 1.8 4.0 2.4 2.2 4.0 3.8 3.2 3.8 
24 Information security policy  1.0 0.0 2.8 3.6 0.6 1.7 3.3 1.0 3.2 3.8 
25 Internal organisation .65 0.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.7 3.7 4.0 2.6 3.5 
26 External parties .35 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.4 3.3 4.0 2.1 3.7 
27 Responsibility of assets  .60 0.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.4 3.4 4.0 
28 Information classification .40 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.8 4.0 4.0 0.0 2.7 4.0 
29 Reporting information security events and 
weaknesses 
.70 0.0 2.8 4.0 0.0 1.6 4.0 3.4 4.0 2.2 
30 Management of information security incidents 
and improvements 
.30 2.9 1.8 4.0 0.0 0.9 4.0 2.8 0.0 2.6 
31 Information security aspects of business 
continuity management 
1.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.6 2.0 4.0 0.0 0.5 4.0 
32 Prior to employment: “Employees, Contractors 
and Third party users”  
.33 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.7 0.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.4 
33 During employment: “Employees, Contractors 
and Third party users”  
.32 2.0 4.0 4.0 2.1 1.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.7 
34 
Termination or change of employment: 
“Employees, Contractors and Third party 
users” 
.35 3.3 4.0 4.0 1.2 2.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.7 
35 Secure areas .47 1.0 2.8 4.0 2.2 1.2 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.1 
36 Equipment security .53 3.7 2.5 4.0 1.4 2.6 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.5 
37 Compliance with legal requirements  .33 1.4 3.0 4.0 1.0 2.2 3.7 0.0 2.9 3.2 
38 Compliance with security policies and 
standards, and technical compliance 
.35 3.0 1.5 4.0 2.0 1.3 3.5 3.3 3.5 1.8 
39 Information systems audit considerations .32 0.0 3.3 4.0 2.0 0.9 3.9 0.0 3.5 3.6 
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Table C-3 All case studies assessment results concerned with the achievement of the 
ISO/IEC 27002 security clauses 
ISO/IEC 27002 Clause W 
Assessment Scores –Clause Level 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
T
 
10 
Communications and Operations 
Management 
.40 2.6 2.2 3.6 1.5 2.2 3.7 3.0 3.2 3.6 
11 Access Control .35 2.0 4.0 3.6 1.5 2.0 4.0 2.6 3.2 3.0 
12 
Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance  
.25 1.9 1.8 4.0 1.4 2.2 4.0 3.0 3.2 3.6 
O
 
5 Security Policy .20 0.0 2.8 3.6 0.6 1.7 3.3 1.0 3.3 3.8 
6 Organisation of Information Security .25 1.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.9 3.6 4.0 2.5 3.6 
7 Asset Management .25 0.0 4.0 4.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 2.1 3.1 4.0 
13 Information Security Incident Management .15 0.9 2.5 4.0 0.0 1.4 4.0 3.2 2.8 2.3 
14 Business Continuity Management .15 0.0 4.0 4.0 0.6 2.0 4.0 0.0 0.5 4.0 
P
 8 Human Resources Security 1.0 1.8 4.0 4.0 1.3 1.4 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.6 
E
 
9 Physical and Environmental Security .55 2.5 2.7 4.0 1.8 2.0 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.3 
15 Compliance .45 1.5 2.6 4.0 1.7 1.5 3.7 1.1 3.3 2.8 
 
 
Table C-4 All case studies assessment results concerned with the achievement of the 
EISRM TOPE domains 
TOPE Domain W 
Assessment Score – domains Level 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
1 Technology 0.50 2.2 2.8 3.7 1.5 2.1 3.9 2.9 3.2 3.4 
2 Organisation 0.25 0.6 3.5 3.9 1.6 2.3 3.8 2.2 2.6 3.6 
3 People 0.10 1.8 4.0 4.0 1.3 1.4 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.6 
4 Environment 0.15 2.0 2.6 4.0 1.7 1.7 3.7 2.7 3.9 3.1 
TOPE s-readiness 
Of 4 1.7 3.1 3.8 1.5 2.0 3.9 2.8 3.2 3.4 
% 43 78 95 38 50 96 70 80 85 
% Achieving Essential Controls 0 100 100 0 67 100 0 100 67 
% Achieving Common Controls 25 88 100 44 69 100 63 56 94 
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Technology Domain 
(ISO/IEC 27002 – clause level) 
 
Group "A" Financial Sector 
  
 
Bank-E2 Bank-E9  
Group "B" Public Sector 
   
Government-E4 Government-E7 Government-E 8 
Group "C" Private Sector 
   
Company-E1 Company-E3 Company-E5 
 
  
Company-E6   
Figure C-1 All case studies results concerned with the achievement of the 
ISO/IEC27002 technical security objectives (Technology Domain) 
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Organisation Domain 
(ISO/IEC 27002 – clause level) 
 
Group "A" Financial Sector 
  
 
Bank-E2 Bank-E9  
Group "B" Public Sector 
   
Government-E4 Government-E7 Government-E8 
Group "C" Private Sector 
   
Company-E1 Company-E3 Company-E5 
 
  
Company-E6   
Figure C-2 All case studies results concerned with the achievement of the 
ISO/IEC27002 organisation security objective (Organisation Domain) 
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People Domain 
(ISO/IEC 27002 – clause level) 
 
Group "A" Financial Sector 
  
 
Bank-E2 Bank-E9  
Group "B" Public Sector 
   
Government-E4 Government-E7 Government-E8 
Group "C" Private Sector 
   
Company-E1 Company-E3 Company-E5 
 
  
Company-E6   
Figure C-3 All case studies results concerned with the achievement of the 
ISO/IEC27002 human security objective (People Domain) 
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Environment Domain 
(ISO/IEC 27002 – clause level) 
 
Group "A" Financial Sector 
  
 
bank2 bank9  
Group "B" Public Sector 
   
Government-E4 Government-E7 Government-E8 
Group "C" Private Sector 
   
Company-E1 Company-E3 Company-E5 
 
  
Company-E6   
Figure C-4 All case studies results concerned with the achievement of the ISO/IEC 
27002 environment security objectives (Environment Domain) 
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Appendix D 
EISRM ASSESSMENT TOOL 
 
The following tool is developed using “Access Software” and “C #” to help in 
evaluating enterprises according to the EISRM assessment model presented 
in the thesis. The tool is still in its early stages and the plan is to enhance this 
tool in the near future to help enterprises in conducting risk management 
according to EISRM framework. The tool in its form now is only concerned with 
the EISRM information security assessment model. The tool is designed to 
receive the input data from the users and conducts the required calculations.. 
The tool presents the results in printed reports. This appendix serves as a 
guide in installing and getting started with the EISRM prototype tool. 
D.1 Installation Requirements  
The following minimum system requirements should be met in order to run the 
EISRM information security assessment prototype tool. 
 A Pentium IV 1.4 MHz or better processor. 
 1GB RAM. 
 Microsoft Windows 2000/XP/Vista. 
D.2 Installing the EISRM Tool  
The EISRM prototype tool is included with the research CD in “ZIP” format. 
Once the user copies it on his PC he could extract it then start the installation 
according to the following steps.  
 Extracting the EISRM tool. 
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o Create a temporary folder on the hard drive of your computer and 
call it, for example, C:\temp. 
o Copy the “EISRM Assessment tool” file from the CD to the hard 
drive of your computer into the C:\temp folder. 
 Installing the EISRM tool 
o Double click on the “C:\temp\EISRM Assessment tool” file  
o Click on OK button. The EISRM tool software should open  
o The installation software will automatically create the 
C:\Doucument\user\topeCompliance” subfolder on your 
computer’s hard drive. 
The EISRM prototype tool software installation procedure is now completed 
successfully.  
D.3 Source Code of the EISRM Tool  
The EISRM prototype tool is developed using Microsoft Access 2003. The 
interface for the EISRM prototype tool source code is written in Microsoft “C#”. 
The source code is presented in the following  
D.3.1  Source Code of the Initialization Part  
1. Open The Connection 
2. Fill The Measure & Importance lists 
private void Interface_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            string ConnectionSTR = 
"Provider=Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0;"+"Data Source= " 
            +Application.StartupPath + "\\complianceModel.mdb"; 
            objConnection = new OleDbConnection(ConnectionSTR); 
            try  
            { 
                //Open The Connection 
                objConnection.Open(); 
            } 
            catch  
            { 
                    Exception Exp = new Exception() ; 
                    MessageBox.Show(Exp.Message); 
                    this.Close(); 
                    return; 
             } 
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             FillCMb(); 
             pnlNavStrategy_Click(sender,e); 
        } 
 
        private void FillCMb() 
        { 
            measureArr = new string[5]; 
            measureArr[0] = "0-None"; 
            measureArr[1] = "1-Poor"; 
            measureArr[2] = "2-Average"; 
            measureArr[3] = "3-Good"; 
            measureArr[4] = "4-Excellent"; 
            cmbMeasure.Items.Clear(); 
            { 
                for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) 
                    cmbMeasure.Items.Add(measureArr[i]); 
            } 
            importanceArr = new string[5]; 
            importanceArr[0] = "1-None"; 
            importanceArr[1] = "2-Low"; 
            importanceArr[2] = "3-Moderate"; 
            importanceArr[3] = "4-Important"; 
            importanceArr[4] = "5-veryImportant"; 
            cmbImportance.Items.Clear(); 
            { 
                for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) 
                { 
                    cmbImportance.Items.Add(importanceArr[i]); 
                    cmbSImportance.Items.Add(importanceArr[i]); 
                    cmbTImportance.Items.Add(importanceArr[i]); 
                    cmbOImportance.Items.Add(importanceArr[i]); 
                    cmbEImportance.Items.Add(importanceArr[i]); 
                    cmbPImportance.Items.Add(importanceArr[i]); 
                } 
            } 
        } 
D.3.2  Source Code of the Functions Part  
1. Load Parts into the tree view 
2. Load parts into the list view 
3. Calculate measure of apart from its objectives 
4. Flush measure & weight of parts into database 
private void LoadParts(int DomainID, TreeNode DNode) 
        { 
            int count = 0; 
            objPartsCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objPartsCommand.CommandText = "Usp_SelectParts"; 
            objPartsCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objPartsCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objPartsCommand.Parameters.Add("@DomainID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = DomainID; 
            objPartsReader = objPartsCommand.ExecuteReader();   
            while (objPartsReader.Read()) 
            { 
                count++; 
                // objPartsReader[1] refers to part Name 
                DNode.Nodes.Add(objPartsReader[1].ToString()); 
                int PartID = Convert.ToInt32(objPartsReader[0]); 
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                DNode.Nodes[count - 1].Tag = PartID; 
                LoadObjectives(PartID, DNode.Nodes[count - 1]); 
            } 
            objPartsReader.Dispose(); 
            objPartsCommand.Dispose(); 
        } 
        private void LoadPartsList(int DomainID) 
        { 
            int Count = 0; 
            grbParent.Text = tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Text; 
            objPartsCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objPartsCommand.CommandText = "Usp_SelectParts"; 
            objPartsCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objPartsCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objPartsCommand.Parameters.Add("@DomainID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = DomainID; 
            objPartsReader = objPartsCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
            while (objPartsReader.Read()) 
            { 
                Count++; 
                // objMeasuresReader[1] refers to Measure Name 
                lvwQuestions.Items.Add(objPartsReader[1].ToString()); 
                int PartID = Convert.ToInt32(objPartsReader["ID"]); 
                int Importance = 
Convert.ToInt32(objPartsReader["Weight"]); 
                int Measure = 
Convert.ToInt32(CalculatePartlMeasure(PartID)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 1].Tag = 
PartID.ToString(); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 
1].SubItems.Add(GetMeasure(Measure)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 
1].SubItems.Add(GetImportance(Importance)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 1].SubItems.Add("Part" + 
Count.ToString());  
            } 
            lvwQuestions.Items[0].Selected = true; 
            lblQuestion.Text = lvwQuestions.Items[0].Text; 
            lblQuestion.Tag = lvwQuestions.Items[0].Tag; 
            objPartsReader.Dispose(); 
            objPartsCommand.Dispose(); 
        } 
        private double CalculatePartlMeasure(int PartID) 
        { 
            int Count = 0; 
            double ImportanceSum = 0, MeasureSum = 0; 
            objObjectivesCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objObjectivesCommand.CommandText = 
"Usp_SelectObjectives"; 
            objObjectivesCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Parameters.Add("@PartID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = PartID; 
            objObjectivesReader = 
objObjectivesCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
            while (objObjectivesReader.Read()) 
            { 
                Count++; 
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                int Importance = 
Convert.ToInt32(objObjectivesReader["Weight"]); 
                int Measure = 
Convert.ToInt32(objObjectivesReader["Measure"]); 
                ImportanceSum += Importance; 
                MeasureSum += Measure * Importance; 
            } 
            double dblMeasure = MeasureSum / ImportanceSum; 
            objObjectivesReader.Dispose(); 
            objObjectivesCommand.Dispose(); 
            return (Math.Round(dblMeasure)); 
        } 
        private void FlushParts(int ID, int Measure, int Importance) 
        { 
            objPartsCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objPartsCommand.CommandText = "Usp_UpdateParts"; 
            objPartsCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objPartsCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objPartsCommand.Parameters.Add("@Measure", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = Measure; 
            objPartsCommand.Parameters.Add("@Weight", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = Importance; 
            objPartsCommand.Parameters.Add("@ID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = ID; 
            int rowsAffected = objPartsCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
            if (rowsAffected != 1) 
                MessageBox.Show(""); 
            objPartsCommand.Dispose(); 
        } 
D.3.2.1 Source Code of the Objectives Functions  
Objectives Functions Part 
1. Load Objectives into the tree view 
2. Load Objectives into the list view 
3. Calculate measure of an Objective from its objectives 
4. Flush measure & weight of objectives into database 
 
private void LoadObjectives(int PartID, TreeNode PartNode) 
        { 
            int count = 0; 
            objObjectivesCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objObjectivesCommand.CommandText = 
"Usp_SelectObjectives"; 
            objObjectivesCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Parameters.Add("@PartID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = PartID; 
            objObjectivesReader = 
objObjectivesCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
            while (objObjectivesReader.Read()) 
            { 
                count++; 
                // objObjectivesReader[1] refers to Objective Name 
PartNode.Nodes.Add(objObjectivesReader[1].ToString()); 
                int ObjectiveID = 
Convert.ToInt32(objObjectivesReader[0]); 
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                PartNode.Nodes[count - 1].Tag = ObjectiveID; 
                LoadControls(ObjectiveID, PartNode.Nodes[count - 1]); 
            } 
            objObjectivesReader.Dispose(); 
            objObjectivesCommand.Dispose(); 
        } 
        private void LoadObjectivesList(int PartID) 
        { 
            int Count = 0; 
            grbParent.Text = tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Text; 
            objObjectivesCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objObjectivesCommand.CommandText = 
"Usp_SelectObjectives"; 
            objObjectivesCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Parameters.Add("@PartID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = PartID; 
            objObjectivesReader = 
objObjectivesCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
            while (objObjectivesReader.Read()) 
            { 
                Count++; 
                // objMeasuresReader[1] refers to Measure Name 
lvwQuestions.Items.Add(objObjectivesReader[1].ToString()); 
                int ObjectiveID = 
Convert.ToInt32(objObjectivesReader["ID"]); 
                int Importance = 
Convert.ToInt32(objObjectivesReader["Weight"]); 
                int Measure = 
Convert.ToInt32(CalculateObjectivelMeasure(ObjectiveID)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 1].Tag = 
ObjectiveID.ToString(); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 
1].SubItems.Add(GetMeasure(Measure)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 
1].SubItems.Add(GetImportance(Importance)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 1].SubItems.Add("Obj" + 
Count.ToString());  
 
            } 
            lvwQuestions.Items[0].Selected = true; 
            lblQuestion.Text = lvwQuestions.Items[0].Text; 
            lblQuestion.Tag = lvwQuestions.Items[0].Tag; 
            objObjectivesReader.Dispose(); 
            objObjectivesCommand.Dispose(); 
        } 
        private double CalculateObjectivelMeasure(int ObjectiveID) 
        { 
            int Count = 0; 
            double ImportanceSum = 0, MeasureSum = 0; 
            objControlsCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objControlsCommand.CommandText = "Usp_SelectControls"; 
            objControlsCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objControlsCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objControlsCommand.Parameters.Add("@ObjectiveID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = ObjectiveID; 
            objControlsReader = objControlsCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
            while (objControlsReader.Read()) 
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            { 
                Count++; 
                int Importance = 
Convert.ToInt32(objControlsReader["Weight"]); 
                int Measure = 
Convert.ToInt32(objControlsReader["Measure"]); 
                ImportanceSum += Importance; 
                MeasureSum += Measure * Importance; 
            } 
            double dblMeasure = MeasureSum / ImportanceSum; 
            objControlsReader.Dispose(); 
            objControlsCommand.Dispose(); 
            return (Math.Round(dblMeasure)); 
        } 
        private void FlushObjectives(int ID, int Measure, int 
Importance) 
        { 
            objObjectivesCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objObjectivesCommand.CommandText = 
"Usp_UpdateObjectives"; 
            objObjectivesCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Parameters.Add("@Measure", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = Measure; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Parameters.Add("@Weight", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = Importance; 
            objObjectivesCommand.Parameters.Add("@ID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = ID; 
            int rowsAffected = 
objObjectivesCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
            if (rowsAffected != 1) 
                MessageBox.Show(""); 
            objObjectivesCommand.Dispose(); 
D.3.2.2 Source Code of the Controls Functions  
1. Load Controls into the tree view 
2. Load Controls into the list view 
3. Calculate measure of a Control from its objectives 
4. Flush measure & weight of controls into database 
private void LoadControls(int ObjectiveID, TreeNode ObjectiveNode) 
        { 
            int count = 0; 
            objControlsCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objControlsCommand.CommandText = "Usp_SelectControls"; 
            objControlsCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objControlsCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objControlsCommand.Parameters.Add("@ObjectiveID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = ObjectiveID; 
            objControlsReader = objControlsCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
            while (objControlsReader.Read()) 
            { 
                count++; 
                // objControlsReader[1] refers to Control Name 
ObjectiveNode.Nodes.Add(objControlsReader[1].ToString()); 
                int ControlID = 
Convert.ToInt32(objControlsReader[0]); 
                ObjectiveNode.Nodes[count - 1].Tag = ControlID; 
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            } 
            if (listpopulated < 1) 
            { 
                tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = ObjectiveNode.Nodes[0]; 
                tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Expand(); 
            } 
            objControlsReader.Dispose(); 
            objControlsCommand.Dispose(); 
        } 
        private void LoadControlsList(int ObjectiveID) 
        { 
            int Count = 0; 
            grbParent.Text = tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Text; 
            objControlsCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objControlsCommand.CommandText = "Usp_SelectControls"; 
            objControlsCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objControlsCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objControlsCommand.Parameters.Add("@ObjectiveID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = ObjectiveID; 
            objControlsReader = objControlsCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
            while (objControlsReader.Read()) 
            { 
                Count++; 
                // objMeasuresReader[1] refers to Measure Name 
lvwQuestions.Items.Add(objControlsReader[1].ToString()); 
                int ControlID = 
Convert.ToInt32(objControlsReader["ID"]); 
                int Importance = 
Convert.ToInt32(objControlsReader["Weight"]); 
                int Measure = 
Convert.ToInt32(CalculateControlMeasure(ControlID)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 1].Tag = 
ControlID.ToString(); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 
1].SubItems.Add(GetMeasure(Measure)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 
1].SubItems.Add(GetImportance(Importance)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 1].SubItems.Add("C" + 
Count.ToString());  
            } 
            lvwQuestions.Items[0].Selected = true; 
            lblQuestion.Text = lvwQuestions.Items[0].Text; 
            lblQuestion.Tag = lvwQuestions.Items[0].Tag; 
            objControlsReader.Dispose(); 
            objControlsCommand.Dispose(); 
        } 
        private void FlushControl(int ID, int Measure, int 
Importance) 
        { 
            objControlsCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objControlsCommand.CommandText = "Usp_UpdateControls"; 
            objControlsCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objControlsCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objControlsCommand.Parameters.Add("@Measure", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = Measure; 
            objControlsCommand.Parameters.Add("@Weight", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = Importance; 
            objControlsCommand.Parameters.Add("@ID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = ID; 
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            int rowsAffected = objControlsCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
            if (rowsAffected != 1) 
                MessageBox.Show(""); 
            objControlsCommand.Dispose(); 
        } 
        private double CalculateControlMeasure(int ControlID) 
        { 
            int Count = 0; 
            double ImportanceSum = 0, MeasureSum = 0; 
            objMeasuresCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objMeasuresCommand.CommandText = "Usp_SelectMeasures"; 
            objMeasuresCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objMeasuresCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objMeasuresCommand.Parameters.Add("@ControlID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = ControlID; 
            objMeasuresReader = objMeasuresCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
            while (objMeasuresReader.Read()) 
            { 
                Count++; 
                int Importance = 
Convert.ToInt32(objMeasuresReader["Weight"]); 
                int Measure = 
Convert.ToInt32(objMeasuresReader["Measure"]); 
                ImportanceSum += Importance; 
                MeasureSum += Measure * Importance; 
            } 
            double dblMeasure = MeasureSum / ImportanceSum; 
            objMeasuresReader.Dispose(); 
            objMeasuresCommand.Dispose(); 
            return (Math.Round(dblMeasure));} 
D.3.2.3 Source Code of the Measures Functions  
5. Load Measures into the list view 
6. Flush measure & weight of Measures into database 
private void LoadMeasures(int ControlID, TreeNode ControlNode) 
        { 
            listpopulated++; 
            int Count = 0; 
            tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = ControlNode; 
            tvwPFactors.Focus(); 
            grbParent.Text = ControlNode.Text; 
            objMeasuresCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objMeasuresCommand.CommandText = "Usp_SelectMeasures"; 
            objMeasuresCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objMeasuresCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objMeasuresCommand.Parameters.Add("@ControlID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value 
                                        = ControlID; 
            objMeasuresReader = objMeasuresCommand.ExecuteReader(); 
            while (objMeasuresReader.Read()) 
            { 
                Count++; 
                // objMeasuresReader[1] refers to Measure Name 
lvwQuestions.Items.Add(objMeasuresReader[1].ToString()); 
                int MeasureID = 
Convert.ToInt32(objMeasuresReader["ID"]); 
                int Importance = 
Convert.ToInt32(objMeasuresReader["Weight"]); 
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                int Measure = 
Convert.ToInt32(objMeasuresReader["Measure"]); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 1].Tag = 
MeasureID.ToString(); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 
1].SubItems.Add(GetMeasure(Measure)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 
1].SubItems.Add(GetImportance(Importance)); 
                lvwQuestions.Items[Count - 1].SubItems.Add("M" + 
Count.ToString());  
            } 
            lvwQuestions.Items[0].Selected = true; 
            lblQuestion.Text = lvwQuestions.Items[0].Text; 
            lblQuestion.Tag = lvwQuestions.Items[0].Tag; 
            objMeasuresReader.Dispose(); 
            objMeasuresCommand.Dispose(); 
        } 
        private void FlushMeasure(int ID, int Measure, int 
Importance) 
        { 
            objMeasuresCommand = new OleDbCommand(); 
            objMeasuresCommand.CommandText = "Usp_UpdateMeasures"; 
            objMeasuresCommand.CommandType = 
CommandType.StoredProcedure; 
            objMeasuresCommand.Connection = objConnection; 
            objMeasuresCommand.Parameters.Add("@Measure", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = Measure; 
            objMeasuresCommand.Parameters.Add("@Weight", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = Importance; 
            objMeasuresCommand.Parameters.Add("@ID", 
OleDbType.Integer).Value = ID; 
            int rowsAffected = objMeasuresCommand.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
            if (rowsAffected != 1) 
                MessageBox.Show(""); 
            objMeasuresCommand.Dispose();} 
D.3.2.4 Source Code of Saving & Navigation Functions  
private void Save() 
        { 
            int NoOfMeasures = lvwQuestions.Items.Count; 
            if (tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Level == 0) 
            { 
                for (int i = 0; i < NoOfMeasures; i++) 
                { 
                    int ID = 
Convert.ToInt32(lvwQuestions.Items[i].Tag); 
                    int imp = 
GetNumericImportance(lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[2].Text); 
                    int mea = 
GetNumericMeasure(lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[1].Text); 
                    FlushParts(ID, mea, imp); 
                     
                } 
                Navigate(); 
            } 
            else if (tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Level == 1) 
            { 
                for (int i = 0; i < NoOfMeasures; i++) 
                { 
                    int ID = 
Convert.ToInt32(lvwQuestions.Items[i].Tag); 
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                    int imp = 
GetNumericImportance(lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[2].Text); 
                    int mea = 
GetNumericMeasure(lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[1].Text); 
                    FlushObjectives(ID, mea, imp); 
                } 
                Navigate(); 
            } 
            else if (tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Level == 2) 
            { 
                for (int i = 0; i < NoOfMeasures; i++) 
                { 
                    int ID = 
Convert.ToInt32(lvwQuestions.Items[i].Tag); 
                    int imp = 
GetNumericImportance(lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[2].Text); 
                    int mea = 
GetNumericMeasure(lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[1].Text); 
                    FlushControl(ID, mea, imp); 
                } 
                Navigate();  
            } 
            else if (tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Level == 3) 
            { 
                for (int i = 0; i < NoOfMeasures; i++) 
                { 
                    int ID = 
Convert.ToInt32(lvwQuestions.Items[i].Tag); 
                    int imp = 
GetNumericImportance(lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[2].Text); 
                    int mea = 
GetNumericMeasure(lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[1].Text); 
                    FlushMeasure(ID, mea, imp); 
                } 
                Navigate(); 
            } 
        } 
        private bool CheckData(int NoOfMeasures) 
        { 
            for (int i = 0; i < NoOfMeasures; i++) 
            { 
                if (lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[1].Text == "null" 
|| 
                   lvwQuestions.Items[i].SubItems[2].Text == "null") 
                    return false; 
            } 
            return true; 
        } 
private void Navigate() 
        { 
            TreeNode MyNode; 
            tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.ForeColor = Color.Black;   
            if (tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Level == 0) 
            { 
                MyNode = tvwPFactors.SelectedNode; 
                MessageBox.Show("Parts Completed"); 
            } 
            if (tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Level == 1) 
            { 
                MyNode = tvwPFactors.SelectedNode; 
                if (MyNode == MyNode.Parent.LastNode) 
                { 
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                    MessageBox.Show("Objectives Completed"); 
                    lblSteps.Text = "Step 4: Parts"; 
                    //tvwPFactors.CollapseAll(); 
                    tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = tvwPFactors.Nodes[0]; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = MyNode.NextNode; 
                    tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Parent.Expand(); 
                } 
            } 
            if (tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Level == 2) 
            { 
                MyNode = tvwPFactors.SelectedNode; 
                if (MyNode == MyNode.Parent.LastNode) 
                { 
                    MyNode = MyNode.Parent; 
                    if (MyNode == MyNode.Parent.LastNode) 
                    { 
                        MessageBox.Show("Controls Completed"); 
                        lblSteps.Text = "Step 3: Objectives"; 
                        tvwPFactors.CollapseAll(); 
                        tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = 
tvwPFactors.Nodes[0].Nodes[0]; 
 
                    } 
                    else 
                        tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = 
MyNode.NextNode.Nodes[0]; 
                } 
                else 
                    tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = MyNode.NextNode; 
                tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Parent.Expand(); 
            } 
            if (tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Level == 3) 
            { 
                MyNode = tvwPFactors.SelectedNode; 
                if (MyNode.NextNode == MyNode.LastNode) 
                { 
                    MyNode = MyNode.Parent; 
                    if (MyNode == MyNode.Parent.LastNode) 
                    { 
                        MyNode = MyNode.Parent; 
                        if (MyNode == MyNode.Parent.LastNode) 
                        { 
                            MessageBox.Show("Measures Completed"); 
                            lblSteps.Text = "Step 2: Controls"; 
                            tvwPFactors.CollapseAll(); 
                            tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = 
tvwPFactors.Nodes[0].Nodes[0].Nodes[0]; 
                        } 
                        else 
                            tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = 
MyNode.NextNode.Nodes[0].Nodes[0]; 
                    } 
                    else 
                        tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = 
MyNode.NextNode.Nodes[0]; 
                } 
                else 
                    tvwPFactors.SelectedNode = MyNode.NextNode; 
                tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Parent.Expand();} 
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            tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Checked = true;} 
D.3.2.5 Source Code of the Charts  
private void CreateChart() 
        { 
            // Set the chart type 
            chart1.Type = ChartType.Radars; 
            // Set the size 
            //chart1.Width = 600; 
            //chart1.Height = 350; 
            // Set the temp directory 
            chart1.TempDirectory = "temp"; 
            // Debug mode. ( Will show generated errors if any ) 
            chart1.Debug = true; 
            chart1.Title = ""; 
 
            chart1.TitleBox.Position = 
TitleBoxPosition.FullWithLegend; 
            chart1.DefaultSeries.Type = SeriesType.Line; 
            chart1.DefaultElement.Marker.Size = 10; 
            // *DYNAMIC DATA NOTE*  
            // This sample uses random data to populate the chart. To 
populate  
            // a chart with database data see the following 
resources: 
            // - Classic samples folder 
            // - Help File > Data Tutorials 
            // - Sample: features/DataEngine.aspx 
            SeriesCollection mySC = getMeasureData(); 
            // Add the random data. 
            chart1.SeriesCollection.Clear();   
            chart1.SeriesCollection.Add(mySC); 
        } 
        SeriesCollection getMeasureData() 
        { 
            SeriesCollection SC = new SeriesCollection(); 
            Random myR = new Random(1); 
                Series s = new Series(); 
                s.Name = tvwPFactors.SelectedNode.Text; 
                for (int b = 0; b < lvwQuestions.Items.Count; b++) 
                { 
                    Element e = new Element(); 
                    e.Name = lvwQuestions.Items[b].SubItems[3].Text; 
                    e.YValue = 
GetNumericMeasure(lvwQuestions.Items[b].SubItems[1].Text); 
                    s.Elements.Add(e); 
                } 
                SC.Add(s); 
            // Set Different Colors for our Series 
            SC[0].DefaultElement.Color = Color.Red; 
            //SC[2].DefaultElement.Color = Color.FromArgb(255,99,49); 
            //SC[3].DefaultElement.Color = Color.FromArgb(0,156,255); 
 
            return SC;} 
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D.4 Running the EISRM Tool  
When the EISRM prototype is loaded, it presents the user with a GUI, as 
shown in Figure D-1. Input screens for the personal, business, and TOPE/ISO 
domains are shown in Figures D-2, D-3 and D-4 respectively. 
Figure D-1 EISRM tool - Input screen for the “Personal Profile” 
 
Figure D-2 EISRM tool - Input screen for the “Business Profile” 
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Figure D-3 EISRM tool - Input screen for the TOPE domains 
 
The EISRM prototype tool could be used in printing reports. The user of the 
tool could use these reports for presenting the results in numerically and 
graphically. Figure D-4 shows an example for the types of reports. 
Figure D-4 EISRM tool – Example of reports for the TOPE domains 
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